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Abstract. This thesis examines a range of cases in which it appears one’s rights against 
harm are violated by another’s behaviour, even though this behaviour has done one 
no harm. Call these cases of harmless wronging. These cases raise a serious problem 
for most theories of rights, though the problem is most pronounced on the Interest 
Theory of Rights. According to that theory, rights necessarily protect their holder’s 
wellbeing. At first glance, one might think that the person’s wellbeing cannot be said 
to be protected by the right in cases of harmless wronging because they are not 
harmed in such cases—so, the necessary condition set for the ascription of a right is 
not satisfied. I offer a novel, welfare-based explanation of why we have rights against 
harmless wrongs, the Safety Condition. This holds that for someone to hold a right 
against us that we not perform some action, we look to whether our performing that 
action could easily leave them sufficiently worse off to place us under a duty. In 
addition to extensional accuracy, one reason for this focus on modality—on what 
might have been—is that it removes an objectionable form of luck from rights. And, 
it matters that rights do not depend on luck in this objectionable way for this re-
quires that we, as duty-bearers, are sensitive to others’ wellbeing: that we do not 
only not harm others, but that we could not easily have harmed them. 
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1. Introduction 
1. Why Rights? 
Rights are important. They are rhetorically important. Often, public debate is held in the 
language of rights. The debate tends not to be whether people may use the bathroom of 
the gender with which they identify, but whether they have the right to do so. Rights are 
also important for non-rhetorical reasons. They are often taken to offer a particularly 
robust protection against certain forms of conduct. For example, they are taken to place 
constraints on promoting the good. Plausibly, it is impermissible to kill a healthy patient 
in order to donate their organs to save five sick patients, even when doing so would max-
imise the good. A typical explanation for this verdict is that the healthy patient has a right 
against being killed that cannot be overridden by the mere fact that killing the patient 
would bring about more good. In this way, rights are often seen as imposing side-con-
straints on others’ behaviour, as ‘trumps’ over other types of considerations, as providing 
others with ‘exclusionary reasons’, and so on.1 
Rights are also non-rhetorically important because of their underlying deontic structure. 
The focus of this thesis is primarily on the paradigm form of rights, the claim-right. Claim-
rights correlate with duties. We get more precise below, but the idea is that I have a claim-
right that you not kill me just in case you are under a duty not to kill me.2 However, this 
duty is not just any sort of duty. It is a directed duty. Some duties are undirected—they are 
not owed to anyone in particular. For example, some people think that duties of benefi-
cence and duties to care for the environment are undirected.3 Some duties are directed—
they are owed to particular parties. When I promise my friend something, I am under a 
duty to satisfy the promise. The promissory duty is directed towards, owed to, my friend. 
 
1 See, respectively, (Nozick 1974; Dworkin 1978; Raz 1986).  
2 See this chapter, section 4.1.  
3 This is not to imply duties to rescue particular people are not directed. For example, intuitively one owes 
it to Singer’s drowning child to save it.  
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This is the underlying structure of rights that I am claiming is important—rights and their 
correlative directed duties are relational.4  
Now, one might act wrongly by failing to satisfy either an undirected or directed duty. 
When one does so, it is important whether one has infringed an undirected or directed 
duty for at least the following two connected reasons. First, if I were to infringe a directed 
duty, I would not merely act wrongly, as when I infringe an undirected duty, but would 
also wrong the person to whom I owe that duty.5 Because of this, there are normative 
upshots specific to the infringement of directed duties. If a duty is directed, many think 
that it is demandable on the behalf of the party to whom it is owed and that its violation 
triggers apology owed to that party. (Correlatively, they tend to think that there is special 
standing for blame and forgiveness on the part of the party to whom the duty was owed.)6 
If a duty is undirected, it is not demandable on behalf of a particular party, and its viola-
tion does not trigger further duties owed to particular parties. Second, since directed du-
ties correlate with rights, and most think that rights are enforceable (other things being 
equal), directed duties are enforceable.7 They are potentially enforceable before as well as 
after the right’s violation. Undirected duties do not correlate with rights, so are thought 
not to be enforceable.  
So, rights are important because they allegedly offer this particularly robust form of moral 
protection and because of how they connect us as moral agents and moral patients. 
 
4 There is a growing emphasis on rights’ relationality: (Cruft 2013a; Gilbert 2018; Cruft 2019; Wallace 
2019). 
5 I am tempted to think that, at least for many directed duties, we are under only directed duties. Particu-
larly, for duties capable of forfeiture or waiver. When I culpably attack someone, I forfeit my rights against 
being harmed by them. Forfeiture explains why it is not wrong for my victim to defensively harm me. When 
I consent to someone slapping me, I waive my rights against being slapped by them. Waiver explains why 
it is not wrong for the person to whom I have consented to slap me. If we were under an undirected duty 
not to harm in addition to directed duties not to harm, we could not explain why it is not wrong to harm 
those who have forfeited or waived their rights against harm. For, despite the forfeiture or waiver extin-
guishing the directed duty, the undirected duty would still exist. This means the duty not to harm must be 
only a directed duty, and not also an undirected duty. This argument generalises for all duties capable of 
forfeiture or waiver. If this analysis is correct, this gives us another reason to care about directed duties and 
their correlative rights—they alone populate a lot of interpersonal morality.  
6 (Skorupski 2010; Darwall 2013; Cruft 2019). 
7 (Thomson 1990, 105–22; James 2003; Cruft 2013b; Wenar 2013; Flanigan 2019). 
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Because of this, a theory of rights (and, correlatively, directed duties) must explain the 
following two connected features.8 First, it must offer an account of what it is to owe a duty 
to another individual. Second, it must offer an account of why, through infringing a di-
rected duty, the duty-bearer does not merely act wrongly but wrongs the person to whom 
she owes that duty.  
The focus of this thesis is with the  
Interest Theory of Rights (Canonical). For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, 
X’s wellbeing (her interests) must be of sufficient weight to place Y under a 
duty to Φ.9 
The Interest Theory has a lot going for it. These reasons are properly developed below, 
but here is a taster. The Interest Theory offers a plausible account of the grounds of rights—
rights are grounded in the wellbeing of their holders. Further, it does a nice job explaining 
why Y owes her duty to X and why Y does not merely act wrongly but wrongs X if she 
infringes her duty. The duty owes its existence to X. If Y infringes that duty, Y has failed 
to respond to morally salient duty-grounding features of X.  
 
8 I have not included that a theory of rights must explain why rights are thought to offer a particularly robust 
form of moral protection for, as Feinberg and Cruft note, this role could be achieved with undirected duties 
only (Feinberg 1980; Cruft 2019). This is because undirected duties require just as much of us as undirected 
duties. Again, we act wrongly whether we satisfy an undirected or directed duty. Because of this, whether 
the duty is directed or not makes no difference to what we were required to do—it makes no extensional 
difference to the normative landscape. This is the sense in which Cruft says we could do without rights. This 
raises the question, if rights make no extensional difference, what difference do they make? The answer, I 
think, lies in rights’ second important role—their relationality. Making the case for this is not the primary 
focus of this thesis, though does crop up in the final analysis. It is also something I look to make more of 
moving forward.   
9 There are lots of clarifications that may be prompted. See chapter 3: especially note 69 and section 3. 
Throughout, when it comes to necessary conditions, I mean for these claims to be explanatory (that is, I mean 
“only if, and partly because”). Yet I avoid structuring the conditions in this way for stylistic reasons. So, 
when it comes to Interest Theory (Canonical), we could rewrite the condition as: X has a right against Y 
that Y Φ, only if, and partly because, X’s wellbeing (her interests) is of sufficient weight to place Y under a 
duty to Φ.  
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2. The Problem of Harmless Wronging 
But there is a problem with the Interest Theory. It is possible that one may have a right 
against another’s action, and yet not be harmed by that action. This is problematic be-
cause, if one is not harmed by the action’s occurrence, one’s wellbeing is not of sufficient 
weight to place others under duties.10 But this means the necessary condition set for the 
ascription of a right on the Interest Theory has not been satisfied, and so our right-holder 
will not actually hold a right against that action. 
Here are two examples: 
Plane Crash (Preempted Harm). Passenger is about to board a plane. Attendant 
takes a disliking to Passenger, so denies her admittance onto the plane. On 
departure, the plane crashes and everybody on board dies. 
Roulette (Pure Risk Imposition). Target is asleep. Her housemate, Shooter, 
comes into her room and decides to play Russian roulette with her. Luck-
ily, no bullet is fired. Shooter, content with having had a round of roulette, 
will never play roulette again. 
Intuitively, Passenger and Target have their rights violated. However, Passenger is better 
off in the world in which her rights are violated than that in which they are not. Target’s 
life is as it would have been had Shooter not made Target the subject of her risky behav-
iour. Given the standard Counterfactual Account of Harm, on which Y harms X iff Y makes X 
worse off than X would have been had Y not acted as she did, this means that Passenger 
and Target are not harmed by the violation of their rights. Because of this, it is hard to 
see how either Passenger’s or Target’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight to place Attendant 
and Shooter under their respective duties. But this means the necessary condition set for 
a right-attribution by the Interest Theory is not satisfied. Call this the Problem of Harm-
less Wronging for the Interest Theory. The problem is that of accommodating our intui-
tions that Passenger and Target have their rights violated, given a commitment to the 
 
10 This claim is defended in chapter 3, section 3.2. 
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Interest Theory. More generally, the problem is that of accommodating agents having 
rights against harmless wrongs, given a commitment to the Interest Theory. 
This thesis offers a principled solution to the Problem of Harmless Wronging for the In-
terest Theory by revising the canonical statement of the theory with what I call the Safety 
Condition. The Safety Condition looks beyond what happens in the actual world to close 
possible worlds to normatively ensure that right-holders’ wellbeing is robustly protected 
across circumstances that could easily come about. In Plane Crash, it could easily have been 
that the plane Passenger would have caught, were she not to have been denied admit-
tance, would not have crashed.11 Were this to have been the case, Attendant would have 
harmed Passenger by denying her admittance onto the plane. In Roulette, it could easily 
have been that there was a bullet in the chamber when Shooter pulls the trigger. Were 
this to have been the case, Shooter would have harmed Target by playing roulette with 
her. It is in virtue of these nearby possibilities that Passenger and Target hold rights 
against the respective actions in the actual world. 
I argue that the Safety Condition correctly generates rights in our two cases of harmless 
wronging. Further, it offers a unified solution of why people are attributed rights against 
harm in these different types of cases of harmless wronging: even if one is not made suffi-
ciently worse off as things turn out, one easily could have been. The Safety Condition’s 
principled extensional accuracy is the primary virtue of the account that I would like to 
stress in this thesis.12 I also argue that we have reason to endorse the Safety Condition in 
addition to its extensional accuracy. Roughly, this focus on how things could otherwise 
have been formally requires that duty-bearers are sensitive to others’ wellbeing: it ensures 
not only that we do not harm others, but that we could not easily have harmed others.  
 
 
11 This is ambiguous between the close possible world in which (a) Passenger is denied admittance onto the 
plane, the plane takes off, and lands, and (b) Passenger is not denied admittance onto the plane, the plane 
takes off, and then lands. As we see in chapter 5, it is (a) that is relevant.  
12 We see further in chapter 8, section 2.2, that the two cases of harmless wronging differ from mundane 
cases of harmful wronging in symmetrical ways to each other. This gives us reason to think the Problem of 
Harmless Wronging is a unified problem that we should want a unified solution to. 
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3. The Argument 
Here is the shape of this thesis. It is made up of three parts. Part I concerns rights. By way 
of motivating the Interest Theory, chapter 2 examines its main rival, the Will Theory of 
Rights. The Will Theory says that rights are grounded in normative control. I argue de-
fenders of the Will Theory face a dilemma. They can remain faithful to the Will Theory’s 
account of control as the grounds of rights, in which case the theory counterintuitively 
undergenerates right-ascriptions. Or, they can revise the Will Theory to increase its ex-
tensional accuracy, but at the cost of obscuring the theory’s focus on normative control. 
Chapter 3 shows how the Interest Theory’s focus on wellbeing as the grounds of rights 
solves the problems facing the Will Theory identified in chapter 2. Though that chapter 
focuses on the Will Theory, the arguments generalise: to avoid analogous problems to 
those raised with the Will Theory, we need to recognise wellbeing as the grounds of at 
least some rights. (And, once we open the door to wellbeing as the grounds of at least 
some rights, we open the door to the Problem of Harmless Wronging.)13 I also argue there 
are other good reasons to endorse the Interest Theory. The chapter then introduces the 
Interest Theory in sufficient detail to be the focus for the remainder of the thesis, before 
returning to the Problem of Harmless Wronging. 
Part II concerns the problem posed by cases of preempted harm. Call this the Problem of 
Preemption. The problem is that of accommodating our intuitions that people have rights 
against harms that are preempted, as in Plane Crash, given a commitment to the Interest 
Theory. The Problem of Preemption is a more specific version of the Problem of Harm-
less Wronging. Chapter 4 begins by showing that we cannot weaken the Interest Theory 
(Canonical) in two seemingly plausible ways to solve the Problem of Preemption: first, by 
saying that rights are grounded in wellbeing considered pro tanto; second, by saying rights 
are grounded in our wellbeing under normalcy. Another tempting way to solve the Prob-
lem of Preemption is to replace the Counterfactual Account of Harm. Chapter 4 argues 
against proceeding in this way on the grounds that alternative accounts of harm are more 
 
13 It is because of this that the Will Theory is my main focus for a rival to the Interest Theory. See chapter 
3, section 4, in which I explicitly argue that the Problem of Harmless Wronging applies to other theories of 
rights in addition to the Interest Theory.  
13 
 
problematic than the Counterfactual Account even with the noted problem of preempted 
harm. Chapter 5 then introduces the Safety Condition as a solution to the Problem of 
Preemption. It offers a taster of why one ought to endorse the Safety Condition in addition 
to extensional adequacy, and defends the Safety Condition against a few objections.  
Part III is concerned with the problem posed by pure risk. Call this the Problem of Pure 
Risk. The problem is that of accommodating our intuitions that people, sometimes, have 
rights against being exposed to risk of harm. Now, if risk of harm were itself harmful, cases 
of pure risk imposition would not be cases of harmless wronging. There would be no 
Problem of Pure Risk. Chapter 6 argues that risk of harm is not itself harmful. For those 
who do not follow me all the way to thinking that risk is not harmful, I argue, at the least, 
risk is harmful only in a small range of cases. If risk is harmful only in a subset of the much 
larger set of cases in which it looks like we have rights against risk of harm, we cannot 
answer the Problem of Pure Risk by arguing that risk is itself harmful. 
Another seemingly plausible way to respond to the Problem of Pure Risk is by arguing 
that rights depend on duty-bearers’ beliefs or the evidence available to them, rather than 
the facts. For example, in Roulette we can suppose Shooter thinks there is a one in six 
chance that she will kill Target, which the best available evidence also supports. If rights 
depend on either duty-bearers’ beliefs or the evidence available to them, Target’s wellbe-
ing is of sufficient weight to place Shooter under a duty not to play roulette with her. 
Chapter 7 argues that rights depend on the facts. So, the Problem of Pure Risk is not 
solved in this way. Finally, chapter 8 demonstrates that the Safety Condition solves the 
Problem of Pure Risk, before explaining why we have reason to endorse the Safety Con-
dition in addition to its extensional accuracy.  
Another way to see the shape of the thesis is by focusing on the Problem of Harmless 
Wronging. Here is the problem:  
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1. Assume the Interest Theory (Canonical): For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, 
X’s wellbeing (her interests) must be of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to 
Φ. 
2. Whether or not X’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to Φ 
depends partly on the extent to which X is harmed by Y’s not Φ-ing or benefited 
by Y’s Φ-ing.  
3. Assume the Counterfactual Account of Harm and Benefit: Y harms X iff Y makes 
X worse off than she would have been had Y not acted as Y did. Y benefits X iff Y 
makes X better off than she would have been had Y not acted as Y did. 
4. In Plane Crash Attendant does not harm Passenger by denying her admittance onto 
the plane, nor would she benefit Passenger by allowing her onto the plane (from 
3). 
5. Passenger’s wellbeing is not of sufficient weight to place Attendant under a duty 
not to deny her admittance onto the plane (from 2 and 4).  
6. Passenger has no right against being denied admittance onto the plane (from 1 
and 5). 
7. Risk of harm is not itself harmful. 
8. In Roulette Shooter does not harm Target by playing roulette with her, nor would 
she benefit Target by not playing roulette with her (from 3 and 7).  
9. Rights are determined by the facts. 
10. Target’s wellbeing is not of sufficient weight to place Shooter under a duty not to 
play roulette with her (from 2 and 8).  
11. Target has no right against Shooter playing roulette with her (from 1 and 10). 
The Problem of Preemption is the conclusion reached in 6. The Problem of Pure Risk is 
the conclusion reached in 11. These problematic conclusions could be avoided by denying 
any of the other premises. Chapters 2 and 3 defend the first premise. Chapter 4 defends 
15 
 
the first and third premise. Chapter 5 then suggests we ought to revise the first premise 
with the Safety Condition to avoid the problematic conclusion in 6. This is in keeping 
with the arguments for the first premise from chapters 2 and 3. (In section 2.3 of chapter 
5 , we also see that the Safety Condition could be seen as revising the second rather than 
the first premise. Roughly, the idea is that we could read whether or not X’s wellbeing is 
of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to Φ as depending on whether X is harmed by 
Y’s not Φ-ing or benefited by Y’s Φ-ing across close possible worlds.) Chapter 6 defends the 
seventh premise. Chapter 7 defends the ninth premise. Chapter 8 then shows how the 
revision to the first premise from chapter 5 extends to avoid the problematic conclusion 
in 11. 
 
4. Rights Theory 
Before beginning, a little rights theory is required to form a background for the rest of the 
thesis. 4.1 introduces the Hohfeldian framework. 4.2 unpacks and then defends Hohfeld-
ian correlativity. 4.3 discusses how we can have rights at different levels of specificity and 
argues that the Problem of Harmless Wronging cannot be circumvented by focusing on 
rights at an abstract level. 4.4 discusses how rights might connect to what we are required 
to do all-things-considered.   
4.1 Hohfeld 
This thesis operates within Wesley Hohfeld’s structural analysis of rights (Hohfeld 1919). 
Hohfeld suggested that all rights refer to a relation between two parties. Let X refer to the 
right-holder, Y to the person against whom she holds that right, and Φ refer to the action 
X has a right to the performance (or non-performance) of.14 First,  
X has a claim-right that Y Φ, against Y, iff Y is under a duty to Φ, owed to 
X.  
 
14 Φ-ing should be read broadly enough to include omissions. For discussion of whether we hold rights to 
things other than the actions or non-actions of others, see (Cruft 2004, 350). 
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If you have a claim-right against me that I give you my pen, I am under a duty, owed to 
you, to give you my pen. I say more about correlativity between claim-rights and directed 
duties in the following subsection.  
Second,  
X has a liberty to Φ, against Y, iff X is under no duty not to Φ, owed to Y.15  
If I have a liberty-right against you that I not give you my pen, I am not under a duty, 
owed to you, to give you my pen. Many think that I can have a liberty-right, against you, 
that I not give you my pen, but be under a duty to give you my pen nonetheless—it is just 
that this duty cannot be owed to you. For example, I may have promised a third-party 
that I will give you my pen. Were I not to give you my pen, I would not wrong you, 
because I did not owe my duty to you, but would wrong the third party. Inasmuch, liberties 
are directed just as claims are directed.16 
Claims and liberties are first-order incidents. There are also second-order incidents.  
X holds a power over Y iff X is able to alter the normative relationship 
between Y and herself (or between Y and some other party).  
From Y’s perspective, she is liable to X changing their normative relationship. Suppose 
that I have the power-right to make promises with respect to my pen. If I promise to give 
you my pen, I have changed our normative relationship from one in which I held a liberty-
right against you not to give you my pen, to one in which you hold a claim-right against 
me that I give you my pen. Alternatively, I might make it that you have to share my pen 
with some third-party, thereby altering the normative relationship between you and them. 
 
15 I have not baked into our definition of liberties, powers, and immunities that they are always liberty-, 
power-, or immunity-rights (see note 36 in chapter 2 and note 68 and section 3.4 in chapter 3). Whereas, I 
have baked into our definition of claims that all claims are rights (though cf. the following subsection); this 
is because I see the theories of the nature of rights as accounts of what it is to owe someone a duty.  
16 E.g., (Van Duffel 2012b, 107). Cf. (Wenar 2015)’s definition of liberties that do not account for the direc-
tionality of liberties (X has a liberty to φ iff X is not under a duty to φ).  
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Second-order incidents also interact with other second-order incidents. I might bestow 
upon you the power-right to decide what to do with the pen.  
Finally,  
X holds an immunity over Y iff X is not liable to Y changing their normative 
relationship (or between her and some other party).  
Before I give you my pen, I might hold an immunity-right that you not divest me of my 
rights to my pen. 
Often, when we hold a “right” against someone, there is actually a combination or cluster 
of these Hohfeldian incidents at play. For example, my right that you not hit me contains, 
at the least, a claim that you not hit me, a power to waive my claim that you not hit me, 
and liberties to exercise or not exercise this power. For the remainder, unqualified refer-
ences to “rights” refer to claim-rights (though, I do include “claim-” in definitions). This 
is because claim-rights are going to be our focus.  
4.2 Correlativity  
Claim-rights are going to be our focus for two reasons. First, they are the only type of 
right that, when all else is equal, requires the performance (or non-performance) of certain 
actions. Second, relatedly, they are the only type of right that are violable. And, this thesis 
is focused on cases in which the violation of rights to the performance (or non-perfor-
mance) of certain actions does not cause harm—what is more, because our focus is on the 
harmless violation of claim-rights, they are also of interest because their violation alone 
triggers the interesting normative upshots introduced above (in section 1).17  
 
17 This is not to say that the other incidents are not normatively important in virtue of lacking these upshots. 
This is because the other incidents are all bound up with claims. For example, since liberties are the absence 
of directed duties on one (the absence of others holding a claim against one), having a liberty to Φ means, 
other things being equal, one can Φ without triggering any of these normative upshots. See chapter 3, 
section 3.4.  
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Since the claim-right is going to be our focus, and there is this correlativity at the heart of 
claim-rights, let us expand on our definition of a claim from above. Particularly, let us call 
the definition that appeared above 
Strong Correlativity. X has a claim-right that Y Φ, against Y, iff Y is under a 
duty to Φ, owed to X.  
Some deny Strong Correlativity—they think that one can be owed a duty that another Φ, 
without having a right against them that they Φ. But they do tend to endorse 
Weak Correlativity. X has a claim-right that Y Φ, against Y, only if Y is under 
a duty to Φ, owed to X. 
On this view, all claim-rights correlate with directed duties, but not all directed duties 
correlate with claim-rights. I do not find it immediately obvious that I can be owed things 
but not have rights to those things.18 So, I am tempted to accept Strong Correlativity.  
Still, perhaps there are counterexamples to Strong Correlativity. Duties of friendship seem 
to be directed, though do not always seem to correlate with rights (you might owe me a 
duty to repair our friendship, but do I have a right that you do so?). Similarly, duties of 
gratitude seem directed, but we might be sceptical of rights to be shown gratitude. Some 
have argued that these examples do not merely speak in favour of Weak Correlativity, but 
also that they offer an explanation of when it is that directed duties correlate with claim-
rights. This is because these people think that a salient feature of these two examples is 
that it is inappropriate to enforce the duties. Because of this, they endorse  
Enforceability. Ceteris paribus, a directed duty correlates with a claim-right iff 
that duty is appropriately enforceable (Cruft 2013b, 209; Wenar 2013, 
214).  
I take it “ceteris paribus” excludes instances in which rights are overridden, and so enforce-
ability is impermissible. Enforceability will also be impermissible if the only means of 
 
18 Though, I do not go as far as Rainbolt in thinking that it is ‘extensional[ly] counterintuitive’ to think that 
one can be owed something, though not have a right to it (Rainbolt 2006, 115). 
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doing so are disproportionate. For example, it is impermissible for me to enforce my right 
that you not steal my pen by breaking your leg. But I take it this is the work that “appro-
priately” is supposed to be doing in the principle.  
Happily, we do not need to settle this dispute between Strong and Weak Correlativity 
here. If we endorse Weak Correlativity, we can endorse the Interest Theory, for example, 
as an account of directed duties; we can then see the Interest Theory and Enforceability 
as an account of rights. I introduce Strong and Weak Correlativity here without settling 
the debate to make clear that we are after an account of what it takes to owe a duty to 
another. For ease of exposition, let us begin by assuming Strong Correlativity.19 
(Notice, we have a distinction between directed and undirected duties, and between Weak 
and Strong Correlativity. These distinctions cut across each other, so there are several 
combinations of views here.20 Some people think all directed duties correlate with rights 
and that there are no undirected duties (Kramer 2000). Some people agree there are no 
undirected duties but think some directed duties do not correlate with rights (Wallace 
2019). Some people agree that some directed duties do not correlate with rights but think 
there are undirected and directed duties (Cruft 2019). And, finally, some agree there are 
both directed and undirected duties but think all directed duties correlate with rights 
(Rainbolt 2006). And, to complete our picture, some people think there are no directed 
duties—and so, a fortiori, no rights (Arneson 2001; Bedi 2009).) 
Before moving on, let me say a final thing about correlativity: some people deny its exist-
ence altogether. The thinking here tends to be that rights cannot be the logical correlatives 
to duties since rights are the grounds of duties. For example, Joseph Raz writes: ‘A right of 
one person is not a duty on another. It is the ground of a duty, ground which, if not 
counteracted by conflicting considerations, justifies holding that other person to have the 
duty’ (Raz 1986, 171). Similarly, Jeremy Waldron thinks that correlativity must be denied 
‘if rights are to be seen as justifications: one statement cannot justify another if the two are 
 
19 Cf. chapter 2, section 5.1. 
20 They also cut across the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. 
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equivalent’ (Waldron 1988, 84; 1985, 10–11; MacCormick 1982, 161; Dworkin 1978, 
171).  
Yet, rights and duties can be logical correlatives while one stands in a justificatory rela-
tionship to the other. This is because the grounding relationship—the “in virtue of”, the 
“because of”— is asymmetrical.21 Take an example from Matthew Kramer. I could desire 
a slope in my garden because of the fact that I want to enjoy the downwards perspective 
from the top. Yet, this slope will also provide me with an upwards perspective from the 
bottom of my garden. Even though either perspective always comes with the other per-
spective, one can ground the other.22 So, this is not a good reason to doubt correlativity.  
4.3 Abstract Versus Specified Rights 
In Plane Crash, we are focusing on Passenger’s right that Attendant not deny her admit-
tance onto the plane and, in Roulette, Target’s right that Shooter not play roulette with 
her. One might note that these are fairly specific rights. However, does not Passenger 
have a right not to be arbitrarily discriminated against and Target a right not to have a 
gun fired at her? Further, do not Passenger and Target hold these rights against the world 
(in rem)? What is more, though Passenger’s and Target’s wellbeing might not be of suffi-
cient weight to place their respective parties under duties not to perform the specific ac-
tions that we focus on, is not Passenger’s wellbeing of sufficient weight to place others 
under duties not to arbitrarily discriminate against her? Is not Target’s wellbeing of suffi-
cient weight to place others under duties not to harm her? Might one object, the Problem 
of Harmless Wronging for the Interest Theory only gets off the ground because I focus on 
these fairly specific rights? There is no problem if we focus on Passenger’s and Target’s 
rights at a more abstract level. 
The answer to this problem comes from looking back to  
 
21 See, among others, (Berker 2017). 
22 See (Kramer 2000, 39), though he does not relate this to the asymmetrical nature of grounding. Another 
reason some are sceptical of correlativity is they think the same right can grounds many duties: ‘there is no 
closed list of duties which corresponds to the right […] A change of circumstances may lead to the creation 
of new duties based on the old right’ (Raz 1986, 171). The response to this argument can be found in the 
following subsection. 
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Strong Correlativity. X has a claim-right that Y Φ, against Y, iff Y is under a 
duty to Φ, owed to X. 
Correlativity needs to be maintained at the same level of specificity (Kramer 2000, 42). 
When we discuss Passenger’s (abstractly stated) right not to be discriminated against, this 
entails Attendant’s duty, owed to Passenger, not to discriminate against her. When we 
discuss Passenger’s (specifically stated) right not to be denied admittance onto the plane, 
this entails Attendant’s duty, owed to Passenger, not to deny Passenger admittance onto 
the plane. 
Speaking about rights and their correlative duties at the abstract level is rhetorically useful. 
They make nice premises in arguments, for example. However, it also comes with its 
drawbacks. Principally, it is not obvious what an abstract duty not to discriminate against 
others entails. To work out exactly what it entails, we need to look to duties at a more 
specified level. And that is where the problem of Harmless Wronging creeps back in. Pas-
senger may well have an abstract right, against Attendant, not to be discriminated against, 
but this does not entail that she has a right against Attendant that she not deny her ad-
mittance onto the plane (at least, on the canonical formulation of the Interest Theory)—
for, her wellbeing is not of sufficient weight to place Attendant under a duty not to deny 
her admittance onto the plane.  
Think about a different right. For example, Ann’s right not to be harmed. Does that ab-
stract right mean that Beth is under a duty not to perform some specific action that harms 
Ann? Well, it depends. Perhaps Ann has waived her right against Beth performing that 
specific action. Perhaps Ann has forfeited her right against Beth performing that specific 
action. Perhaps Ann simply never had a right against that specific action, though it is 
harmful—for example, Ann has no right that Beth not return Ann’s love, Ann has no 
right that Beth give Ann the last lifejacket, and so on.23 We need, then, to look to the 
potential specific right and specific duty. 
 
23 Some people are sceptical of forfeiture and think that when we would usually say someone has “forfeited” 
their rights, the pro tanto duty not to harm remains (and so does the pro tanto right) but has been overridden 
(Thomson 1986a, 33–37; Griffin 2008, 65–67); cf., (Thomson 1991). This view seems problematic since it 
cannot distinguish between victims justifiably defending themselves against unjustified threateners, where 
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4.4 All-Things-Considered Versus Pro Tanto View 
In this final subsection, I speak a little of the relationship between rights and all-things-
considered requirements. I rely on this discussion in a few places throughout, but it is 
principally here to provide a foundation for how rights relate to the rest of the normative 
domain.  
While we are assuming Strong Correlativity, that much does not settle the nature of the 
correlative duty. Some people endorse the 
All-Things-Considered View. If X has a claim-right against Y that Y Φ, Y is 
required to Φ.24 
“Required” should be thought of as an all-things-considered notion.25 There might be 
good reason to endorse the All-Things-Considered View. As Judith Jarvis Thomson 
writes, ‘very often when we ought [or are required] to do a thing, we ought [or are re-
quired] to do it precisely because someone has a claim[-right] against us that we do it’ 
(Thomson 1990, 79). If the All-Things-Considered View is not correct, our conception of 
 
unjustified threateners have forfeited their rights against being harmed, and people harming others with a 
lesser evil justification, where those whom one harms have not forfeited their rights against being harmed. 
In the case of self-defence, there is no moral remainder—no explanation, apology, or compensation owed. 
In the case of lesser evil justifications, there is a moral remainder. Appealing to the pro tanto right not to be 
harmed (and correlative pro tanto duty not to harm) in the case of the lesser evil justification explains this 
moral remainder. We focus more on the moral remainder in the following subsection.  
24 Among others, (Wellman 1995; Shafer-Landau 1995; Oberdiek 2004; Steiner 2013). The All-Things-
Considered View is only conditional, rather than biconditional, because of the directionality of claim-rights, 
the possibility of undirected duties, and the possibility of other factors contributing to all-things-considered 
requirements. Suppose that Beth does not have a claim-right, against Ann, that Ann mow Beth’s lawn. If 
the All-Things-Considered View were biconditional, this would mean that Ann is not required to mow 
Beth’s lawn. But Ann may nonetheless be required to mow Beth’s lawn. For example, Ann may have prom-
ised a third party that she will mow Beth’s lawn. Or, for whatever reason, Ann may be under an undirected 
duty to mow Beth’s lawn. Or, if other factors contribute to the all-things-considered requirement in addition 
to duties, Ann may be required to mow Beth’s lawn without even being under a duty to do so.  
25 The notion that I am calling “requirement” is often called “ought”. However, as Snedegar among others 
has shown, “ought” is too weak. “Requirement” (or “must”, “have to”, and so on) is the stronger notion we 
are after. This can be seen from the felicity of “You ought to help that old lady cross the road, but you’re 
not required do” and the infelicity of “You are required to help that old lady, but it’s not the case that you 
ought to”. The first of these sentences show that “ought” does not entail “requirement”. The second sug-
gests that “requirement” does entail “ought” (Snedegar 2016, 159–62). 
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what we are required to do will be more complicated. We must answer the question of 
what a right’s content is, and then ‘the separate question of a right’s normative implica-
tions’ (Oberdiek 2008, 128).26 
Some people deny the All-Things-Considered View. They endorse the 
Pro Tanto View. If X has a claim-right against Y that Y Φ, Y has a pro tanto 
duty to Φ.27 
On this view, rights and their correlative duties are pro tanto considerations: they have 
‘genuine weight, but nonetheless may be outweighed by other considerations’ (Kagan 
1989, 17).  Since rights do not entail requirements, a defender of the Pro Tanto View must 
say something about how rights interact with requirements. Following Thomson, let us 
say, if X has a claim-right against Y that Y Φ, and Y does not Φ, she infringes X’s right; if Y 
does not Φ and she is required to have Φ-ed, she violates X’s right to Φ (Thomson 1986a, 
40; 1986b, 51–55; 1990, 122).  
Why might one prefer the Pro Tanto View? Suppose that Ann owns some land. Her 
neighbour, Ben, falls ill and needs to get home to take some medicine. Time is tight and 
the quickest way for Ben to get home is to cut across Ann’s land.28 It seems plausible both 
that:  
(1) Ann has a claim-right against Ben that he stay off her land, 
and that 
 
26 Only claim-rights easily translate into requirements. Ann’s having a liberty-right to Φ against Beth means 
neither that Ann is not required to Φ nor that she is required to Φ. Rather, it means only that she is not 
under a duty, owed to Beth, not to Φ. It is entirely open whether she is required to Φ. We face similar issues 
when translating rights into talk of reasons. Suppose that X has a (claim-)right against Y that Y Φ. It is 
plausible that Y thereby has a reason to Φ. However, what if Y has a liberty-right not to Φ against X. This 
does not mean that Y has reason not to Φ; she might have plenty of reason to Φ, and no reason not to Φ. 
For example, suppose Ann has a liberty-right, against Beth, not to mow Beth’s lawn. Does this mean Ann 
has no reason to mow Beth’s lawn? No: she may have plenty of reasons.  
27 Among others, (Thomson 1990; Feinberg 1980; Kamm 2007; Cruft 2019).  
28 The case is taken with slight alternations from (Thomson 1990, 98).  
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(2) Ben is not required to stay off Ann’s land. 
Both of these things cannot be true if the All-Things-Considered View is true. The com-
bination of the All-Things-Considered View and (1) implies the negation of (2). 
Similarly, suppose we have a standard trolley case in which a trolley is headed towards 
some number of people, which it will kill if not stopped. Bystander can divert the trolley 
onto a side-track. Unfortunately, there is a person on the side-track (call this person The 
One). It seems plausible both that: 
(3) The One has a claim-right that Bystander not kill her, 
and yet that there is some number of people that makes it permissible for Bystander to 
divert the trolley. Suppose we have that number of people. This means 
(4) Bystander is not required not to turn the trolley (i.e., it is permissible for By-
stander to turn the trolley).  
The combination of the All-Things-Considered View and (3) implies the negation of (4). 
Now, to accommodate cases like this (cases in which it looks like X has a claim-right 
against Y that Y Φ, and yet it is false that Y is required to Φ), defenders of the All-Things-
Considered View suggest that the content of X’s right specifies that the right does not obtain 
in those particular circumstances. Moral Specificationists think that X only has a claim-right 
that Y not unjustifiably or wrongfully Φ (Oberdiek 2004; 2008). For example, The One has a 
claim-right that Bystander not unjustifiably turn the trolley onto her. Factual Specificationists 
think that X only has a claim-right that Y Φ, unless: list of exemptive clauses (Shafer-
Landau 1995). For example, Ann has a claim-right against Ben that he not cross her land, 
unless he needs to save his life, and so on. 
While defenders of the All-Things-Considered View may be able to explain away this 
contradiction by endorsing Specificationism, one might wonder how they can deal with 
what is called the moral remainder. For example, if Ben causes some damage to Ann’s 
land while permissibly cutting across it, some think he is liable to pay compensation to 
Ann. Similarly, even if Bystander acts permissibly in turning the trolley, it is plausible that 
25 
 
she still wrongs The One, owes her an apology, and so on. Yet, if there was no right violated 
in either case, as Specificationism admits, what might explain these features? 
For this reason, let us assume the Pro Tanto View. As it happens, not too much turns on 
our choice—though I will draw on the moral remainder at times. The reason for this is 
two-fold. First, the Problem of Harmless Wronging applies to either view. Second, the 
debate between the All-Things-Considered and Pro Tanto Views is neutral on substantive 
first-order normative questions. A defender of the All-Things-Considered View says that 
a reason that countervails a putative right directly determines the content of the right (that 
it does not obtain in those particular circumstances). A defender of the Pro Tanto View 
says that this reason does not have any bearing on the right’s existence but does impact 
what the putative correlative duty-bearer is required to do.29  
 
5. Harmless Wronging 
Before beginning in earnest, a final preliminary is required. This thesis centres around 
discussion of two examples of harmless wronging: preempted harm and pure risk imposi-
tion. One might wonder why we are not discussing more prominent cases of harmless 
wronging found in the literature. For example:  
Promise. Beth promises to meet Ann at the pub at 8. Ann only goes to the 
pub because Beth has promised to meet her. Ann would prefer, and it 
would be better for Ann, if Beth were not to show up. Beth does not show 
up.30 
 
29 See Shafer-Landeau: ‘the problem of specifying the content of a right is the very same problem as that of 
[...] knowing when a right is permissibly infringed. In each case, conflicting moral considerations generate 
a moral conclusion either about what a full-fledged right contains, or about the circumstances under which 
a full-fledged right can be permissibly infringed’ (Shafer-Landau 1995, 215). The views might not even 
differ on the moral remainder if Specificationists can build it into their view. 
30 E.g., (Owens 2012). 
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Paternalism. Carl has stopped smoking but, in a moment of weakness of will, 
has bought a packet of cigarettes. It would be better for Carl if Dave were 
to take the cigarettes to avoid his relapse into nicotine addiction.31 
Property. Erica has some ugly garden gnomes left in her front garden from 
when she moved into her house. Fran quite likes the gnomes, so takes them 
while walking past. Erica does not even notice.32  
Neither Ann, Carl, nor Erica are harmed, all-things-considered, in these cases. Yet, intu-
itively, they have their rights violated. So, we have three more examples of harmless 
wronging. If the Interest Theory (Canonical) is correct, we have a problem. We cannot 
account for why Ann, Carl, and Erica have their rights violated.  
The reason we focus on our two cases of harmless wronging, as opposed to these problems 
raised by harmless promise-breaking, paternalism, and trespass is because cases of 
preemption and pure risk concern rights against harm that are violated: Attendant’s and 
Shooter’s actions wrong Passenger and Target in a very similar way to if they would have 
straightforwardly harmed their victims. It is less obvious that Promise, Paternalism, and Prop-
erty are about harm. However we solve harmless promise-breaking, paternalism, and 
harmless trespass, we should want to solve the Problem of Preemption and Pure Risk in 
a way that appeals to harm. The Safety Condition offers such an explanation. 
Similarly, suppose we look at all these cases of harmless wronging and conclude the In-
terest Theory is false. Other things being equal, we should still want harm to explain the 
grounding of Passenger’s and Target’s rights even if we do not think all rights are 
grounded in their holder’s wellbeing. Those who deny the Interest Theory should still 
want a solution to the Problem of Harmless Wronging. Suitably refined, Safety Condition 
offers such an explanation to those who deny the Interest Theory.33  
  
 
31 E.g., (Feinberg 1988; Tadros 2016a; May 2017). 
32 E.g., (Ripstein 2009; Cruft 2019). 
33 One would just deny the necessary aspect of the definition. We return to why the Problem of Harmless 
Wronging is problematic to other theories in chapter 3, section 4.  
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2. The Will Theory 
1. Introduction34  
Suppose that Ann justifiably owns some property. She plays in its garden with her child. 
Carl, her neighbour, is under a duty not to drive across her garden. Beth does not have a 
garden, so plays in the park with her child. Carl is under a duty not to drive across the 
park. Carl drives across Ann’s garden and the park, making both unfit for purpose. In 
both cases, Carl does not act as his duty dictates. Let us suppose, he harms Ann and Beth. 
Commonly, it is thought that Carl wrongs Ann but not Beth, and manifests disrespect for 
Ann but not for Beth. Perhaps this is because Ann holds a right that Carl not drive across 
her lawn, whereas Beth does not hold a right that Carl not drive across the park. Correl-
atively, Carl is under a directed duty, owed to Ann, not to drive across her garden, 
whereas he does not owe Beth a directed duty not to drive across the park. 
Recall that I said that a theory of rights (and, correlatively, of directed duties) must explain 
the following two connected features. First, it must offer an account of what it is to owe a 
duty to another individual. Second, it must offer an account of why, through infringing a 
directed duty, the duty-bearer does not merely act wrongly, but wrongs the person to 
whom she owes that duty. We can add a third connected feature: why, through infringing 
a directed duty, the duty-bearer manifests disrespect towards the person to whom she 
owes that duty (Cruft 2013b).35  
Ann has control over Carl’s duty not to drive across her lawn, whereas Beth has no control 
over his duty not to drive across the park. The Will Theory of Rights says that having 
control over another agent’s duties grounds rights. Perhaps this explains why Carl owes 
 
34 At points in this chapter, I thank two anonymous reviewers from the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.  
35 The domain in which we find the right and correlative duty affects the nature of the wrong and disrespect. 
If the right is moral, we have a moral wrong and moral disrespect. If legal, we have a legal wrong and legal 
disrespect. For the most part, I speak about rights without specifying their nature. When this is salient (e.g., 
section 4), I distinguish between moral and legal rights. See also Wenar on being “game-wronged” and 
Cruft on students owing duties to their lecturers (Wenar 2013, 203–4; Cruft 2013b, 207); cf. section 5.1, 
where I consider whether wronging and directed duties come apart from rights.  
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his duty to Ann. If Carl infringes his duty, he fails to respect that Ann has normative con-
trol over him—this may explain why he wrongs and manifests disrespect towards her.  
The Will Theory has commonly been objected to on the grounds that it undergenerates 
right-ascriptions along three fronts. This chapter systematically examines, in a manner 
not explored before, a range of positions open to a defender of the Will Theory in response 
to these counterexamples. I argue that none of these initially plausible ways of responding 
are wholly satisfactory. The argument generalises to form a dilemma for the defender of 
the Will Theory. Either, one can remain faithful to the Will Theory’s account of control 
as the grounds of rights, in which case the theory undergenerates right-ascriptions. Or, 
one can revise the Will Theory to increase its extensional accuracy, but at the cost of 
obscuring the theory’s focus on normative control. The dilemma applies for other theories 
that have the right-holder play some active role in right-holding (such as controlling the 
correlative duty, being able to demand compliance of the correlative duty, and so on); to 
avoid such problems we need to recognise wellbeing as the grounds of at least some rights. 
Section 2 offers an exposition of the Will Theory. Section 3 defends the Will Theory 
against an important recent objection: that the paradigm Will Theory right-holder does 
not hold the necessary pair(s) of powers over another’s duties. Section 4 considers the 
standard three dimensions along which the Will Theory undergenerates right-ascriptions. 
Sections 5 to 7 move beyond much of the literature on the Will Theory, systematically 
examining how the Will Theory might answer these undergenerations. We want both to 
be faithful to the Will Theory’s account of the grounds of rights while properly accounting 
for the direction of duties. 
 
2. Introducing the Will Theory 
The Will Theory says that rights give agents normative control. As Neil MacCormick puts 
it, it recognises the right-holder’s will as ‘preeminent over that of others in relation to a 
given subject matter and within a given relationship’ (MacCormick 1977, 189). Let us 
offer an initial definition. 
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Will Theory. For X to have a (claim-)right against Y that Y Φ, X must have 
the power to alter Y’s duty to Φ.36 
Given that the idea behind the Will Theory is that rights endow their holder with norma-
tive control, we can see why, for X to have a right that Y Φ, she must hold a power to alter 
Y’s duty to Φ—this grants her normative control. Suppose that you are under a duty of non-
interference with respect to my pen. If I have the power to waive your duty, I have nor-
mative control over my pen: I am permitted to keep hold of it, give it to you, and so on. 
If it were a third-party who had the power to free you from your duty, on the face of 
things I would not have normative control over the pen. At any point, the third-party 
could free you from your duty. It is for this reason that Hillel Steiner sees rights as demar-
cating ‘spheres of practical choice within which the choices made by designated individ-
uals […] must not be subjected to interferences’ (Steiner 2000, 238). Inasmuch, on this 
picture, rights are ‘normative allocations of freedom’. In H. L. A. Hart’s terms, ‘[t]he individual 
who has the right is a small scale sovereign to whom the duty is owed’ (Hart 1982, 183).37 
In section 7, we consider a revision to the Will Theory on which it is not necessary that X 
has the power to alter Y’s duty, but that X has some weaker measure of control over Y’s 
duty. We begin with this stronger formulation since it most clearly endows X with control 
over Y’s duty.    
The Will Theory offers an account of the grounds of rights. Talk of “the grounds of rights” 
might be ambiguous. First, one might think that what is being identified is the moral base 
of Y’s correlative duty. That is, the normative control afforded to X by her right explains 
why Y is under a correlative duty. Suppose that Dana has a right, against Eric, that Eric 
 
36 (Hart 1955; 1982; Wellman 1985; Sumner 1987; Steiner 1994; 2000). This definition suffices only for 
claim-rights for Y only has a correlative duty to Φ when X has a claim to Φ. As suggested by my exposition 
of Hohfeld in the previous chapter (section 4.1), I think that liberties, powers, and immunities can classify 
as rights. The Will Theory can be reformulated to accommodate this. See, e.g., (Cruft 2004, 367–68); Stei-
ner makes room for immunities (Steiner 1994, 61). I also omit that Y’s duty to Φ must be owed to X for I 
see the Will Theory as offering an account of what it is to owe a duty to another.  
37 In its strongest formulation, the Will Theory would require that the right-holder has exclusive control 
over the duty, as it typically the case. If the right-holder does not have exclusive control, this complicates 
matters. We turn to similar issues in section 7. 
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not interfere with her movement. On this view, the reason why Eric is under a duty of 
non-interference is that this allows Dana control of her life. Alternatively, second, the Will 
Theory may recognise a plurality of moral bases of duties but suggest, when a duty pro-
tects X’s will, it becomes directed (and, correlatively, confers a right upon X). Suppose that 
Eric promises Dana that he will water her flowers. Eric’s duty might not owe its existence 
to the fact that this serves Dana’s autonomy (promise-keeping might be grounded in some 
other way). Rather, because Dana has control over Eric’s duty, this feature makes Eric’s 
duty directed.  
There are two dialectical reasons often given in support of the Will Theory. First, the Will 
Theory solves the third-party beneficiary problem that putatively plagues the Interest 
Theory. The Interest Theory is introduced in more detail in the following chapter but, 
roughly, on one version of the Interest Theory (the Nonjustificatory version), for X to have 
a (claim-)right against Y that Y Φ, her interest must be protected by Y’s duty (e.g., Kramer 
2000).38 While this is only a necessary condition for right-ascriptions, some people are 
sceptical that any further condition could explain why third-party beneficiaries are not 
counterintuitively owed the duties from which they benefit. Suppose Dana promises Erica 
that she will pay Fran £10. What might explain why Dana does not owe her duty to Fran, 
given that Fran’s interests are served by the duty (Hart 1982; Steiner 2000; Sreenivasan 
2005; cf., Kramer 2010)? The Will Theory avoids this conclusion as Fran does not have 
the necessary control over Dana’s duty.  
Second, the Will Theory can deal with referred rights that are not justified by their holder’s 
interest, such as a journalist’s right not to disclose her sources. These rights are problem-
atic for the Justificatory version of the Interest Theory, on which, for X to have a (claim-
)right against Y that Y Φ, X’s interests must be of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty 
to Φ (for example, Raz 1986, 166; cf. May 2012).39  
 
38 We return to this in chapter 3, section 3.1. 
39 This was the version of the Interest Theory introduced in the previous chapter. We return to this choice 
point between these two versions of the Interest Theory in the following chapter, section 3.1.  
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A final piece of exposition is required for the Will Theory. Above, I said, let us proceed 
with the assumption that X needs to hold the power to alter Y’s duty for this endows her 
with normative control over her duty. However, there are several ways that X might be 
able to alter Y’s duty. These other powers become relevant below (sections 3 and 7).  
Hart thought there were three disambiguations of X’s power (Hart 1982, 183–84). First, 
if the duty has not been infringed, X might hold the power to waive or enforce Y’s duty. 
Second, if it becomes clear that Y will infringe her duty or if Y does infringe her duty, X 
might hold the power to waive or enforce proceedings for the remedy of Y’s failure to 
respect her duty (for example, in the legal case, X may hold the power to sue for an in-
junction or compensation). Third, X might hold the power to waive or enforce those rem-
edies.  
Steiner separates each of Hart’s powers into two powers (Steiner 2000, 240). It is useful 
to do so for reasons that become clear in the following section:  
1. to waive compliance with the duty; 
2. to leave the duty in existence;40 
3. to waive proceedings for the enforcement of the duty;41 
4. to demand proceedings for the enforcement of the duty (i.e., sue for an injunction 
or compensation); 
5. to waive enforcement of the duty; 
6. to demand enforcement of the duty. 
 
40 This is not a Hohfeldian-power for it is not an ability to alter the normative relationship between two 
parties but the ability to leave things as they are. This will be made clear in the following section. I delay 
refining it until then for ease of exposition. 
41 Matthew Kramer has suggested in private communication that, to waive proceedings for the enforcement 
of the duty in advance of a contravention of the duty is to waive the duty. This is incorrect—you may be 
under a duty not to assault me, and I say, “You are under a duty not to assault me, but I waive my power 
to enact proceedings for the enforcement of the duty.” My doing this does not waive the duty. You are still 
under a duty not to assault me. 
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Let us begin by assuming that, for X to have a right that Y Φ, all six powers must be held 
by X (compare section 7). With all of this in place, we can move on to assess the Will 
Theory. 
 
3. A Terminological Refinement  
Matthew Kramer has recently raised a novel objection against the Will Theory. Within 
any legal system, there are two default rules that might be operating concerning the post-
violation stage of enforceability, powers 3-6.42  
(1) A default rule under which the nonexercise of a power-of-enforcement in the aftermath 
of a violation of a duty will result in the noneffectuation of the duty. 
(2) A default rule under which the nonexercise of a power-of-waiver in the aftermath of a 
violation of a duty will result in the effectuation of the duty. 
(Kramer 2013, 250; Kramer and Steiner 2007, 286–88). 
The idea is that, for any duty, there must be some default rule in place determining what 
will happen if the duty is (likely to be) violated and the power-holder is silent. 
Suppose that the second default rule is operative. If Y is likely to or does violate her duty, 
X’s nonexercise of powers 3-6 result in the enforcement of that duty. For example, suppose 
that Y does violate her duty and X wants to sue for compensation. Given the second de-
fault rule, X neither holds nor exercises any power of enforcement because the enforce-
ment of Y’s duty will proceed automatically—this is not a power of enforcement for ‘a 
putative legal power is no legal power […] if it does not make any difference to anyone’s 
legal positions’ (Kramer 2013, 252; my emphasis).  
The worry for the Will Theory is that, rather than X holding two powers, 
5. to waive enforcement of the duty; and, 
 
42 Post-violation because there is a default rule build into power 2. See note 40.  
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6. to demand enforcement of the duty, 
X actually holds one power, 5. But, according to the standard definition of the Will The-
ory, right-holders need to hold the pair(s) of Hohfeldian powers.43 So, the Will Theory 
cannot account for any rights, given the operativeness of either default rule. 
However, even though X does not hold the relevant pair of Hohfeldian powers, the com-
bination of X having the power of waiver and the operativeness of the second default rule 
means that X has control over Y’s duty. Either, X waives Y’s duty to pay compensation, or 
she does not waive Y’s duty to pay compensation (in which case Y is under that duty).44 
Although the Will Theory has traditionally been formulated to require that X hold the 
pair(s) of Hohfeldian powers over Y’s duty, there is no reason why we should not refine 
the Will Theory to reflect that X has the necessary control over Y’s duty to count as a 
right-holder in this case: 
Will Theory 2. For X to have a (claim-)right against Y that Y Φ, either: 
(i) if default rule 1 is operative, X must have the power to en-
force Y’s duty to Φ, or 
(ii) if default rule 2 is operative, X must have the power to 
waive Y’s duty to Φ. 
Kramer writes, if one were to ‘retreat from the notion that a right consists in three sets of 
paired powers over a correlative duty, they would be abandoning their rationale for the 
Will Theory’ (Kramer 2013, 257). This is incorrect. The refinement is motivated by, first, 
a recognition that some default rule must be operative with reference to the waiver or 
enforcement of duties and, second, that a right-holder must have the relevant kind of 
normative control over the correlative duty. Given that X has the power to waive Y’s duty, 
 
43 This is not a strawman-characterisation of the Will Theory: ‘something is a right if it is […] a claim […] 
to which are attached powers of waiver and enforcement’ (emphasis mine) (Steiner 1994, 61). 
44 Things get more complicated if X is not uniquely empowered to waive the enforcement of Y’s duty. In a 
appendix on file with author, I take up this question, as well as, first, if X does not have an immunity with 
regards to exercising her power and, second, if X does not hold the liberty to exercise her power.  
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she is free to reshape her normative space; given that the duty will be enforced if she does 
not act, she is free to have her normative space shaped as she would like. 
 
4. Undergenerations of Rights 
With Kramer’s objection dealt with, let us turn to the standard objections to the Will 
Theory.  
The Will Theory requires that a right-holder has control over the duty that correlates to 
her right. This means that ‘potential rightholders [are] only those beings that have certain 
capacities: the capacities to exercise powers to alter the duties of others’ (Wenar 2005, 
239). This precludes agents with undeveloped, compromised, or damaged rational capac-
ities (for example, very young children, the severely mentally disabled, and some of those 
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease).45 These agents cannot meaningfully waive or enforce 
the duties of the individuals against whom they hold their rights. So, they cannot hold 
powers. Accordingly, they cannot hold rights on the Will Theory (MacCormick 1982, 
156–59; Kramer 2000, 69–70). This is an implausible implication of the Will Theory. 
Call this the Incapacity Undergeneration. It is both an objection to the Will Theory as an 
account of moral and legal rights. 
The Will Theory also undergenerates right-ascriptions for inalienable rights. Perhaps my 
rights against servitude and against grievous bodily harm are of such a character that I 
cannot waive them. This means that I do not hold a power of waiver over them. Because 
the Will Theory requires that we hold powers over any claims in order for them to be 
rights, inalienable rights cannot be accounted for. MacCormick has nicely captured this 
problem. In relation to minor interferences, physical sports, or bona-fide surgical opera-
tions, X can waive Y’s duty not to harm or interfere with her. The Will Theory can ac-
count for these rights. Yet, in relation to serious harm or operations by unqualified sur-
geons, X cannot waive Y’s duty not to act in such ways. Accordingly, the Will Theory 
cannot account for these more serious rights: ‘How odd that, as the [normative] 
 
45 It also precludes animals and, perhaps, the dead. Whether these are right-holders is more contentious.  
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protection is strengthened, the right disappears!’ (MacCormick 1977, 197–98). Call this 
the Inalienability Undergeneration. It is an objection to the Will Theory as an account of 
moral and legal rights. 
Finally, the Will Theory undergenerates rights that are not inalienable in general but are 
not alienable by their holders. The usual example offered is some of our rights pertaining 
to the criminal law.46 Crudely put, criminal law duties are not waivable by their correla-
tive right-holders. My neighbour’s legal duty not to cut off my arm (correlating with my 
right that she not do so) is not waivable by me. But, at least on positivist views of the law, 
the state is able to waive this duty. The Will Theory implies that I do not actually hold 
this right against my neighbour. Call this the Inability Undergeneration.47 (Since the state 
can waive the duty, the Will Theory says the state holds the right. We return to this in 
section 5.1.) 
The Inability Undergeneration contains rights that are alienable by others aside from the 
putative right-holder, whereas the Inalienability Undergeneration contains rights that are 
inalienable in general. Drawing the precise boundary between these two classes of under-
generations is going to be hard. It depends on whether we think certain criminal law 
duties could be waived by legal officials, or whether they are inalienable in general. It is 
also unclear whether the Inability Undergeneration applies to moral rights pertaining to 
the criminal law. Perhaps the moral rights that individuals have pertaining to the criminal 
law are either inalienable (so captured by the Inalienability Undergeneration) or morally 
waivable by their holders, though, for practical reasons, not legally waivable. Alterna-
tively, if the legal rights are justified, their holders do not have the moral power to waive 
the duties correlating to them. Regardless of which way we go on this question, there are 
some moral rights pertaining to the law that are not inalienable in general, but are not 
waivable by their holders. For example, in countries with minimum wage laws, employers 
 
46 “Some of” since it is likely that the rest will be inalienable in general.  
47 For those with less positivistic views of the nature of the law, judges have the legal power to incarcerate 
people for long periods of time (or even execute people), legal powers the individual likely will not have. 
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this.   
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are under duties to pay their employees certain amounts; these duties are not waivable by 
potential employees, though is waivable by the state.   
Steiner thinks that the Incapacity Undergeneration is a moral objection to the Will Theory, 
but the Inalienability and Incapacity Undergenerations are conceptual objections because 
the Will Theory is ‘logically incapable of explaining how the undisputed existence of some 
perfectly enforceable duties [criminal law duties] implies rights at all’ (Steiner 2000, 248). 
It is unclear why this conceptual point is not true of the Incapacity Undergeneration. The 
objection is not “Wouldn’t it be bad if children didn’t hold rights, how immoral of the 
Will Theory!” but “We take children to have rights just as we take adults to have rights 
with respect to the criminal law—the Will Theory logically precludes this.” For this rea-
son, I see no reason to distinguish the character of the Incapacity Undergeneration from 
the Inalienability and Inability Undergenerations. 
Steiner also suggests that the three dimensions along which the Will Theory undergener-
ates right-ascriptions suffer from ‘severely disabling circularity inasmuch as [they] simply 
presuppose the truth of the [Interest Theory]’ (Steiner 1994, 66).48 However, they do not 
presuppose the Interest Theory but suggest that the Will Theory is overly restrictive.  
With our three classes of undergenerations in place, the following three sections put for-
ward a range of seemingly plausible ways that a defender of the Will Theory can respond, 
while laying clear the implications of those positions. We see there is a general problem. 
Either, we can keep the Will Theory faithful to its account of control as the grounds of 
rights, in which case the theory undergenerates right-ascriptions, or we can make the the-
ory extensionally accurate, but at the cost of obscuring the theory’s focus on control. 
 
5. Being Revisionary About Rights 
One might think that we need not refine the Will Theory in reply to our three classes of 
undergenerations, but simply draw out the Will Theory’s implications more carefully. 
 
48 Kramer makes similar remarks in reply to the third-party beneficiary problem (Kramer 2000, 67–68).  
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Subsection 5.1 examines how defenders of the Will Theory may respond in this way to 
the Incapacity and Inalienability Undergenerations. Subsection 5.2 examines how they 
may respond in this way to the Inalienability Undergeneration.   
5.1 Being Revisionary About Right-Holders  
The Incapacity and Inability Undergenerations occur because someone who is intuitively 
not the right-holder is in possession of the relevant powers of demand and waiver. Why 
not think that it is these individuals—the holders of these powers—that possess the rights? 
With reference to the Inability Undergeneration, Steiner writes ‘there’s simply no obstacle 
to extending the application of the Will Theory to criminal-law duties and holding that, 
whereas civil law confers Will Theory rights on private citizens, criminal law (now) rests 
them in state officials’ (Steiner 2000, 250). 
It is more tempting to say that it is not the state officials, but society at large who is the 
right-holder, and that officials act as fiduciaries on society’s behalf. While comparatively 
more attractive, this view still has flaws. First, the objections I raise below apply equally. 
Second, the Will Theory cannot, without alteration, make sense of fiduciaries. We con-
sider such an amendment below (Will Theory 3), so I set it aside for now. 
There are obstacles to thinking that criminal law rights and the rights of agents without 
rational capacities are actually held by others. Both as a mark of first-order and theoretical 
intuitions, it is extremely counterintuitive. The right that correlates with your being under 
a duty not to break my leg seems to be my right, not some state officials’. I said that it is 
more tempting to think of the revisionary right-holder as being society. Perhaps, if you 
break my leg, you wrong society through breaking its laws in some sense, in addition to, or 
in place of, acting wrongly in an undirected sense. Nonetheless, you also wrong me in a 
way that is distinct from my being a member of society. Put differently, I have different 
grounds for complaint than society. 
This is because being revisionary about right-holders in this way is inattentive to the di-
rectionality of duties. Take the Incapacity Undergeneration. Children, the mentally disa-
bled, and individuals suffering from Alzheimer’s seem to have rights to the provision of 
certain goods and against certain interferences. Failure to respect duties pertaining to 
these entitlements seems to wrong those individuals. This feature marks that these duties 
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are directed to the individuals under consideration—as we saw in the introduction, one is 
wronged by a duty’s violation only if one is owed that duty; if one is not owed a duty, one 
is not wronged by its violation.  
There are two ways a defender of revisionism about rights might reply. First, they might 
welcome the implication and argue that it is the holders of the relevant legal powers (it is 
the legal officials, the guardians of children) who are wronged when these rights are vio-
lated (Hart 1955, 181).49 This is an implausible implication of being revisionary about 
rights. In Michael Thompson’s terms, we think of these individuals as ‘not just raw materials 
for wrongdoing, but someone whom someone might ‘wrong’’ (Thompson 2004, 352).  
Second, we might separate rights from wrongings. We might hold that some feature(s) 
grounds wronging and say, of that set of wronging, only those instances when an agent 
has normative control over the individual who wronged them are right-violations.50 
Above, I distinguished two senses of grounding—this reply is closer to the second sort, on 
which all manner of things ground duties; it is when an agent has normative control over 
another’s duty that it becomes directed. This reply goes further, saying that all manner of 
things ground directed duties, infringements of which constitute wronging, and there is a 
further subset, those directed duties that agents have normative control over, that corre-
late with rights. Now, we might be sceptical of such a complicated picture as it appears 
ad hoc. Relatedly, we need to give an account of what makes a directed duty, since the 
normative control that previously delineated directed from undirected duties now deline-
ates rights from directed duties.  
Further, there is a worry that the defender of the Will Theory has changed the subject in 
dissociating rights from directed duties. This implication can be seen by examining the 
following dilemma concerning the normative seriousness of right-violations. Suppose that 
two threateners are about to inflict two equal harms on a child and her guardian. A de-
fender of the view outlined above says that both individuals are wronged by their 
 
49 Cf. note 58. 
50 This is not the way Steiner would go—he characterises rights as ‘essentially about who is owed what by 
whom’ (Steiner 2007, 459). 
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respective threateners. However, only the guardian is the holder of a right against the 
threateners’ actions. She holds both a right against her threatener’s action and a right 
against her child’s threatener. We could say that right violations are normatively signifi-
cant for the person who holds that right, in addition to that she has been wronged. Yet 
this implies, counterintuitively, that something more normatively significant happens to 
the guardian—like her child, she is wronged; unlike her child, she has two rights violated, 
whereas her child has no rights violated. This is odd. Instead, we could say that right 
violations are not normatively significant in addition to wronging. Yet this means all of the 
normative work is being done by directed duties; aside from being counterintuitive, we 
need not care about the Will Theory of rights anymore.   
We have been proceeding on the assumption that a person is wronged only if they have 
a directed duty violated (often, correlating with a claim-right). We might abandon this 
assumption. This allows us to keep the Will Theory as an account of directed duties and 
rights. Nicolas Cornell thinks that we should separate rights from wrongs, where rights 
concern reasons for action ex ante and wronging concerns complaint ex post (Cornell 2015, 
119).51 Cornell offers several cases in support of this verdict, including a third-party ben-
eficiary case, a case in which harm results from an overheard lie, and a case in which a 
drunk driver kills someone’s child. Cornell believes that the third-party beneficiary, the 
overhearer, and the child’s parents are wronged, though they have no right violated. Be-
cause of this, he thinks: ‘parties may sometimes be put in a special moral position to com-
plain and seek justification ex post, not by conduct over which they could have asserted 
any rights claim of their own ex ante, but rather by conduct that was wrong for other 
reasons, like violating someone else’s rights’ (Cornell 2015, 113). He thinks the Will The-
ory gives a good account of rights, and the Interest Theory gives a good account of wrong-
ing.52 Regardless of whether Cornell is correct that the third-party beneficiary, over-
hearer, and parents are wronged, a child or a person without rational capacities seem to 
 
51 Cornell does not discuss that Y might be under a directed duty to X to Φ, but X not have a claim-right 
against her that she Φ (notable in its omission, e.g, (Cornell 2015, 111)).  
52 Cornell takes it that children have rights, so he requires some revision to the Will Theory. 
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be on the “rights” side of Cornell’s taxonomy. This is because what happens to the child 
or the person without rational capacities generates reasons for action ex ante.  
We have considered whether one can respond to the Incapacity and Inability Undergen-
erations by being revisionary about who the right-holder is, attributing it to whoever is in 
possession of the relevant powers of demand and waiver. This line of thinking gets wrong 
who is wronged by a duty’s violation because it gets wrong the directionality of duties. We 
have also seen that separating rights from directed duties and separating rights & directed 
duties from wrongs in reply to this problem does not come without its own problems.  
For the remainder of this chapter, let us see how we might respond on behalf of the Will 
Theory without recourse to separating rights from directed duties or wrongs. In Section 
6, we see how we might revise the Will Theory to respond to the Incapacity and Inability 
Undergenerations. Before that, let us see how we might respond to the Inalienability Un-
dergeneration without revising the Will Theory.  
5.2 Normative Control  
The Inalienability Undergeneration occurs because, intuitively, there are some rights that 
are not waivable, either by their holder or by anyone else. Above, I gave the example of 
rights against servitude and against grievous bodily harm. Now, recall from the introduc-
tion that I said many think that I can have a liberty, against you, not to give you my pen, 
but be under a duty to give you my pen nonetheless—it is just that this duty cannot be 
owed to you (for example, it may be owed to a third-party, to whom I have promised my 
pen). Another example of this phenomena is, even if I free you from your duty not to take 
my pen, you may still be under a duty not to take my pen, owed to someone else (for 
example, you may have promised a third-party that you will not take my pen). What is 
going on here is that I have removed the duty that you owed to me not to take my pen 
without removing all duties that you are under not to take my pen.  
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We might use this machinery to try and explain inalienable rights on the Will Theory.53 
Take the example of my legal right, against you, that you not inflict grievous bodily harm 
on me. Perhaps, were I to attempt to waive my right, I would free you from your duty, 
owed to me, not to inflict grievous bodily harm on me, but you remain under a legal duty 
not to do so nonetheless (for example, a legal duty owed to the state). Put differently, you 
are under (at least) two duties not to inflict grievous bodily harm on me. I have the power 
to waive one of those duties. Since I have the power to waive that duty, I have sufficient 
control over that specific duty to attribute a right to me on the Will Theory. Correlatively, 
this means you owe me a duty not to inflict grievous bodily harm on me. An important 
upshot of this is that, if I waive the duty, you would not wrong me by inflicting grievous 
bodily harm on me, though you may still act wrongly.54  
What to make of this way of responding to the Inalienability Undergeneration on behalf 
of the Will Theory? Let me draw out three implications. First, the type of normative con-
trol that grounds rights is somewhat weaker than the picture the Will Theory began with. 
Recall Hart’s insight that, on the Will Theory, ‘[t]he individual who has the right is a 
small scale sovereign to whom the duty is owed’. Given what we have said in this subsec-
tion, rights are not grounded in the control one has to make others’ actions permissible—
the type of control that Hart’s language evokes.55 While this certainly does not count de-
cisively against the Will Theory, it is an interesting implication of this line of thinking.  
 
53 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this way of responding to the Inalienability Undergen-
eration.  
54 On the importance of this kind of control, see Owens’s discussion of normative interests (Owens 2012). 
Might we be able to tell a similar story for moral rights? Perhaps I am able to free you from your moral 
duty, owed to me, not to inflict grievous bodily harm on me, and yet you still be under a moral duty not to 
inflict such harm on me. For example, perhaps one remains under an undirected duty not to inflict grievous 
harm on me despite my valid consent. Tadros endorses a view of this sort, though the details are somewhat 
different (Tadros 2016a, 265–80, esp. 273–74). However, a defender of this view owes us an account of 
why, on the one hand, the undirected duty not to harm is present in cases of grievous bodily harm, despite 
one’s valid consent waiving the directed duty, while the undirected duty is not present in cases of non-
serious harm and, on the other hand, why this does not simply mean the directed duty not to commit 
grievous harm remains present. I look to develop this in future work.  
55 Can we appeal to the fact that one has control over whether others wrong one in performing certain 
actions inasmuch as one has control over whether to leave the duty, owed to one, in existence? As an 
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Now one might say, other things being equal, X, the right-holder, has control over whether 
Y’s not Φ-ing is permissible. This allows defenders of the Will Theory to keep X’s making 
Y’s not Φ-ing permissible central on the account.56 Yet, we need to ask what is meant by 
other things being equal, here. And, what must be being held equal is all other duties that 
Y is under—only in holding those other duties absent can we say that X has the power to 
make Y’s not Φ-ing permissible. There is still a departure from Hart’s picture of right-
holders as small-scale sovereigns. 
Second, this way of thinking might still strike one as extensionally inadequate. This way 
of thinking does allow that one can waive one’s rights and others’ directed duties not to 
perform certain actions, though the performance of those actions remain impermissible. 
Nonetheless, it implies that one can waive all of one’s rights and correlative directed duties 
owed to one. But, it seems possible that a legal system or moral theory may imply that 
inalienability is possible. For example, that one cannot waive others’ duties not to enslave 
one, seriously harm one, or even kill one. One could think, even to perform these actions 
in the knowledge that the right-holder consents would be to undermine the right-holder’s 
moral status—as someone to whom these sorts of things cannot be done—and thereby 
constitute a wrong to them. Of course, this is only a sketch of such a moral view. But it does 
not seem at all contradictory to have inalienable moral rights. That a legal system may 
have such implications is even easier to imagine.  
Third, and somewhat relatedly, regardless of what one actually thinks of the extensional 
adequacy of this way of thinking, it implies that it is still conceptually impossible for one 
to hold a right that one is incapable of waiving. Correlatively, it is conceptually impossible 
for one to owe a duty to someone else that they are incapable of waiving. And, ruling this 
out as a matter of conceptual fiat might strike one as a mark against the Will Theory. For 
example, the volenti non fit injuria principle states that, to one who consents, no wrong is 
 
anonymous reviewer pointed out to me, this risks assuming in the analysis one of the features the account 
is trying to explain. 
56 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
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done. If the Will Theory is correct, there is no argument concerning the volenti princi-
ple—it simply falls out of the nature of rights. But this seems like an open question. 
We have considered how problematic the Inalienability Undergeneration is without re-
course to revising the Will Theory. It does not come without its problems. Below, we turn 
to another way that a Will Theorist might respond to the Inalienability Undergeneration 
by revising the Will Theory (section 7). 
 
6. What’s in Being a Power-Holder? 
We have seen that it will not do to be revisionary about rights. Perhaps: 
Will Theory 3. For X to have a (claim-)right against Y that Y Φ, either X or 
some other agent, Z, must have the power to alter Y’s duty to Φ on X’s 
behalf.  
Will Theory 3 responds to the Incapacity and Inability Undergeneration. If there are 
inalienable rights, they cannot be rights on Will Theory 3.57  
One might wonder how principled of a refinement Will Theory 3 is. Hart came to endorse 
(something like) Will Theory 3.58 By way of supporting the refinement, he suggests, 
since (a) what such representatives can and cannot do by way of exercise of 
such power is determined by what those whom they represent could have done 
if sui juris [of age] and (b) when the latter become sui juris they can exercise 
these powers without any transfer or fresh assignment; the powers are re-
garded as belonging throughout to them and not to their representatives, 
though they are only exercisable by the latter during the period of disability. 
(Hart 1982, 184, fn. 86) 
 
57 Herein lies the difference between Will Theory 3 and Sreenivasan’s Hybrid Theory—the Hybrid Theory 
allows that no-one hold the power over Y’s correlative duty, provided this is in the right-holder’s interest 
(Sreenivasan 2005; 2010). 
58 (Hart 1982, 184, fn. 86); cf. Hart’s earlier view, note 49.  
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Hart’s two points hold only for the Incapacity Undergeneration. So, one will either need 
to tell a different story to motivate Will Theory 3 with regards to the Inability Undergen-
eration, or else find some other way of responding to that class of undergenerations. Fur-
ther, it is not obvious that Hart’s first point, (a), holds for all rights. There are moral and 
legal powers that one can exercise when of age, though a fiduciary cannot exercise on 
one’s behalf. For example, when of age, one can consent to sexual intercourse with others. 
But fiduciaries cannot exercise powers of sexual consent. So, it is not true in general that 
‘what such representatives can and cannot do by way of exercise of such power is deter-
mined by what those whom they represent could have done if sui juris [of age]’.  
Hart’s second point, (b), holds only for children who go on to develop sufficiently sophis-
ticated rational capacities. Perhaps an analogous story could be told for those who lose 
their rational capacities, though the transfer of legal powers does not proceed by default 
as Hart emphasises with children. Hart’s second point does not hold for those who will 
never develop sufficiently sophisticated rational capacities, such as those with severe men-
tal disabilities. So, it is unclear how principled of an account Hart has actually offered. 
This points to a more general problem with Will Theory 3 that is best got at through 
considering two further problems with this refinement. 
First, Will Theory 3 weakens the grounding relation supporting the Will Theory.59 The 
idea behind the Will Theory is that rights protect agents’ will. However, in what way does 
a fiduciary acting on the claim-holders’ behalf manifest the protection of the claim-
holder’s will? Perhaps, if we consider the rights of children, their fiduciaries are acting in 
ways that the child would will, were she able. Yet, I think we are conflating what we take 
to be in a child’s will with what is in their interests in general. In this way, I am unclear of 
whether I can understand the child’s will in the same way as I understand an autonomous 
agent’s will—the autonomous agent’s will is morally salient because it allows her to shape 
her own life; this is not true of the child. This line of argument gets even more obscure 
 
59 Put differently, despite Hart’s attempts to the contrary, Will Theory 3 is ad hoc. 
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when considering the rights of those with severe mental disabilities and agents who have 
permanently lost their rational capacities.60  
Relatedly, second, we might ask how Will Theory 3 interacts with the directionality of 
wronging associated with violating rights. On the Will Theory, if Y fails to respect X’s 
right, she wrongs X because she has failed to respect X’s will. The protection of X’s will 
grounds her right—it explains why her right has normative importance. Once we weaken 
the Will Theory so that the power might be held by another agent, Z, why does Y’s failing 
to respect X’s right not wrong Z instead of X? When Y fails to respect X’s claim that Z 
holds a power over, Y fails to respect Z’s will; on the Will Theory, failing to respect some-
one’s will was supposed to account for wronging.  
This leads us to the more general problem with Will Theory 3—we need an explanation 
of how the fiduciary relationship links up with the Will Theory’s focus on normative con-
trol, as well as a way to determine when someone is holding a power as a fiduciary, rather 
than holding a power as a right-holder. Moving forward, those wanting to defend Will 
Theory 3 need to offer us such an account. 
One way of cashing out this relationship between the right-holder and others holding 
powers on their behalf that is faithful to the Will Theory’s focus on normative control as 
the grounds of rights is:  
Will Theory 4. For X to have a (claim-)right against Y that Y Φ, either (i) X 
must have the power to alter Y’s duty to Φ or (ii) that duty must be aimed 
at satisfying the minimum conditions necessary for the exercise of nor-
mative agency for X.  
Will Theory 4 appears to deal with most of the undergenerations. First, perhaps children 
are afforded rights so that they can become normative agents; second, perhaps inalienable 
 
60 Perhaps there are even some people who do not counterfactually have consciousness because their disa-
bility is essential to their identity. 
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rights are aimed at protecting normative agency; third, perhaps the rights we have per-
taining to the criminal law protect us in our capacity as normative agents.  
There are at least three reasons to be sceptical of Will Theory 4. First, Will Theory 4 will 
not generate rights for agents without autonomy in prospect, so still undergenerates right-
ascriptions for those with permanently compromised or deteriorating rational capacities. 
While Will Theory 4 lessens the scope of the Incapacity Undergeneration, it is still deeply 
problematic.  
Second, it is misplaced to say that, for example, children are afforded rights only insofar 
as those rights are aimed at satisfying the minimum conditions necessary for normative 
agency. (Note that I am not denying that these sorts of considerations ground some of the 
rights afforded to children.) Suppose that Dana is under a duty not to break Eric’s child’s 
arm. It is misplaced to say that Eric’s child has this right only insofar as, were Dana to 
break her arm, this would inhibit her ability to arrive at the minimum conditions neces-
sary for normative agency. (If Eric’s child is young enough, will it inhibit her arriving at 
normative agency whatsoever?) The same seems true, to a great extent, of inalienable and 
criminal law rights.  
Third, and this is somewhat of a dialectical point, this account now seems structurally 
identical to the Interest Theory. Without having offered the Interest Theory, I cannot 
fully develop this criticism. But, Will Theory 4 says that children are afforded rights so 
that they can become beings who can lead autonomous lives. Because it is not the exercise 
of autonomy that grounds rights (vis-à-vis clause (ii)) but autonomy in prospect, propo-
nents of Will Theory 4 require that rights are aimed at something valuable (autonomy). 
This looks structurally identical with the Interest Theory, though a version of the Interest 
Theory on which autonomy-interests exclusively ground rights.  
That Will Theory 4’s clause (ii) is structurally identical to the Interest Theory (with inter-
ests restricted to autonomy) does not mean it is false, though it does have dialectical im-
plications on those arguments that can be used against the Interest Theory. And, in any 
case, the two previous objections (undergenerations pertaining to those without autonomy 
in prospect and the strange grounding of lots of rights) heavily speak against the view. 
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7. Different Measures of Control 
Here are two further ways we might revise the Will Theory. 
Will Theory 5. For X to have a (claim-)right against Y that Y Φ, X must 
have some power over Y’s duty to Φ.61  
Will Theory 6. For X to have a (claim-)right against Y that Y Φ, either (i) 
X must have the power to alter Y’s duty to Φ or (ii) be specially placed 
to demand the enforcement of the right.62 
There are some problems with Will Theory 5 and 6. First, Will Theory 5 cannot answer 
all of the Inalienability and Inability Undergenerations since those who are intuitively the 
right-holders will not always hold any of the six powers identified above. (While the person 
who is the object of a criminal law duty is well placed to see to it that the duty is enforced, 
she is not necessarily uniquely placed.) Will Theory 6 is in a better position on this score 
since one can argue that the right-holder is specially placed to demand the enforcement 
of the duty, even if powers of waiver are held by other parties or if the duty is inalienable. 
Second, both Will Theory 5 and 6 cannot answer the Incapacity Undergeneration. This 
is because young children, for example, cannot exercise any of the six powers offered 
above, nor are they specially placed to demand the enforcement of their rights. So, it is 
not clear how far Will Theory 5 and 6 get us.  
Third, Will Theory 5 and 6 seem at odds with the intuitive stringency of rights on the Will 
Theory. This is easiest to see on Will Theory 6. In discussion of the Inalienability Under-
generation, I noted MacCormick’s observation that agents hold the power to waive oth-
ers’ duties not to inflict minor but not major suffering upon them. This means that any 
agent, X, satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) with respect to minor suffering and only (ii) with 
respect to major suffering. X’s right against major suffering is more stringent that her right 
 
61 This view is relied upon in Steiner, especially his discussion of plea bargaining (Steiner 1994, 70; 2000, 
251). 
62 (Feinberg 1980; Skorupski 2010, 307–13; Darwall 2013). 
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against minor suffering. Rights are grounded in the normative control they endow their 
holder with. It is not clear how these two features link up on Will Theory 6. We can tell a 
similar story with Will Theory 5. Suppose that X has only the power to waive enforcement 
of the duty (powers 5 and 6), but not the power to waive the duty. If X’s having normative 
control over Y’s correlative duty grounds X’s right, how can the right that manifests less 
of this be more important?63 This seems difficult to explain. 
Fourth, there might be problems with Will Theory 5 and 6 depending upon how the 
normative control of the duty is distributed. Let us begin by seeing how this follows on 
Will Theory 5. Suppose that X holds only the powers to waive or demand enforcement of 
Y’s duty (powers 5 and 6), but Z holds the power to waive Y’s duty. The Will Theory says 
that rights are grounded in the normative control they endow their holder with. Yet, while 
X has some control over Y’s duty—she is in control of what happens as concerns enforce-
ment if Y violates her duty—she only has this control conditional on Z’s not waiving Y’s 
duty. And, one might be sceptical of whether this level of control is sufficient for X to have 
a right over Y that Y Φ. Even if one thinks this level of control is sufficient, it is important 
to appreciate the somewhat weakened notion of normative control that grounds rights 
given the move to Will Theory 5. 
Alternatively, perhaps it is Z that has control over the duty, and so Z that holds the right. 
First, this means Will Theory 5 will not help with the Inability Undergeneration (since it 
is those who are not, intuitively, the right-holder that have the power to waive the duty). 
Second, it is not even obvious it gets us the result that Z holds the right. Suppose that Z 
leaves the duty in existence for she wants Y to Φ. Y violates her duty. Z has no control over 
what happens now—X may simply waive Y’s duty to pay compensation. Again, one might 
be sceptical that this level of control is sufficient to endow X with a right. (Steiner thinks 
the right shifts from Z to X, though does not comment on its intuitive strangeness (Steiner 
2000, 247).) 
Things are a little different for Will Theory 6. But, the general point holds when X is only 
specially placed to demand enforcement of the right, but someone else has the power to 
 
63 Sreenivasan makes a similar point (Sreenivasan 2005, 261).  
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waive the duty correlative to the right. For example, suppose X wants to demand enforce-
ment of the right, yet Z waives the duty. More generally, we might be sceptical that X has 
sufficient normative control over the correlative duty in virtue of being specially placed to 
demand enforcement of the right if someone else has the power to waive the duty in the 
first place. At the least, again we should note the marked shift in the type of control over 
others’ duties that grounds rights on the Will Theory. 
At this stage, one might reply that all this fourth objection shows is that we need to be 
more careful in formulating the right in question. For example, when X has the power to 
enforce Y’s duty, and Z has the power to waive Y’s duty, why not say: X has a (claim-)right 
that Y Φ conditional on Z not waiving Y’s duty.64  
The first thing to note is this does not help us with the first three objections raised against 
Will Theory 5, and the second and third objections, which hold against Will Theory 6. 
And, in any case, this proposal is not going to come without its issues. This is because the 
conditional nature of these rights might strike one as extensionally odd. Let us take two 
concrete examples.  
Suppose we want to use Will Theory 5 to deal with rights correlating with criminal law 
duties. Sometimes, victims of the violation of criminal law duties have some measure of 
control over the enforcement of the duty after its violation through judges taking into 
account their wishes in sentencing. In virtue of this control afforded to victims, let us say 
they are endowed a legal right correlative with the criminal law duty. Now, this does not 
mean they have a right against the harm. Rather, they have a conditional right against the 
harm, conditional on the duty’s not being waived (and on their wishes being taken into 
account in sentencing—for if their wishes are not taken into account, they have no control 
over the duty). And, one might find it implausible that the right is conditional in this way.   
Let us take another example. In section 4, I said that, in countries with minimum wage 
laws, employees have the right to a minimum wage. This is problematic for the Will The-
ory since the state has the power to waive employers’ duty to pay a minimum wage. On 
 
64 Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for this suggestion.  
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Will Theory 5 and 6, employees have the right to a minimum wage if they hold, for ex-
ample, the power to demand enforcement of the duty. The fourth objection I have raised 
to Will Theory 5 and 6 is that they only have the control endowed by this power if the 
state does not waive employers’ duty to pay a minimum wage. And, this does not endow 
employees with the type of normative control necessary for rights on the Will Theory. 
The conditional strategy of replying to this objection would say that the right employees 
have is the right to a minimum wage conditional on the state not waiving the duty—this 
links the control employees do have with the content of their right. But, like with rights 
corresponding to criminal law duties, the conditional nature of this right might strike one 
as extensionally odd—I am inclined to think employees have the right to a minimum 
wage. The right may well be more secure if the state did not have the power to waive the 
employers’ duty to pay a minimum wage, but this does not affect the content of the right. 
Whatever one thinks of the extensional plausibility of these conditional rights, there is a 
more general problem that all of this discussion highlights: the more moves defenders of 
the Will Theory make in replying to our three classes of undergeneration (for example, 
by moving to either Will Theory 5 or 6, by drawing out that putative right-holders do 
have control conditional on others not waiving the correlative duties, and so on), the 
weaker the normative control the right-holder has over the duty. But, the insight of the 
Will Theory was supposed to be that rights endow us with normative control. Recall Stei-
ner’s remark that rights, on the Will Theory, demarcate ‘spheres of practical choice within 
which the choices made by designated individuals […] must not be subjected to interfer-
ences’ (Steiner 2000, 238). One might be sceptical of how much of this insight of the Will 
Theory remains true of either Will Theory 5 and 6. Put differently, how connected to the 
idea of normative control grounding rights are Will Theory 5 and 6?  
It is difficult, then, to link the idea of normative control with there being a distribution of 
the powers one holds over another’s duty. It is even more difficult to see why, the more 
stringent a right appears, the less normative control one has over it. This is exemplified 
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with inalienable rights—we are only (elusively) specially placed to demand the enforcement 
of these right.65  
 
8. Conclusion 
In section 4, I introduced the Incapacity, Inalienability, and Inability Undergenerations. 
Sections 5-7 put forward a range of seemingly plausible ways that a defender of the Will 
Theory may respond, while laying clear the implications of those positions. At the end of 
section 4, I suggested that there was going to be a general problem with these responses—
either, we can keep the Will Theory faithful to its account of normative control as the 
grounds of rights, in which case the theory undergenerates right-ascriptions; or, we can 
make the theory extensionally accurate, but at the cost of obscuring the theory’s focus on 
control.66   
We have seen that, (5.1) if one wants to be revisionary given the undergenerations that 
plague the Will Theory, one faces trouble in attempting to account for the connection 
between rights, directed duties, and wrongings. That is, the counterintuitiveness of the 
undergenerations cannot be explained away. And, we have seen that (5.2) emphasising 
that one may be able to waive some of others’ duties not to Φ, without waiving all of 
others’ duties not to Φ, still leads to undergenerations of rights.  
In section 6, we found that, on the one hand, while the idea of a fiduciary acting on a 
right-holder’s behalf may get a better extension than the standard formulation of the Will 
Theory, it obscures the connection between rights and wronging. On the other hand, we 
saw that though it may be faithful to the Will Theory’s account of the grounds of rights 
 
65 Rowan Cruft argues, further, that Will Theory 6 will be, in many circumstances, circular, for whether or 
not X is specially placed to demand the enforcement of another’s duties seems to depend upon whether we 
think the duty is owed to them in the first place (Cruft 2019, 32–34).  
66 A further point to note is that none of the revisions across sections 5 to 7 solved all three undergenerations; 
each would have to be taken with other revisions, thereby intensifying the weakened focus on normative 
control as the grounds of rights. 
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to see some rights as being grounded in securing the minimum conditions necessary for 
autonomy, this account is both stretched and itself extensionally inadequate.  
Finally, in section 7, we saw that the Will Theory has trouble if revised to allow right-
holders to have lessened powers of control over others’ duties. While this revision may 
achieve a better extension than the standard formulation of the Will Theory, again it is 
difficult to link these revisions up with the Will Theory’s focus on normative control as 
the grounds of rights.  
Moving forward, defenders of the Will Theory need either to take a stand on this dilemma 
or else find some other way of dissolving the dilemma not discussed in this chapter. I am 
sceptical this dilemma can be dissolved. The central insight of the Will Theory is that 
rights endow their holders with control—but, some rights just are not about control. So, 
if rights are not necessarily grounded in control, what are they grounded in?   
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3. The Interest Theory 
1. Introduction 
Think of some of one’s most important rights: one’s rights against being killed, against 
being tortured, against being raped. Why might one think those rights are so especially 
important compared with one’s other rights? One thought is that it would be awful for 
one were those things to happen. According to the Interest Theory of Rights, it is precisely 
because these things would be so awful for one that one has rights against the performance 
of those actions by others. Correlatively, that is why others owe one duties not to perform 
those actions: because they would be so awful for one. 
This way of introducing the Interest Theory brings to light a problem with the Will The-
ory, a problem that was lurking in the background of the previous chapter. The Will 
Theory says rights are grounded in the control with which they endow their holders. 
However, this fails to capture why (at least some) rights are important. Some rights are 
important because of the harm that would befall one were they to be violated. This point 
is well put when Cécile Fabre writes that ‘being tortured without one’s consent is bad 
because of the immense physical suffering one incurs, and/or because of the resulting [...] 
impairment of one’s [autonomy]’ (Fabre 2000, 15).67 The Will Theory cannot recognise 
this first feature—that badness of certain states of affairs—as playing any grounding role 
in rights, for rights are, on that theory, exclusively grounded in normative control. That 
is not a satisfactory account of the grounds of rights.  
In this chapter, we see that the Interest Theory solves the problems raised against the Will 
Theory in the previous chapter (section 2). I also argue we have other reasons to endorse 
the Interest Theory. The Interest Theory is then introduced in sufficient detail to be our 
focus for the remainder of this thesis (section 3). Finally, we return to the problem for the 
Interest Theory outlined in chapter 1, the Problem of Harmless Wronging (section 4). I 
 
67 Similarly, Cruft, Liao, and Renzo ask: ‘The fact that torture undermines one’s agency by undermining 
one’s capacity to decide how to act and to stick to the decision is certainly an important factor in justifying 
the existence of a human right not to be tortured but is it the only factor?’ (Cruft, Liao, and Renzo 2015, 
11). See also (Liao 2010; Tasioulas 2010, 663–66). 
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also suggest the problem is troublesome for other theories in addition to the Interest The-
ory.  
 
2. Introducing the Interest Theory  
Let us offer an initial formulation of the 
Interest Theory (Canonical). For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, X’s well-
being (her interests) must be of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to 
Φ.68  
The Interest Theory offers a plausible account of the grounds of rights—rights are 
grounded in the wellbeing of their holders.69 Further, the Interest Theory neatly explains 
the distinctive structural features of rights and their correlative directed duties. First, it 
gives a good account of why Y owes her duty to X—the duty owes its existence to features 
about X. Second, and relatedly, it offers a plausible account of why, if Y infringes her duty, 
she does not merely act wrongly but wrongs X—Y has failed to respond to morally salient 
duty-grounding features about X.  
I unpack the Interest Theory in the following section. In the remainder of this section, let 
us see why else one might want to endorse the Interest Theory (in addition to the Interest 
 
68 As we see directly below in the text, the Interest Theory offers an account of what it is to owe a duty to 
another. Accordingly, I omit that Y’s duty must be owed to X as is usually contained in these definitions. A 
few more clarifications. First, this version of the Interest Theory more closely resembles that of (Raz 1986, 
166) rather than that of (Kramer 2017) (see section 3.1). Second, the definition suffices only for claim-rights 
for Y is under a correlative duty to Φ only if X has a claim-right that she Φ (cf. section 3.4). Third, one might 
wonder how the Interest Theory can be called a theory given that it is merely a necessary but sufficient 
condition; this is addressed below (see section 3.3).  
69 This is ambiguous between saying that wellbeing makes the right exist and that wellbeing makes the duty 
correlate with a right. On the Interest Theory as I have defined it, grounds should be disambiguated in the 
first, stronger sense. This is because we are assuming a Justificatory version of the Interest Theory on which 
the grounds of the duty (the justification of the duty) determine its direction (see section 3.1). But, were we 
to go for a Nonjustificatory version, on which the direction of the duty is not tied to its justification, grounds 
could be disambiguated in the second, weaker sense. See the similar discussion in section 2 of chapter 2 on 
the ambiguity of grounds. 
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Theory’s plausible grounding of rights and its nice explanation of some of the structural 
features of rights).  
The Interest Theory can recognise rights that the Will Theory does not. The Will Theory 
says right-holders must have some measure of control over the duties that correlate with 
their rights. This precludes those with undeveloped, compromised, or damaged rational 
capacities (for example, very young children, the severely mentally disabled, and those 
suffering from the later stages of Alzheimer’s disease). This was the Incapacity Undergen-
eration. The Interest Theory can recognise the rights of these people. All it requires is that 
they have wellbeing sufficiently important to place others under duties.  
Importantly, the Interest Theory does not simply gain extensional accuracy where the 
Will Theory struggles; it also explains why these people are potential right-holders. It is 
the facts about their wellbeing that explains why others are under duties not to treat them 
in certain ways.  
Since the Will Theory requires that right holders have some measure of control over the 
duties correlative with their rights, the Will Theory rules out inalienable rights. It also 
rules out holding rights where control over the correlative duties is held by someone else. 
These were the Inalienability and Inability Undergenerations respectively. The Interest 
Theory gets these cases correct. In either case, it does not matter that the right-holder 
does not have the power to control the duties correlative with those rights. All that matters 
is whether the holders’ wellbeing is the grounds of those duties. What was so puzzling 
about the Will Theory’s failure to recognise inalienable rights was that the best candidates 
for inalienable rights are very stringent. For example, the right not to be killed, rights 
against servitude, and so on. The Interest Theory makes sense of this—these are incredi-
bly weighty rights because there is so much at stake for the holder’s wellbeing. Below, we 
turn to whether the Interest Theory can explain why we do not hold powers of control over 
some of our rights (section 3.4.2).   
This gives us another reason to endorse the Interest Theory: it offers a plausible account 
of the stringency of rights that is in keeping with the grounds of rights. (Differently, it gives 
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a plausible account of the severity of the wrong of a right’s violation.)70 My right that you 
not kill me is much more stringent than my right that you not hit me, and the wrong of 
killing me much graver than the wrong of hitting me, because being killed would be a lot 
worse for me than being hit.71 
 
3. Unpacking the Interest Theory  
Above, we canvassed some reasons to endorse the Interest Theory: it offers a plausible 
account of the grounds of rights; building on this, it offers a plausible account of the strin-
gency of rights. It nicely explains some structural features of rights and directed duties. 
And, it deals well with the three classes of undergenerations that the Will Theory struggles 
with (as well as explaining why the Incapacity Undergeneration is not a problem for the 
Interest Theory).  
 
70 Some people have suggested to me that wrongs are all of the same weight (these people have exclusively 
been card-carrying Kantians). I find this incredibly implausible. Intuitively, the wrong one does to me when 
one breaks my leg is graver than the wrong one does to me when they break my finger. This is easily 
explained by saying that the respective right violated is more stringent in the leg breaking than the finger 
breaking.  
71 This may be in conflict with what McMahan calls the Equal Wrongness Thesis: ‘the wrongness of killing 
should reflect our commitment to the fundamental equality of persons [and] not vary with such factors as 
the degree of harm caused to the victim’ (McMahan 2002, 235). Space does not permit me a full analysis 
of this (for other discussion, see (Hanser 2012)). But let me say a few things. Some of this conflict is just the 
Problem of Preemption: when death is not particularly bad for one, this may be because the badness is 
preempted by some other bad; to anticipate discussion of what is to come, whether this preempted harm 
will affect what rights we hold given the Safety Condition will depend on how easily it could have been that 
the harm was not preempted.  
Even setting that aside, an analogous thesis, that the wrongness of inflicting some harm should not 
vary with such factors as the degree of harm, is implausible as suggested in the text: my right that you not 
kill me is much more stringent than my right that you not hit me. (The same holds comparing my right that 
you not kill me with Bloggs’ right that you not hit them.) Further, the Equal Wrongness Thesis is, to my 
eye, intuitively implausible in intrapersonal comparisons: other things being equal, the wrongness of killing 
me as a child is graver than killing me as I approach the end of my life. And, even when it comes to inter-
personal cases, I am tempted by the thought that, other things being equal, the wrong of killing a child is 
graver than the wrong of killing someone at the end of their life, and that it is harder to justify killing the 
child than the person at the end of their life. Finally, even if one is not tempted by this thought, this might 
be because the comparative utilities are irrelevant, in a way analogous to discussion of nonconsequentialist 
aggregation (Scanlon 1998, 229–41; Kamm 2007, 48–77). 
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In this section, I unpack the Interest Theory. My aim here is to provide a solid foundation 
for the Interest Theory. Because of this, at places we go into more detail than is strictly 
necessary for the arguments raised in the remainder of the thesis.  
3.1 Justificatory and Nonjustificatory 
This subsection compares two versions of the Interest Theory. The Problem of Harmless 
Wronging applies to either version, so this subsection is not strictly necessary for the ar-
gument of the thesis. The Interest Theory (Canonical) links the grounds of the correlative 
duty with the person to whom the duty is owed. However, there is another way defenders 
of the Interest Theory can go. Compare: 
Interest Theory (Justificatory). For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, X’s 
wellbeing (her interests) must be of sufficient weight to place Y under a 
duty to Φ. 
Interest Theory (Nonjustificatory). For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, X’s 
wellbeing (her interests) must be protected by Y’s duty to Φ.72 
Whereas the Justificatory version links the grounds of the duty to its direction (its justifi-
cation, so to speak), the Nonjustificatory version does not go this way. On the Nonjustifi-
catory version, we need not care what grounded the duty. We need care only about 
whether the duty protects the right-holder’s wellbeing. In this way, we can see that the 
Justificatory version is in some sense more demanding than the Nonjustificatory version. 
Often, one’s wellbeing will be served by some duty without being the grounds of the duty.  
 
72 I have omitted “Canonical” to make clear that the choice-point is between Justificatory and Nonjustifi-
catory versions of the Interest Theory. The Interest Theory’s most prominent defenders are Raz and Kra-
mer. Raz endorses a Justificatory version of the Interest Theory: ‘“X has a right” if and only if X can have 
rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interests) is a sufficient reason for 
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty’ (Raz 1986, 166). Kramer endorses a Nonjustificatory 
version of the Interest Theory: ‘Necessary though insufficient for the holding of a legal right by X is that the 
duty correlative to the right, when actual, normatively protects some aspect of X’s situation that on balance 
is typically beneficial for a being like X (namely, a human individual or a collectivity or a non-human ani-
mal)’ (Kramer 2017, 49). Kramer’s view has subtly changed over the years, but that does not concern us 
here (Kramer 2000; 2001; 2010; 2013); for discussion of the changes, see (Bowen, n.d.). 
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There are at least two reasons to endorse the Justificatory version. First, the Nonjustifica-
tory version struggles with so-called third-party beneficiaries, briefly introduced in the 
previous chapter (Hart 1982; Steiner 2000; Sreenivasan 2005).73 Again, suppose that 
Dana promises Erica that she will pay Fran £10. Intuitively, Dana owes Erica a duty to 
pay Fran £10 and does not owe Fran a duty to pay her £10. While the definition of the 
Nonjustificatory version of the Interest Theory is only a necessary condition, what addi-
tional necessary conditions will explain why Dana does not owe her duty to Fran (and, 
correlatively, will explain why Fran does not hold a right against Dana to the promise) 
given that Fran’s interests are served by the duty?  
Now, intuitions go both ways on this example.74 Even so, it is very hard to accept that 
Dana owes her duty to others who might benefit from the duty. For example, what of 
Fran’s daughter, for whom Fran was going to buy a present with the £10?75 Since Dana’s 
promissory duty is not grounded in Fran’s or her daughter’s wellbeing, the Justificatory 
version easily explains why Dana’s duty is not owed to them. 
The most promising reply to the problem of third-party beneficiaries is that Fran’s daugh-
ter does not necessarily benefit from the duty’s being fulfilled (Kramer 2000, 79–84; 2010, 
36–39). For example, Fran may decide not to buy her daughter a present. Whereas, so 
the thought goes, Fran’s wellbeing is necessarily protected by the promise’s fulfilment; so, 
the duty is owed only to those whose wellbeing is necessarily protected by the duty. Now, 
there may be some bugs with going this way. For example, we can likely bake into the 
case that the third party will necessarily be harmed when the right-holder is harmed.76 
But perhaps these bugs can be worked out. In any case, this appeal to necessity at least 
appears ad hoc. What principled reason do we have to move from, on the one hand, rights 
being grounded in their holder’s wellbeing being protected by the correlative duty to, on 
 
73 See chapter 2, section 2. 
74 Compare (Kramer 2017, 74–76) with (Sreenivasan 2005; Wenar 2013, 213). 
75 Some think so-called harmless promise breaking is wrong because it erodes the practice of promise keep-
ing, a practice that is beneficial to everyone (Rawls 1999, 301–7). If this is correct, we all benefit from a 
promise being upheld since we all benefit from the practice of promise keeping. This means promissory 
duties will be owed to everyone on the Nonjustificatory version, an unwelcome implication. 
76 For example, see the previous note.  
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the other hand, rights being grounded in their holder’s wellbeing being necessarily pro-
tected by the correlative duty?  
This is related to our second reason to endorse the Justificatory version. The Justificatory 
version’s account of the grounds of rights is more plausible than the Nonjustificatory ver-
sion’s account of the grounds of rights. On the Justificatory version, one holds a right only 
if, and (partly) because, one’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight to place the person against 
whom one holds the right under a duty. That is why the duty-bearer owes her duty to the 
right-holder—the duty exists because of them. On the Nonjustificatory version, one holds 
a right only if, and (partly) because, one’s wellbeing is necessarily protected by the duty. But 
why would one’s wellbeing being necessarily protected by some duty make it that the duty 
is owed to that individual?77  
Now, the Problem of Harmless Wronging applies to both versions of the Interest Theory. 
Since I think the Justificatory version’s account of the grounds of rights is more plausible 
than the Nonjustificatory version’s account, I will here adopt the Justificatory version.  
3.2 Sufficient Weight, Harm, and Wellbeing 
What does it mean, then, for someone’s wellbeing to be of sufficient weight to place some-
one else under a duty? On the face of it, things would be easier if we had gone for the 
Nonjustificatory version of the Interest Theory: we have an intuitive idea of what it is for 
someone’s wellbeing to be protected by a duty—we look to whether they would be harmed 
or benefited were the duty not to be respected. But, discovering whether someone’s 
 
77 This is not to say that there is no reason to prefer the Nonjustificatory version. Consider again an example 
of what we can call a referred right, introduced in section 2 of chapter 2: a journalist’s right not to disclose 
her sources (Raz 1986, 178–80; 1994). The journalist’s right does not seem to be grounded in her own 
interests in not disclosing her sources, but in the public’s interest in having a free press. But, on the Justifi-
catory version of the Interest Theory, rights must be grounded in their holder’s interests (in the wellbeing 
at stake for the holder). So, it looks like that version of the Interest Theory cannot explain how the journalist 
holds a right not to disclose her sources. However, since presumably the journalist’s interests are protected 
by others’ duties not to force her to disclose her sources (it makes carrying out her job easier for one thing), 
she can hold a right on the less demanding Nonjustificatory version. For potential replies on behalf of the 
Justificatory version, see (Raz 1994; May 2012). Addressing this problem for the Justificatory version would 
take us too far afield. But, for what it is worth, I am not even sure the costs of biting the bullet on referred 
rights is too great, especially when it comes to referred moral rights. Perhaps the duty is owed to the public 
at large.  
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wellbeing is sufficiently weighty to place others under duties is quite similar to discovering 
whether someone’s wellbeing is protected by another’s duty. It depends, in the first place, 
on the extent to which the potential right-holder would be harmed or benefited were the 
potential duty-bearer not to act as the would-be duty dictates.78 For example, Fabre says: 
‘the degree to which an interest of X’s is important enough to warrant the imposition of 
a duty on Y is a function of the degree to which X would be harmed if Y desisted from 
acting as required by the duty’ (Fabre 2008, 227).79  
This means we need an account of harm and benefit. Let us begin by assuming the dom-
inant  
Counterfactual Account of Harm and Benefit. Y harms X iff (and because) Y makes 
X worse off than X would have been had Y not acted as she did. Y benefits 
X iff (and because) Y makes X better off than X would have been had Y not 
acted as she did. 
The Counterfactual Account gets lots of cases right. For example, you harm me by cutting 
off my leg because you make me worse off than I would have been had you not cut my 
leg off. You benefit me by curing me of a cold because you make me better off than I 
would have been had you not cured me of the cold. What is more, the Counterfactual 
Account has great explanatory power: it is very plausible that you harm me by cutting my 
leg off because you make me worse off than I would have been had you not cut my leg off. 
The Counterfactual Account has this significant explanatory power because it tracks the 
difference harm makes to the harmed person—inasmuch, it is a difference-making account 
 
78 There is a distinction between benefiting from a duty’s existence and benefiting from the performance of 
the action required by that duty. For example, suppose that Threatener will punch Victim regardless of 
whether she is under a duty not to. In this case, Victim would not be benefited by the duty’s existence, since 
its existence makes no difference to whether Victim is punched either way; but, Victim would be benefited 
by the performance of the action required by the duty (i.e., not being punched). Cruft thinks the Interest 
Theory is formulated in the first way, and that this is problematic for the Interest Theory on these grounds 
(Cruft 2010). But we should formulate the Interest Theory in the second way, so there is no problem. This 
comes up again in chapter 8, section 4.2.  
79 See also (Scanlon 1984, 146; Raz 1986, 165–92; Cruft 2010, 441–45; Tasioulas 2015, 50–56). 
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(Bradley 2009, 50–51). We see some competing accounts of harm and benefit in the fol-
lowing chapter (sections 3-4). 
It is worth clarifying two features of the Counterfactual Account of Harm. First, it is re-
stricted to one person harming another, since we are mostly concerned with one person 
harming another person. More generally, we can say, an event, e, harms someone, X, iff 
X is worse off than she would have been had e not occurred. On this more general under-
standing, a tree falling from the wind can harm X just as much as a person’s cutting down 
a tree can harm X. We can also read X broadly enough to include anything we think 
capable of being harmed. For example, Mouse (my dog) can be harmed by an event if 
that event leaves her worse off than she would have been had the event not occurred. 
Second, the Counterfactual Account it is morally neutral. This is a very plausible feature 
of an account of harm and benefit but strikes some people as odd.80 Suppose we were to 
go for a morally loaded Counterfactual Account: Y harms X iff Y unjustifiably makes X 
worse off than X would have been had Y not acted as she did. Now suppose Threatener 
comes at Victim with a knife, culpably looking to kill them. The only way Victim can 
defend herself is by shooting Threatener in the leg. Victim acts justifiably in defending 
herself. This implies that, on the moralised Counterfactual Account, Victim does not 
harm Threatener. But that is very implausible. She harms Threatener. It is merely that 
the harm is justified. 
So, we discover whether one’s wellbeing is sufficiently weighty to place others under duties 
by looking, in the first place, to how one would have fared were the duty not to be re-
spected. Another thing we look to is the cost to the potential duty-bearer of acting as the 
would-be duty dictates. This plausibly differentiates rescues that one has rights to the per-
formance of and those that one does not have rights to the performance of. For example, 
if the only way that you can save a drowning child is by subjecting yourself to some suffi-
ciently large harm, intuitively, the child has no right to be rescued. But, if the costs are 
 
80 In conversation, Antony Duff objected on these grounds. Similarly, Feinberg thinks Y harms X only if Y 
violates X’s rights (Feinberg 1984, 36); in addition to the reasons raised in the text to avoid moralised ac-
counts, Feinberg’s view would leave us in an awful circle since we are grounding rights in harm. For more 
on why not to go moralised, see (Tadros 2016a, 181–82). 
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trivial, intuitively, the child does have a right to be rescued—it is not only wrong for you 
not to save the child, but you would wrong the child.81 
There might be other things we look to in determining whether potential right-holders’ 
wellbeing is sufficiently weighty to place others under duties. Some of these things I con-
sider in the following subsection as separate considerations on rights; for example, 
whether the harm is intended or merely foreseen, whether it is a doing or an allowing, 
and so on. As I say below, we could build these other considerations into the theory here 
as partly constitutive of what it is for one’s wellbeing to be sufficiently weighty to place 
others under duties. 
We are building up to an account of what determines whether one’s wellbeing is suffi-
ciently weighty to place others under duties. A complete analysis would take a stand on 
what wellbeing consists of. We can distinguish three types of theory of wellbeing (Parfit 
1984, 493–502). On Hedonistic Theories, wellbeing consists only of pleasure. On Desire The-
ories, wellbeing consists only of the satisfaction of one’s desires. On Objective List Theories, 
wellbeing consists only of the advancement of certain aspects of our lives, regardless of 
our attitudes toward those aspects. Finally, on Hybrid Theories, wellbeing consists of some 
combination of these accounts (it could be disjunctive, for example, “pleasure or desire 
satisfaction”, or conjunctive, for example, “desire satisfaction one takes pleasure in”).82 
We begin by being agnostic on this. 
 
81 This discussion is in keeping with the discussion of liberty-rights on the Interest Theory below, section 
3.4. For classic discussion of cost sensitive duties to rescue, see (Kagan 1989; Scheffler 1994). For explicit 
discussion of cost sensitive directed duties to rescue, correlative to rights, see (Quong 2015; Frowe 2019; n.d.) 
82 Even within each type of theory, there is debate as to the details. For example, Hedonists tend to disagree 
as to what pleasure amounts to. Internalists about pleasure say that there is some quality common to all 
pleasurable experiences (Crisp 2006), whereas Externalists say there is some external feature common to all 
pleasurable experiences, for example, that they are desired (Sidgwick 1981, 127; Sumner 1996, 87–91; 
Parfit 1984, 493). Hedonists also disagree about whether all pleasures are commensurable (Mill 1969; Crisp 
2006). Desire Theorists tend to disagree over which desires count for one’s wellbeing. We turn to two choice-
points in chapter 6, section 2. Objective List Theorists disagree about what items get to go on the list, as 
well as how the items on the list are linked. Monists think that one sort of thing unifies the list; for example, 
Perfectionists think that what is on the list is determined by the kind of thing that we are (Hurka 1993), whereas 
Pluralists think there is no such story to be told (Rice 2013). And Hybrid Theorists also disagree about which 
theories to combine, whether to make them conjunctive or disjunctive, and so on (Kagan 2009). The keen 
reader might also notice that I have only defined what is good for one, with no mention of what is bad for 
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3.3 Other Considerations 
The Interest Theory (Canonical) is a necessary but insufficient condition on rights. In this 
subsection, I list some other potential considerations that, together, are jointly sufficient 
for rights on the Interest Theory. Some of these conditions are explicit necessary but in-
sufficient conditions. Some modify the other necessary but insufficient conditions. I also 
explain how we might see these considerations as themselves partly constitutive of whether 
others’ wellbeing is sufficiently weighty to place one under duties.  
First, we have not said anything of the relation between the potential duty-bearers not 
acting as the duty dictates and the harm (or failure to benefit) to the potential right-holder. 
There are a few ways Interest Theorist could go. They could say that the potential duty-
bearer needs to cause the harm to the right-holder were she not to act as the potential duty 
dictates. Suppose Carla will hit Ann if, and only if, Ben Φs (for example, Carla will hit 
Ann unless Ben tells Ann he will never see her again). Since Ben does not cause the harm 
to Ann were he not to Φ (were he not to tell Ann he will never see her again), the causal 
reading of the relationship between the duty and harm (or failure to benefit) is not satis-
fied. So, Ann would not have a right against Ben that he not Φ. Alternatively, the Interest 
Theorist could say that the potential duty-bearer would need to “bring about” or “make 
it the case” that the right-holder was harmed were she not to act as the potential duty 
dictates.83 Though Ben may not cause the harm to Ann, he may well bring it about or 
make it the case. And there may be other ways still that the Interest Theorist could go. 
There are other things related to the relationship between the harm and the action re-
quired by the duty that might be relevant to the duty. Consider the following putative 
asymmetries:  
 
one. This is because some theorists think wellbeing (what is good for one) is different from illbeing (what is 
bad for one) (Kagan 2014). 
83 One place to look for locutions like this would be the literature on the Doctrine of Doing/Allowing. See 
the note below. 
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Asymmetry Between Harm and Failure to Benefit. Other things being equal, it is 
harder to justify Y’s harming X than it is to justify Y’s failing to benefit X.84 
Doctrine of Foreseeability. Other things being equal, it is harder to justify Y’s 
(reasonably) foreseeing that she will harm X than it is to justify Y’s not (rea-
sonably) foreseeing that she will harm X.85 
Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). Other things being equal, it is harder to jus-
tify Y intending to harm X than it is to justify Y merely foreseeing that her 
action will harm X.86 
Doctrine of Doing/Allowing (DDA). Other things being equal, it is harder to 
justify Y doing harm to X than it is to justify Y allowing harm to X.87  
Interest Theorists may make any combination of these four conditions partly constitutive 
of rights. For example, in making DDE internal to rights we would say that, other things 
being equal, if Y intends the harm that would befall X were Y to violate the potential duty, 
it is more likely to warrant a right against that conduct than if that harm were merely 
foreseen. This means that a harm to X caused by Y might be sufficient to warrant a right 
if that harm is intended by Y, although it might be insufficient if it was an unintended but 
foreseen consequence of her action. The same story could be told for our other three 
putative asymmetries.  
There may be other conditions relevant for right-ascriptions. For example, we might look 
to the distribution of harm among relevant groups of people and draw upon Prioritarian or 
Egalitarian considerations. We might look to the nature of the aspect of wellbeing at stake 
and draw Sufficientarian considerations (Fabre 2012, 17–26). We might not be 
 
84 (Shiffrin 1999; 2012; Gardner 2017). 
85 See (Thomson 1990, 229–34) for discussion of a similar principle.  
86 (Foot 1967; Quinn 1989a; Bennett 1995; McMahan 1994; Kamm 2007; Nelkin and Rickless 2014; 
Tadros 2015). 
87 (Foot 2002; Quinn 1989b; Bennett 1995; Woollard 2015). 
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Sufficientarians, but nonetheless think only some aspects of one’s wellbeing are deserving 
of right-ascriptions (Tasioulas 2015, 56–63).  
Now, we could see all these considerations as themselves partly constitutive of whether 
others’ wellbeing is sufficiently weighty to place one under duties. If we went this way, we 
could read Interest Theory (Canonical) as a necessary and sufficient condition. This would 
be a good thing. Yet, it would leave “sufficient weight” doing a lot of work in the back-
ground. Since our focus is on harmless wronging—cases in which people are not harmed 
by their right’s violation, so it is the canonical necessary condition of the Interest Theory 
that is not satisfied—I think it is clearer to keep these conditions separate.88  
3.4 Rights Beyond Claims 
To round off our unpacking of the Interest Theory, let us return to the other Hohfeldian 
incidents. So far, we have spoken only of claim-rights. This is because our definitions have 
referred to the correlative party’s duty to Φ, and there is only such a duty when the right-
holder holds a claim-right that Y Φ. However, as my exposition of Hohfeld suggested, in-
tuitively other Hohfeldian incidents are appropriately labeled “rights”. In the following 
two subsections, I suggest we can extend the Interest Theory to cover liberties, powers, 
and immunities. As with subsection 3.1, the following discussion does not really affect the 
arguments to be extended in the remainder of the thesis. However, it does demonstrate 
the resources available to a defender of the Interest Theory.   
3.4.1 Liberties 
First, consider liberties. Recall,  
X has a claim that Y Φ, against Y, iff Y is under a duty to Φ, owed to X, 
 and, 
 
88 This relates to whether we see the Safety Condition as a revision to the canonical statement of the Interest 
Theory or as a revision to how we determine whether one’s wellbeing is sufficiently weighty to place others 
under duties. See chapter 5, section 2.3.  
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Y has a liberty not to Φ, against X, iff Y is not under a duty to Φ, owed to 
X.89 
X’s claim against Y that Y Φ just is the absence of Y’s liberty not to Φ against X. The same 
is true in the opposite direction. Because of this, we might endorse the 
Interest Theory (Liberty). For Y to have a liberty-right against X not to Φ, Y’s 
wellbeing (her interest) must be of sufficient weight not to place her under 
a duty to Φ.  
That condition is in keeping with the Interest Theory’s account of the grounds of rights—
Ann has a liberty-right not to have sex with people at her discretion because her being 
under those duties not at her discretion would be awful for Ann.  
Notice, whereas all claims are claim-rights (notwithstanding our discussion of Weak Cor-
relativity in chapter 1, section 4.2), not all liberties are liberty-rights. Take Ann’s absence 
of a duty to assault Ben. Since Ann does not owe Ben a duty to assault him, she has a 
liberty against him not to assault him. Yet, it might be a stretch to say she has a right 
against Ben not to assault him. The explanation of this is that Ann’s wellbeing is not doing 
any work in explaining why she is not under a duty to assault Ben; it is Ben’s wellbeing 
that is doing that work. So, Interest Theory (Liberty) is not satisfied. This is different from 
Ann’s liberty not to have sex with Ben, for example. There, her wellbeing is grounding 
the absence of her duty.  
The question arises, however: when is someone’s wellbeing the grounds of the absence of 
a duty? I leave this question hanging for two reasons. First, it is not strictly relevant to the 
argument of this thesis and this chapter is already getting long. Second, suppose there was 
no good way to make this distinction, and so we were forced to conclude that all liberties 
were liberty-rights. I am in two minds as to how worrying this would be. While it does 
seem odd to say that Ann has a liberty-right not to assault Ben, I wonder if the strangeness 
comes from the rare need we have to refer to this right. Focus on Ann’s legal liberty not to 
 
89 Chapter 1, section 4.1. Here, I have switched “X” to “Y” and “Φ” to “not Φ” to help emphasise how 
claims and liberties are deontic opposites.  
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assault Ben. Suppose the police began hounding Ann, trying to make her assault Ben. 
Perhaps she would say, “Look, leave me alone—I have the legal right not to assault Ben!” 
So, even if we cannot offer a comprehensive account of when someone’s wellbeing is and 
is not the grounds of the absence of a duty, we can still extend the Interest Theory to cover 
liberty-rights. 
 3.4.2 Powers and Immunities 
Recall, the Interest Theory can accommodate inalienable rights. Suppose the right to life 
is inalienable (unless one has sufficiently good reason to end one’s life). The Interest The-
ory can say that others are under duties not to take one’s life because one’s life is suffi-
ciently important for one. Yet, rather than merely accommodating inalienable rights, the 
Interest Theory may offer a ready explanation of why such a right is inalienable: ‘the disa-
bility is to [the right-holder’s] own advantage in preventing him ever from bartering away 
his freedom, whatever the temptation’ (MacCormick 1977, 205). This suggests we should 
endorse the 
Interest Theory (Power). For X to have a power-right against Y, X’s wellbeing 
must be of sufficient weight to make Y liable to X altering the normative 
relationship between Y and herself (or between Y and some other party).  
An example might help. Compare the world in which Ann is able to make promises to 
the world in which she is unable to make promises. In the world in which Ann is unable 
to make promises, she cannot benefit from the practice of promise keeping. Further, she 
misses out on lots of deep normative phenomena. Often, making promises strengthens 
friendships. Ann has a lot of wellbeing at stake in being able to change the normative 
landscape between her and others through promising. These aspects of her wellbeing 
ground those normative powers.90  
 
90 For further discussion, see (Owens 2012). 
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Not only does the Interest Theory (Power) explain why we hold inalienable rights, it nicely 
explains why lots of our rights are often alienable. To see this, consider the following ob-
jection from N. E. Simmonds. Simmonds complains that the Interest Theory is 
compatible with a state of affairs where all powers of enforcement and waiver are 
monopolized by the state […] There is surely a good deal of force in the Will 
Theory’s claim that, in such circumstances, citizens would have no rights at all, 
regardless of how effectively their interests might be catered for in the state’s pol-
icies and enactments. (Simmonds 2000, 225) 
Simmonds is talking about legal rights here, but the example is nonetheless illustrative. 
He is correct about a few things. First, the citizens of this state would hold legal claim-
rights given the Interest Theory. Second, this regime is problematic: citizens cannot shape 
the normative landscape in ways that would allow them to lead autonomous lives. How-
ever, if the Interest Theory (Powers) is correct, we can explain what is problematic about 
this regime: citizens’ wellbeing is sufficiently weighty to warrant their being empowered 
to shape the normative landscape in ways that would allow them to lead autonomous 
lives. This importance is not being reflected in the legal powers they hold. 
Just as claims are the flipside of liberties, powers are the flip sides of immunities:  
X holds a power over Y iff Y is liable to X altering the normative relationship 
between Y and herself, 
and  
Y holds an immunity over X iff Y is not liable to X changing their normative 
relationship.91 
Ann’s not having the power to impose duties on Ben to worship in certain ways just is 
Ben’s immunity, against Ann, that she not impose duties on him to worship in certain 
ways. This suggests we should endorse the  
 
91 Again, there is some slight tinkering with these definitions from chapter 1, section 4.1, to draw out that 
powers and immunities are deontic opposites.  
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Interest Theory (Immunity). For X to have an immunity over Y, X’s wellbeing 
must be sufficiently important not to make her liable to Y’s changing their 
normative relationship.  
Now, some people may find the Interest Theory (Power) and (Immunity) implausible.92 I 
say nothing else to defend it here, and the focus of this thesis is going to continue to be 
only on claim-rights. This subsection has widened the scope of the theory just to show it 
has the resources to do so.  
 
4. Returning to the Problem of Harmless Wronging 
I have argued that the Interest Theory has a lot going for it. However, there is a problem 
for the Interest Theory—the Problem of Harmless Wronging. I introduced the problem 
in chapter 1. However, we are now in a better position to fully appreciate the problem. 
In subsection 3.2 of this chapter we saw that whether one’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight 
to place others under duties depends, in the first place, on the extent to which one would 
be harmed or fail to be benefited by the potential duty-bearer not acting as the would-be 
duty dictates. But, in cases of harmless wronging, one is not harmed by the would-be 
duty’s violation.  
Take our cases of harmless wronging, Plane Crash (Preemption) and Roulette (Pure Risk). Since 
neither Passenger nor Target is harmed by the violation of the would-be duties, neither 
party’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight to place their respective would-be duty-bearers 
under their duties. This means that the necessary condition set for right holding on the 
Interest Theory (Canonical) is not satisfied, so they hold no right.  
I said that the Problem of Preemption and the Problem of Pure Risk are more specific 
versions of the Problem of Harmless Wronging for the Interest Theory. We take up the 
Problem of Preemption in the following chapter. However, before beginning I want to 
 
92 Examples of harmless promise-rights are very easy to come up with (though cf. the introduction of the 
Pro Tanto and Normality Thesis in the following chapter, section 2). 
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note how harmless wronging is problematic for other theories of rights in addition to the 
Interest Theory.93  
Leif Wenar’s Kind-Desire Theory says that ‘claim-rights correspond to […] duties that 
the members of the relevant kind want to be fulfilled’ in their capacity as members of that 
kind (Wenar 2013, 218–19).94 Wenar offers the following example of a kind-based desire:  
When traveling through King’s Cross station in London, you may hear a rec-
orded announcement saying that members of the station’s staff will be happy to 
help passengers. Even if every individual who works at King’s Cross is entirely 
misanthropic, we still say that all staff members, qua staff members, are happy to 
help passengers. (Wenar 2013, 215) 
By grounding rights in kind-based desires, which are independent of right-holders’ well-
being, Wenar hopes to avoid problems caused by cases of harmless wronging.95 Yet, while 
“what is in one’s kind-based desire in one’s capacity as a member of that kind” and “what 
is good for one” may come apart when thinking about roles one finds oneself in, it is 
difficult to see how one’s rights against harm will not end up being cashed out in terms of 
what is good for one—one’s kind-based desires will just be what is good for one.96 Because 
of this, the Kind-Desire Theory will struggle in a similar way to the Interest Theory when 
it comes to the cases of harmless wronging I discuss.97 
 
93 This is in addition to my suggestion in chapter 1 (section 5) that cases of preempted harm and pure risk 
concern rights against harm; so, we should want a harm-based explanation to be available. Even if one 
denies the Interest Theory, one should want harm to play some explanation in why we have rights against 
these harmless actions.  
94 I have avoided Wenar’s formalisation to avoid unnecessary complications.  
95 Among others, cases of harmless promise-breaking, paternalism, and harmless trespass (chapter 1, section 
5). In note 4, I said speaking of the grounds of rights is ambiguous: we could be after the thing that makes 
the right exist or the thing that makes it a right. The Kind-Desire Theory disambiguates grounds in the 
second way (along with the Nonjustificatory version of the Interest Theory and Sreenivasan’s Hyrbid The-
ory introduced directly below). Cruft’s view (introduced below) should be disambiguated in the first, 
stronger way since it is based on the Justificatory version of the Interest Theory. 
96 Cruft makes a similar observation (Cruft 2017). Cruft now worries the Kind-Desire Theory fails as a 
sufficient condition (Cruft 2019, 20–31). 
97 Another popular reductive analysis of rights is Sreenivasan’s Hybrid Theory. On that theory, ‘Y has a claim-
right against X that X ϕ just in case: Y’s measure (and, if Y has a surrogate Z, Z’s measure) of control over 
a duty of X’s to ϕ matches (by design) the measure of control that advances Y’s interests on balance’ (Sreeni-
vasan 2005; 2010). Take two problematic examples from our discussion of the Will Theory. Control over a 
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Rowan Cruft has recently offered a non-reductive account of directed duties and their 
correlative rights that we may think fares better with cases of harmless wronging. How-
ever, Cruft does think the Interest Theory (Canonical) offers a sufficient condition for 
natural directed duties in the sense of ‘duties owed to someone whether or not their exist-
ence or direction is recognized, and independently of their creation in law or convention’ 
(Cruft 2019, 89). If we add to this sufficient condition that the duty is ‘everyone’s business’, 
in the sense of ‘rights that anyone anywhere can, ceteris paribus, permissibly demand on 
behalf of the right-holder’, then we have two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions 
on human rights (Cruft 2019, 17). Cases of harmless wronging pose problems for Cruft’s 
sufficient condition, then, and his account of human rights.98 
Finally, even those who offer seemingly fully non-reductive analyses of rights struggle with 
cases of harmless wronging. For example, many think, other things being equal, the strin-
gency of a right corresponds to the harm that would befall its holder were that right to be 
violated (Thomson 1990, 149–75; Kamm 2007, 249–75).99 Cases of harmless wronging 
wreak havoc with the intuitively plausible stringencies of rights. For example, what is the 
stringency of Passenger’s and Target’s rights against Attendant’s and Shooter’s behav-
iour?  
Though none of these theories are committed to the necessity claim of the canonical state-
ment of the Interest Theory, there is a reason they all face problems when it comes to 
 
young child’s right is vested in a fiduciary because that advances the child’s interests. Similarly, ordinarily 
one’s lack of control over duties correlative to one’s inalienable rights (if one has them) advances one’s 
interests. Yet, the lack of control one has over duties that one is a third-party beneficiary to the performance 
of does not best advance one’s interests. However, since Srinivasan’s theory is ultimately grounded in well-
being, again it has trouble with cases of harmless wronging. For example, since Shooter does not harm 
Target in Roulette, what level of control over the duty is in her interests on balance?  
98 Elsewhere, I argue Cruft ought to see the Interest Theory (Canonical) as grounding his non-reductive anal-
ysis of rights (Bowen Forthcoming).  
99 Their views are hard to pin down. Here goes. Thomson thinks X’s claim against Y is equivalent to Y’s 
behaviour being constrained in a certain way, principle of which is that the constraint is (moral) remainder 
inducing when permissibly not acted in accordance with (Thomson 1990, 200–202). Kamm thinks rights 
reflect our inviolability as moral persons: ‘Inviolability is a reflection of the worth of the person. On this 
account, it is impermissible for me to harm the person in order to save [the many], because doing so is 
inconsistent with his having this status’ (Kamm 2007, 449). 
72 
 
harmless wronging.100 This is the plausible thought that we began with: that part of the 
grounds of our rights against certain forms of harm is that it would be awful for one were 
those things to happen to one. Even though the focus of this thesis is offering a solution to 
the Problem of Harmless Wronging for the Interest Theory, moving to a focus on modality 
when it comes to rights against harm is of use for others in addition to defenders of the 
Interest Theory.  
  
 
100 Well, Cruft’s account of human rights accepts the necessity claim. 
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4. Preemption  
1. Introduction 
In this part of the thesis we are focusing on preempted harm. Here is our example of harm 
that is preempted:  
Plane Crash. Passenger is about to board a plane. Attendant takes a disliking 
to Passenger, so denies her admittance onto the plane. On departure, the 
plane crashes and everybody on board dies. 
Passenger is better off in the world in which her putative rights are violated than in the 
world in which they are respected. Whether one’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight to place 
others under a duty depends, in the first place, on how one would fare were the would-be 
duty not to be respected. Given this, Passenger’s wellbeing is not of sufficient weight to 
place Attendant under a duty not to deny her admittance onto the plane. And because of 
this, on the canonical statement of the Interest Theory, Passenger does not have a right 
against Attendant that Attendant not deny her admittance onto the plane. This is an ex-
ample of the Problem of Preemption.  
Now, there are at least two general ways that we might solve the Problem of Preemption. 
First, we might say that people are clearly harmed when harm is preempted. So, any view 
of harm that says otherwise (for example, the Counterfactual Account) is mistaken. All we 
need to do is replace our account of harm. Once we find an account that arrives at the 
putatively correct verdict that agents are harmed when harm is preempted, the canonical 
statement of the Interest Theory can arrive at the correct verdict that agents have rights 
against preempted harm.101 (In effect, this strategy suggests that Plane Crash, and examples 
of preempted harm more generally, are not cases of harmless wronging.) 
Second, we might think that we need not even get involved with whether agents are or 
are not harmed by preempted harm. This is because we might think that the way I have 
set up the Interest Theory is too demanding in requiring that agent’s wellbeing need actually 
 
101 This strategy only offers a solution to the Problem of Preemption. 
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ground the potential duty. Rather, we might revise the Interest Theory’s necessary con-
dition in some way.102 This strategy has the advantage over the first strategy of not having 
to get involved in controversial debates over the metaphysics of harm.   
In this chapter, I argue that the first strategy and two seemingly plausible ways of pursuing 
the second strategy do not work. First, in section 2, we consider two seemingly plausible 
ways we may revise the Interest Theory (Canonical). First, that only one’s wellbeing con-
sidered pro tanto needs to ground duties, and not one’s wellbeing all-things-considered. 
Second, that one’s wellbeing needs to ground duties only under normal circumstances 
and not necessarily as things turn out. Neither of these accounts offer a full solution to the 
Problem of Preemption. The rest of the chapter then turns to the first strategy—replacing 
the Counterfactual Account. In sections 3 and 4, I present and object to Temporal and 
Non-Comparative Accounts of Harm and Benefit respectively. Finally, in section 5, I bol-
ster my support for the Counterfactual Account by showing that other potential problems 
with that account are not too worrying. This sets the stage for the following chapter in 
which I introduce the Safety Condition as a solution to the Problem of Harmless Wrong-
ing.  
Before we begin, a preliminary. Plane Crash is an example of harm that is preempted. Cases 
in which harm is preempted are similar to cases in which harm is overdetermined. Sup-
pose I shoot Victim. Had I not shot Victim, Threatener would have. There, the harm I 
cause Victim preempts the harm Threatener would have caused were I not to have shot. 
Now suppose that Threatener and I shoot Victim simultaneously, where either shot alone 
would have been sufficient to kill Victim. There, the harm that each of us causes is over-
determined. Since the Counterfactual Account says Y harms X iff Y makes X worse off 
than X would have been had Y not acted as she did, it cannot accommodate either 
preempted or overdetermined harm. Victim would have been equally worse off in either 
case had I not shot.  
 
102 It is an open question whether this is a full solution to the Problem of Harmless Wronging. It is open 
because it depends on whether the weakened necessary condition can handle our cases of pure risk. 
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Our focus is going to be on preemption. When harm is overdetermined, each person lays 
an equal claim to having caused the harm; when harm is preempted, intuitively, only one 
person lays claim to having caused the harm—in our case, me. This is important. In either 
case Victim is worse off than she would have been had Threatener and I not shot. So, it is 
open to a defender of the Counterfactual Account to say, though neither of us individually 
harm Victim, we together harm Victim. Now, while it might be somewhat plausible to 
say we together harm Victim when we simultaneously shoot, it is counterintuitive when 
harm is preempted. So, Threatener can say: “Wha’d’ya mean, we harmed Victim—I 
didn’t shoot her, you did. Yes, I would’ve harmed her had you not harmed her, but you 
did harm her so I didn’t!” This is even stranger in cases in which the thing that causes the 
harm is not an agent: suppose a tree falls on Victim and, had the tree not fallen on Victim, 
Threatener would have shot. It is odd to think that the tree and Threatener together harm 
Victim. Because of this, it is best to see how we can deal with the Problem of Preemption 
without saying we caused the harm.103 
 
2. Revising the Necessary Condition  
2.1 Pro Tanto 
A tempting thought to begin with is that, in Plane Crash, although Passenger is not harmed 
all-things-considered by being denied admittance onto the plane, she is made worse off in 
a regard (she is harmed pro tanto). For example, she suffers inconveniences that she would 
not have suffered were she not to have been arbitrarily denied admittance onto the plane. 
And, though the extent to which she is made worse off is insufficient to make her worse 
off all-things-considered, there is nonetheless this regard in which she is worse off through 
being denied admittance onto the plane. Perhaps she ought to be afforded a right protect-
ing those aspects of her wellbeing. 
 
103 For defence of these plural harm views, see: (Parfit 1984, 82–83; Feit 2015). For a similar objection to 
mine, see (Hanser 2008, 436). For independent problems, see (Norcross 2005). 
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If we want to say this, we would need to endorse the following revision to the Interest 
Theory (Canonical): 
Pro Tanto Thesis. For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, some aspect of 
X’s wellbeing must be of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to Φ.  
Because Passenger is made worse off in a regard, she can be afforded a right protecting 
that aspect of her wellbeing.104  
Many see the Pro Tanto Thesis as plausible. For example, Raz says ‘what one can have 
a right to may be in one’s interest to have in some respects but not in others’ (Raz 1994, 
45).105 Simon Căbulea May goes as far as to say that: ‘No plausible version of the interest 
theory should assert that the ascription of rights turns on a comprehensive assessment of 
each person’s wellbeing’ (May 2017, 90). 
Now, a task for the defender of the Pro Tanto Thesis is to determine how we parse one’s 
wellbeing all-things-considered from one’s wellbeing pro tanto. Since the Pro Tanto The-
sis is ultimately not going to solve the Problem of Preemption, let us assume that task can 
be fulfilled.  
Why might one endorse the Pro Tanto Thesis? One reason might be that such an en-
dorsement solves a few other problems for the Interest Theory. Recall our other cases of 
harmless wronging (chapter 1, section 5): 
Promise. Beth promises to meet Ann at the pub at 12. Ann only goes to the 
pub because Beth has promised to meet her. Ann would prefer, and it 
would be better for Ann, if Beth were not to show up. Beth does not show 
up. 
 
104 That is, assuming the other necessary and sufficient conditions on right ascriptions are satisfied. Since 
we are assuming Passenger would have a right against being denied admittance onto the plane were it not 
to have crashed, we can assume these other conditions are satisfied—it is Interest Theory (Canonical) that 
causes us trouble with the Problem of Harmless Wronging. Because of this, if our revision to Interest Theory 
(Canonical) is satisfied, I assume hereafter these other conditions will be satisfied.  
105 See, also, (Cruft 2004, 372; Tasioulas 2015, 48–49). 
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Paternalism. Carl has stopped smoking but, in a moment of weakness of will, 
has bought a packet of cigarettes. It would be better for Carl if Dave were 
to take the cigarettes to avoid his relapse into nicotine addiction. 
May says of Paternalism, while it might be better if Dave were to take the packet of ciga-
rettes, ‘[Carl] holds a claim-right against him that he not steal the cigarettes insofar as 
[Carl] has an interest in keeping [his] possessions’ (May 2017, 90). We could tell a similar 
story of Promises.106 
As it turns out, we need not take a stand on whether to endorse the Pro Tanto Thesis. 
While the Pro Tanto Thesis might solve Plane Crash, in that it accommodates the intuition 
that Passenger has her rights violated, it will not solve all cases of preempted harm—it 
will not provide a full solution to the Problem of Preemption. This is because it provides 
a solution to Plane Crash only because Passenger is made worse off along some specific 
dimension—a specific dimension that she would not have been made worse off in were 
Attendant to have allowed her onto the plane (while the inconveniences of not catching a 
plane are greatly outweighed by death, these two sorts of harm are different). However, 
this feature does not hold in all cases of preempted harm. Consider:  
Hitmen. Suppose that we have two hitmen. Hitman2 admires Hitman1. 
Hitman2 secretly follows Hitman1 on every job she has in the hope that, 
one day, Hitman1 will fail to complete a hit and she will be able to do so 
instead, thereby impressing Hitman1. 
For any victim that Hitman1 is contracted to kill (call her Victim), what aspect of her 
wellbeing is setback by Hitman1 that would not be setback by Hitman2? I am sceptical 
there is any such aspect, assuming Hitman2 would complete the hit the instant that 
 
106 We need to be careful in specifying these pro tanto aspects of one’s wellbeing in a non-circular way. We 
cannot appeal to an aspect of one’s wellbeing created by the duty and correlative right (e.g., that it makes 
Ann’s life go better for her when Beth keeps her promises because this means Beth does not disrespect Ann 
by not keeping her promises made to Ann). Yet, Ann may have an interest in having promises to her kept 
as it allows her to rely on future promises, forge normatively significant bonds, and so on. For more on this, 
see (Cruft 2017; 2019, 26–30). 
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Hitman1 fails to.107 Accordingly, the Pro Tanto Thesis cannot account for why Victim has 
a right against Hitman1 killing her. We ought to look beyond the Pro Tanto Thesis, then. 
The way I am thinking about pro tanto harm is that we see if there is a regard that Victim 
is worse off in that she would not otherwise have been worse off in. And, there is no aspect 
of Victim’s wellbeing that is diminished in the actual world compared to the closest coun-
terfactual world in which Hitman1 does not shoot. But one might find it implausible that 
my simple counterfactual account of pro tanto harm cannot recognise even pro tanto 
harm in Hitmen. So, perhaps we should think of pro tanto harm differently. In section 4, 
we look at a drastically different account of pro tanto harm. In the meantime, let us con-
sider a less drastic revision.  
Ben Bradley endorses the Counterfactual Account when it comes to all-things-considered 
harm. But he thinks:  
Something is a [pro tanto] harm for a person if and only if either (i) it is intrinsi-
cally bad for that person, or (ii) it brings about something intrinsically bad for that 
person, or (iii) it prevents something intrinsically good for that person. (Bradley 
2009, 66)108 
Bradley’s way of thinking about pro tanto harm differs from mine. In Hitmen (Nonlethal 
Variant), suppose Hitman1 nonfatally shoots Victim and, had they not shot, Hitman2 would 
have nonfatally shot Victim in the same way. In this case, my view does not recognise any 
pro tanto harm. There is no regard that Victim is worse off in that she would otherwise 
not have been worse off in had Hitman1 not shot. Why? Because Hitman2 would have 
shot her in the same way. However, Bradley’s view can recognise a pro tanto harm: being 
shot is intrinsically bad for Victim, so is a pro tanto harm for Victim; since Hitman1 caused 
that pro tanto harm, Hitman1 pro tanto harms Victim. As Bradley’s account can recognise 
 
107 Perhaps one could postulate an interest in not being killed by Hitman1, an interest that Hitman2 does not 
setback. It is difficult to translate this “interest” into an aspect of Victim’s wellbeing. And, when all else is 
equal, whether one is actually killed by Hitman1 or Hitman2 does not seem to matter (hold equal that Victim 
has no personal relationship with either party, and so on).   
108 Bradley actually speaks about prima facie harm, but he means pro tanto: ‘harms that are bad for a person 
in one way, but might also be good for that person in another more important way’ (Bradley 2009, 66). The 
objections to the Noncomparative Account below (section 4) give us reason to doubt whether (i) and (ii) are 
sufficient conditions on pro tanto harm.  
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pro tanto harm, we can accommodate Victim having a right against being shot in Hitmen 
(Nonlethal Variant). Problem of Preemption thus solved.  
Despite Bradley’s view being able to deal with the Nonlethal Variant of Hitmen, it cannot 
deal with our original lethal variant. Let us proceed on the plausible assumption that when 
one dies, one ceases to exist. Given this, death cannot be bad because of its intrinsic fea-
tures—‘For nonexistence has no intrinsic properties, positive or negative’ (McMahan 
2002, 98). This means that the badness of death must be comparative: bad in virtue of what 
good it excludes.109 Finally, let us specify that Victim’s death in Hitmen is painless.  
Since Hitmen involves painless death, only condition (iii) is relevant for our purposes (it 
cannot be intrinsically bad for that person since it, death, is nothing). However, Hitman1’s 
shooting Victim does not prevent anything intrinsically good for Victim. Why not? Because 
Hitman2 would have shot Victim anyway. So, condition (iii) is not satisfied. Given Brad-
ley’s definition of pro tanto harm, Victim is not harmed pro tanto by Hitman1 shooting 
her. Accordingly, the Pro Tanto Thesis cannot account for why Victim has a right against 
Hitman1 killing her even if we think of pro tanto harm differently from how I have been 
thinking about it. This, then, gives us reason to move beyond the Pro Tanto Thesis. 
(Offhand, it is not only cases involving death that Bradley’s account cannot deal with. 
Rather, it is cases that (a) do not involve intrinsic bads and (b) in which the prevention of 
intrinsic goods is preempted. Suppose a secret admirer has slipped some tickets for the 
basketball into Justin’s mailbox. Ben comes across the tickets and takes them without Jus-
tin ever knowing they were there. Had Ben not taken the tickets, Adam would have taken 
them. Ben taking the tickets (i) is not intrinsically bad for Justin, (ii) does not bring about 
something intrinsically bad, nor (iii) does it prevent something intrinsically good. So, it is 
not pro tanto harmful for Justin.)  
 
109 This is very much the standard view on the badness of death (McMahan 2002; Bradley 2009; 
Timmerman 2016).  
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2.2 Normality 
To return to Plane Crash, another thought that we might have is that planes do not nor-
mally crash. Perhaps we ought to revise the Interest Theory along this dimension as a way 
to respond to the Problem of Preemption. 
Normality Thesis. For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, X’s wellbeing 
(her interests) must, under normal circumstances, be of sufficient weight to 
place Y under a duty to Φ. 
Passenger is worse off than she would have been under normal circumstances—for, under 
normal circumstances, had she not been denied admittance onto the plane, she would 
have landed safely at her destination. The extent to which she is worse off is sufficient to 
place Attendant under a duty not to deny her admittance onto the plane. So, given the 
Normality Thesis, Passenger can be attributed a right against being denied admittance 
onto the plane.110  
Appealing to something like the Normality Thesis is prominent in the literature. For ex-
ample, Neil MacCormick’s version of the Interest Theory says, 
to ascribe to all members of a class C a right to treatment T is to presuppose that 
T is, in all normal circumstances, a good for every member of C, and that T is a good 
of such importance that it would be wrong to deny it to or withhold it from any 
member of C (MacCormick 1982, 160, emphasis added). 
Similarly, Kramer’s formation of the Interest Theory appeals to what is ‘typically beneficial 
for a being like X’ (Kramer 2017, 49, emphasis added). And, when considering cases of 
preempted harm, Joel Feinberg suggests that we ought to amend the Counterfactual Ac-
count of Harm with an appeal to normality: ‘A harms B only if his wrongful act leaves B 
worse off then [sic] he would otherwise be in the normal course of events insofar as they were 
reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances’ (Feinberg 1986, 153). Were we to endorse both Fein-
berg’s revised Counterfactual Account and the Interest Theory (Canonical), Passenger 
would have a right against being denied admittance onto the plane. Ignoring Feinberg’s 
 
110 Subject to the other necessary conditions on rights being satisfied. 
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“insofar as they were reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances”, this view and the Mac-
Cormick/Kramer view are extensionally equivalent. They differ on intension: the Mac-
Cormick/Kramer view would say agents are not harmed by, but have rights against, 
preempted harm; the Feinberg view says we are harmed by preempted harm and there-
fore have rights against it.111  
(Let us pause and note that MacCormick and Kramer go further than the Normality 
Thesis in normalising the agent as well as the circumstances. We ought not go this far. If 
we normalise the agent, why would someone violating my rights wrong me, rather than 
wrong everyone. After all, I only have that right because the normal or generic person’s 
wellbeing would be of sufficient weight to place the duty-bearer (on grounds of parity, also 
considered under normality or generically) under a duty. Or, since MacCormick and 
Kramer endorse Nonjustificatory versions of the Interest Theory, I have that right only 
because the normal or generic person’s wellbeing would be served by the duty. On this 
picture, rights lose what Cruft has called individualistic justification; but individualistic justi-
fication nicely accounts for why the duty is owed to the individual, why its violation 
wrongs them, and why it manifests disrespect to them (Cruft only makes this final point) 
(Cruft 2013b, 205–6).) 
Why might one appeal to the Normality Thesis? Think back to our other cases of harmless 
wronging. Plausibly, under normal circumstances, one is harmed by promise-breaking, 
interferences with autonomy, and trespass.112 Given the Normality Thesis, we can ac-
count for why we have rights that the promises made to us are kept, as well as rights that 
 
111 Building normality into harm is odd, though. Suppose Passenger complains that she was made worse off 
all-things-considered by being denied admittance onto the plane (what can I say; she’s a philosopher). At-
tendant retorts that the plane has actually crashed, and so they benefited her as things turned out. Passenger 
replies, “Yes, but normally planes do not crash. Since you made me worse off than I would’ve been under 
normal circumstances had you not denied me admittance onto the plane, you harmed me.” Attendant: 
“How have I harmed you along those lines? The plane crashed. Had you been aboard, you’d be dead now. 
All that your appeal to normality shows is that, normally, I would’ve harmed you by denying you admittance 
onto the plane. Luckily for me, things didn’t go as usual this time, so I didn’t harm you.” Attendant is a bit 
insensitive, but has a point.   
112 It is notable that Kramer, while appealing to normality, goes for the all-things-considered reading of the 
Interest theory, whereas those who endorse the Pro Tanto Thesis make no appeal to normality.  
84 
 
our autonomy and property is not interfered with even if, as things turn out, violation of 
those rights is harmless. 
However, this does not so much give us what we might call a deep reason to endorse the 
Normality Thesis. Instead, it gives us a dialectical reason to endorse the Normality Thesis 
rather than Interest Theory (Canonical). So one might say: “Great, you can solve those 
problem cases with the Normality Thesis. But that doesn’t tell me anything about why 
rights respond to normality.” Further, we have already seen that there are other ways that 
one might attempt to answer these problems. 
A deeper reason for why we might appeal to normality is the following: if rights are de-
termined by whether X’s interests are actually of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty, 
this opens up an epistemological gap between, on the one hand, what rights X holds and 
correlative duties Y is under and, on the other hand, Y’s knowledge of whether she is under 
those duties. This problem might be compounded depending on how we think of duties. 
For example, following Thomson, we might think that Y’s being under a duty amounts to 
her  behaviour ‘being constrained in a certain way’ (Thomson 1990, 200). Perhaps it is 
implausible that one’s behaviour can be (normatively) constrained while one is unaware 
of whether they are under that duty. Appealing to normality helps bridge this gap—plau-
sibly, we are always in a position to know what happens under normality. (In fact, I pos-
tulate this is the reason Feinberg includes “insofar as they were reasonably foreseeable in the cir-
cumstances” in his appeal to normality.) 
However, there might be other ways that we can bridge this epistemological gap between 
what duties people are under and their knowledge of being under those duties.113 We 
might not even be worried about this epistemological gap, thinking it is running together 
questions of whether we are under duties with whether we are blameworthy for infringing 
those duties.  
Alas, we have reached a dead end again. While the Normality Thesis does accommodate 
our intuition that Passenger has a right against Attendant, it will not solve all cases of 
 
113 For example, we could move to an Evidence-Relative version of the Interest Theory (chapter 7, section 
4). The Safety Condition may also help dissolve this gap. 
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preempted harm. For, harm may be preempted in the normal world and yet we still want 
to say that people should be attributed rights against those preempted harms. Consider 
Hitmen again. Because Hitman2 always follows Hitman1 on every job she has, any victim 
that Hitman1 is contracted to kill will not have a right against Hitman1’s action. This is 
because Victim would be no worse off under normal circumstances were Hitman1 not to 
shoot since Hitman2 would make Victim worse off to an equal extent. The harm, then, is 
preempted under normal circumstances. 
One might reply that it is not obvious that the circumstances described in this case are 
normal of hitmen in general, but only of Hitman1. Perhaps we ought to restrict the refer-
ence class to normal hitmen. (We are moving into the territory of MacCormick’s and Kra-
mer’s appeal to normality; with that comes the worry I raised above.) But this will not do. 
Suppose that, so eager to make sure that their hits are completed, assassination agencies 
begin to always send their hitmen out in pairs. This means that for any victim it is normal 
that, were the first hitman to fail, another hitman would always be there to kill that vic-
tim.114  
A less fanciful example than Hitmen is to imagine a polluting factory. Suppose that, be-
cause of certain factors, these kinds of polluting factories always pop up in close proximity 
to each other. For example, the factories always require a river to dump waste in, cheap 
land, close proximity to (cheap) work forces, and so on. On the supposition that one pol-
luting factory is sufficient to harm on its own, any harm caused by a particular factory 
would under normal circumstances be preempted by another factory. This is because 
there would always be another factory nearby, that is itself polluting, that would have 
caused an equal harm.115 
 
114 I think this holds on most accounts of normality, including non-statistical ones. For example, some people 
think, the less cause for explanation an event’s occurrence would prompt, the more normal that event’s 
occurrence is (Smith 2016, 38–45). But, if hitmen were always sent out in pairs, and people knew this, a 
second hitman’s presence would not call for explanation. So, it would be normal. We return to this in section 
4.3.2 of chapter 8. 
115 “Cancer Alley” comes to mind, an 85 mile stretch of the Mississippi that produces one quarter of Amer-
ica’s petrochemicals, each year dumping more than one billion pounds of toxic chemicals into the river 
(Shrader-Frechette 2002, 8–9). See, also, (Kagan 2011).  
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Another sort of normalcy we might appeal to is what we can call deontic normalcy. On this 
view, we look only to counterfactual worlds in which people are acting as they are required 
when considering how things would have fared had the potential duty-bearer not per-
formed the action required by the would-be duty. This would mean the closest admissible 
counterfactual world in which Hitman1 does not shoot Victim is not the possible world in 
which Hitman2 shoots Victim—in that world, Hitman2 is not acting as she is required. 
Rather, it is one in which no one shoots Victim. Since Victim is sufficiently worse off in 
the world in which Hitman1 shoots her than the world in which neither hitman shoots, 
Hitman1 is under a duty not to shoot Victim correlating with Victim having a right against 
Hitman1 that she not shoot her.  
However, appealing to deontic normalcy will not help with Plane Crash. Everyone is acting 
as they are required to act in the closest counterfactual world in which Attendant does 
not deny Passenger admittance onto the plane and the plane crashes. We would need to 
look to (1) the normal world in which (2) everyone is acting as they are required. Then, 
we need not worry about the closest counterfactual world in which the plane crashes. This 
combination of these two senses of normalcy appears ad hoc. There is also a danger of 
circularity. When looking to those worlds in which everyone is acting as they are required, 
directed duties cannot be contributing to this requirement; we are trying to determine 
what directed duties people are under. We also cannot allow these undirected duties to 
be grounded in harm-based considerations; we are trying to circumvent that harm may 
be preempted in the normal world. This means only agent-centred, non-harm-based, un-
directed duties can be contributing to requirement. We also need to move to a Nonjusti-
ficatory version of the Interest Theory: obviously enough, the grounds of the duty will not 
be the wellbeing of the right-holder, so the Justificatory version of the Interest Theory is 
not satisfied. I would prefer not to have to do any of these things. 
 
3. The Temporal Account of Harm 
In the previous section, I argued that it will not do to answer the Problem of Preemption 
by revising the canonical statement of the Interest Theory with either an appeal to pro 
tanto aspects of one’s wellbeing or to normality. Let us leave this general strategy of 
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responding to the Problem of Preemption by revising the Interest Theory (Canonical) 
until the Safety Condition is introduced in the following chapter. Instead, let us take up 
the other strategy of revising the Counterfactual Account of Harm. Recall that strategy 
said, intuitively, agents are harmed even if the harm in question is preempted. Any view 
of harm that says otherwise, such as the Counterfactual Account, is intuitively mistaken. 
All we need to do to solve the Problem of Preemption is reject that account of harm and 
find a new one. This and the following section take up two alternative accounts of harm. 
Since this strategy of rejecting the Counterfactual Account objects that the Counterfactual 
Account is implausible as an account of harm and benefit, in the following two sections 
we assess competing views as accounts of harm and benefit, and leave aside discussion of 
rights. 
3.1 Other Reasons to be Sceptical of the Counterfactual Account 
Cases of preempted harm suggest, against the Counterfactual Account, that intuitively it 
is not necessary for a person to be harmed that they be made worse off than they otherwise 
would have been. However, it is not obvious that it is sufficient for a person to be harmed 
that they be made worse off than they otherwise would have been. This is because often 
it seems we do not harm people when we fail to benefit them. But, failing to benefit people 
leaves them worse off than they would have been had we benefited them. So, this will 
imply failure to benefit is a harm on the Counterfactual Account. Consider:  
Golf Clubs. Suppose Batman purchases a set of golf clubs with the intention 
of giving them to Robin, which would make Robin happy. The Joker says 
to Batman, “Why not keep them for yourself?” Batman is persuaded. He 
keeps the golf clubs. (Bradley 2012, 397) 
Batman makes Robin worse off than he would have been had he given Robin the golf 
clubs. Given the Counterfactual Account, on first pass this implies that Batman harms 
Robin. Yet, many are sceptical of this: ‘Merely failing to benefit someone does not con-
stitute harming that person’ (Bradley 2012, 397). Let us call this the Problem of Omission.  
A closely related problem with the Counterfactual Account, one that we might think par-
asitic on the Problem of Omission, is that ‘we often consider failing to be benefited as 
morally and significantly less serious than both being harmed and not being safe from 
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harm’ (Shiffrin 1999, 121; 2012, 372). Yet, if we cannot distinguish harm from failure to 
benefit (given the Problem of Omission), how can we account for the more serious nature 
of harm rather than failure to benefit? Let us call this the Problem of the Harm/Failure 
to Benefit Asymmetry.116 These two problems are separate, though the latter parasitic on 
the former, for one may think there is no asymmetry concerning the moral significance of 
harm and failure to benefit, though nonetheless think that there is an metaphysical dis-
tinction between harm and failure to benefit.  
So far, my intention has been only to motivate rejecting the Counterfactual Account. I 
delay saying anything in response to these problems on behalf of the Counterfactual Ac-
count until section 5. 
3.2 Introducing the Temporal Account  
Cases of preempted harm suggest that it is not necessary for a person to be harmed that 
they be made worse off than they otherwise would have been. Instead, perhaps it is suffi-
cient that they are made worse off than they were prior to being harmed. For example, in 
Plane Crash, while Passenger is not worse off than she would have been had she not been 
denied admittance onto the plane, she is worse off than she was prior to being denied 
admittance on the plane. Perhaps it is because of this that she is harmed.117 Similarly, in 
Hitmen, perhaps Victim is harmed because she is made worse off through being killed than 
 
116 Shiffrin actually thinks there are two asymmetries that the Counterfactual Account blurs: first, harm/fail-
ure to benefit, and second, avoidance of harm/bestowal of benefit. Golf Clubs is an example of the first 
asymmetry. Shiffrin suggest that an example of the second asymmetry is, other things being equal, I may 
pro tanto harm you to preempt a greater pro tanto harm, but not pro tanto harm you to bring about a 
larger pro tanto benefit (Shiffrin 2012, 363). See, also, (Gardner 2017).  
117 Is Passenger harmed all-things-considered or merely pro tanto? As we see, the Temporal Account thinks 
it is sufficient for one to be harmed that they be made worse off than they were prior to being harmed. Since 
she is not made better off than she was prior to being denied admittance onto the plane, and only made 
worse off, it is difficult to see how a defender of the Temporal Account could plausibly argue that Passenger 
is harmed pro tanto but benefited all-things-considered. Yet, it is plausible that Passenger is harmed pro 
tanto but benefited all-things-considered by being denied admittance onto the plane. Straightaway we run 
into a problem with Temporal Account, similar to that discussed below with Lessening Decline. That said, the 
Temporal Account does handle Hitmen very well, where there is no inclination to see any all-things-consid-
ered or pro tanto benefit. So, in spite of the worry raised in this note, the view deserves entertaining.  
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she was prior to being shot, even if she is no worse off than she would have been had 
Hitman1 not shot her.  
If we want to say this, we should endorse the 
Comparative Temporal Account of Harm and Benefit. Y harms X iff (and because) 
Y makes X worse off than she was prior to Y’s acting. Y benefits X iff (and 
because) Y makes X better off than she was prior to Y’s acting.118 
The Temporal Account also seems not to fall foul of the Problem of Omission: Batman 
does not make Robin worse off than Robin was prior to Batman not giving him the golf 
clubs. Inasmuch, Batman does not harm Robin. Since the Temporal Account seems to 
distinguish between harm and failure to benefit, we might also think that it does not fall 
foul of the Problem of the Harm/Failure to Benefit Asymmetry.  
Returning to the Problem of Preemption, since Attendant and Hitmen1 harm Passenger 
and Victim in spite of their not leaving them worse off than they otherwise would have 
been, they can be attributed a right on the canonical statement of the Interest Theory.  
3.3 Temporal Problems 
Alas. There are problems with the Temporal Account. I think these problems are more 
fundamental than those problems with the Counterfactual Account. It is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for a someone to be harmed that they be made worse off than they were 
prior to being harmed. Let us begin with the claim that it is not sufficient for an someone 
to be harmed that they be left worse off than they were prior to being harmed. 
 
118 The Temporal Account is endorsed in some form by (Thomson 1990, 261–63; Perry 2003; Velleman 
2008, 242–44; Rabenberg 2014). (Thomson 2011) now rejects the Temporal Account. In chapter 3, section 
3.2, I offered a more basic, event-based definition of the Counterfactual Account; we could offer an analo-
gous more basic definition of the Temporal Account. 
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Lessening Decline. Badly-Off is suffering from a painful disease that is getting 
worse by the day. Nice gives Badly-Off some medicine that makes Badly-
Off feel worse, but which slows the decline of her disease.119 
By giving Badly-Off the medicine, Nice makes Badly-Off worse off than she was prior to 
Nice acting. According to the Temporal Account, she harms Badly-Off. Yet, this is im-
plausible. Intuitively, Nice does not harm but actually benefits Badly-Off. This shows that 
it is not sufficient for someone to be harmed that they be left worse off than they were 
prior to being harmed—one does not harm someone else when lessening their decline, 
even if one makes them worse off than they were prior to being harmed. The explanation 
of why Nice benefits Badly-Off lies in, as the Counterfactual Account suggests, that she 
leaves Badly-Off better off than Badly-Off would have been had she not given the medi-
cine.120 She makes a difference, in a positive way, to how Badly-Off fares. 
Let us turn to why it is not necessary for someone to be harmed that they be left worse off 
than they were prior to being harmed.  
Placebo. Badly-Off is suffering from a painful disease. Naughty steals the 
medicine that would have cured Badly-Off and replaces it with sugar pills. 
The sugar pills make Badly-Off slightly better, but worse than she would 
have been had she received the medicine.121 
By swapping Badly-Off’s medicine, Naughty makes Badly-Off better off than she was 
prior to Naughty acting. According to the Temporal Account, she does not harm Badly-
Off but benefits Badly-Off. Yet, this is deeply implausible. Intuitively, Naughty harms, 
and does not benefit, Badly-Off. This shows that it is not necessary to be harmed that one 
be left worse off than they were prior to being harmed. In a similar way to the preceding 
problem, the explanation of why she harms Badly-Off lies in that, as the Counterfactual 
 
119 See, also, (Norcross 2005, 149–50; Tadros 2016a, 192). 
120 As Norcross puts it: ‘We compare levels of welfare, not across time, but across worlds’ (Norcross 2005, 
150). 
121 Hanser calls this a preventative harm since Naughty harms Badly-Off by preventing Badly-Off from 
receiving a benefit (Hanser 2008, 429; Boonin 2014, 60; Tadros 2016a, 192).  
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Account suggests, Naughty leaves Badly-Off worse off than Badly-Off would have been 
had she not swapped the medicine for the sugar pills. This time she makes a difference, 
in a negative way, to how Badly-Off fares. 
I have suggested that it is not necessary for a person to be harmed that they be worse off 
than they were prior to being harmed. One might reply that, in Placebo, Naughty denies 
Badly-Off the opportunity of getting better. And so, perhaps Badly-Off is worse off than she 
was prior to Naughty acting, in virtue of not having the opportunity of getting better. For 
example, Thomson says of a similar case, ‘he [Naughty] caused his victim’s chances of 
getting a benefit to shrink, thereby causing [her] victim to be worse off in a way than he 
was’ (Thomson 2011, 445).122 Let us call this the Opportunity Reply.  
Before assessing the Opportunity Reply, a clarification. Intuitively, we want to say that 
Badly-Off is worse off all-things-considered than she was prior to Naughty acting, and not 
that she is worse off only pro tanto. This means that the harmfulness of being denied the 
opportunity of getting better needs to be greater than the benefit she receives from the 
placebo-effect. To see this, suppose that, at t1 (prior to Naughty acting), Badly-Off is at 
wellbeing level x. And suppose the pro tanto benefit she receives from the placebo effect 
is y and the pro tanto harmfulness of being denied the opportunity of recovering is z. This 
means that at t2 (after taking the placebo) Badly-Off is at wellbeing level x+(y-z). From 
this we can see that z needs to be greater than y, otherwise Naughty only harms Badly-
Off pro tanto, though benefits Badly-Off all-things-considered.  
First, it is unclear whether the Opportunity Reply extends to show that it is not sufficient 
for someone to be harmed that they be left worse off than they were prior to being 
harmed. In Lessening Decline, Nice does not furnish Badly-Off with the opportunity of 
 
122 It is surprising that Thomson says this given what she says in earlier work. She says ‘if it would be bad 
for X to get a thing Z, and if Y makes it probable that X will get Z, then Y causes X to be at a disadvantage’ 
(Thomson 1990, 244). Thomson then considers whether Y harms X merely by subjecting her to risk of 
harm—by putting her at a disadvantage. She says: ‘this is a bad argument, for we cannot really say that 
causing a person to be at a disadvantage is itself causing the person a harm’ (Thomson 1990, 244). But if 
causing someone to be at a disadvantage is not in itself harmful, why would having opportunities (being at 
an advantage) be beneficial? (Somewhat ironically, in 1990, Thomson endorsed the Temporal Account but 
suggests this argument, needed to supplement the Temporal Account, is bad; in 2011, Thomson abandons 
the Temporal Account, though mounts this ‘bad argument’ on its behalf.). 
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getting better—she just lessens Badly-Off’s decline. So, it is unclear how the Temporal 
Account could avoid the counterintuitive result that Nice harms Badly-Off in Lessening 
Decline. This means, even if the Opportunity Reply works to account for why Badly-Off is 
harmed in Placebo (which we see below that it does not!), we still have reason to be sceptical 
of the Temporal Account because it implies Badly-Off is harmed and not benefited in 
Lessening Decline.  
Second, the Opportunity Reply misidentifies the harm in Placebo. Straightforwardly, 
Badly-Off is harmed in virtue of not getting better and not in virtue of being denied the 
opportunity of getting better. As Victor Tadros suggests, ‘it is the recovery that [Badly-
Off] cares about, not the option of recovering’ (Tadros 2016a, 193).  
Third, in chapter 6, we see that merely being subjected to risk of harm is not itself harmful. 
Since benefit is the other side of the coin from harm, this shows that having the oppor-
tunity of a benefit is not itself beneficial. So, removing the opportunity of a benefit does 
not itself make one worse off.  
Even if one is not convinced by the previous objections (the third of which the reader is 
having to take on good faith at this stage), we can mount a fourth, dialectical reply. The 
Opportunity Reply suggests that Naughty makes Badly-Off worse off than she was prior 
to Naughty acting in virtue of removing the opportunity of getting better. However, to 
determine whether the opportunity of getting better is actually beneficial to Badly-Off, we 
need to look to the counterfactual world in which she receives the medicine and see how 
she fares. Seana Shiffrin suggests that, because of this, the Temporal Account collapses 
into the Counterfactual Account (Shiffrin 2012, 368, fn. 25).123 This is not strictly correct: 
the Temporal Account still says that one is harmed if and only if, and because, one is made 
worse off than they were; it is just that one can be made worse off than they were by being 
denied the opportunity of a benefit, were the value of that opportunity is determined by 
counterfactual-analysis. However, what this does mean is that we cannot evade the 
 
123 Tadros objects that we need to appeal to counterfactuals to determine the magnitude of harm on the 
Temporal Account (Tadros 2016a, 192). Perry says we need to appeal to counterfactuals to determine the 
damages owed as a matter of compensation (Perry 2003, 1296). Neither notice that this means the Temporal 
Account inherits the Counterfactual Account’s problems with preemption as suggested below. 
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problem caused by preemption since it may be that, in the closest world in which Naughty 
does not swap the medicine, the benefit is preempted by some harm. This means that the 
opportunity Badly-Off is denied will not be valuable. So, the removal of this worthless 
opportunity does not make her worse off than she was. For example, consider 
Placebo (Preempted Variant). Badly-Off is suffering from a painful disease. 
Naughty steals the medicine that would have cured Badly-Off and replaces 
it with sugar pills. The sugar pills make Badly-Off slightly better. Were 
Naughty not to have swapped the pills, Also-Naughty would have swapped 
the actual medicine for sugar pills. 
Since opportunities are valued in counterfactual terms, the problem caused by preemp-
tion re-emerges. Naughty does not deny Badly-Off the opportunity of getting better in 
Placebo (Preempted Variant) since Also-Naughty would have swapped the medicine for a pla-
cebo anyway.  
 
4. The Noncomparative Account 
I have just argued that, against the Temporal Account, it is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for someone to be harmed that they be made worse off than they were prior to being 
harmed. Before that, we saw that we have reason to think, against the Counterfactual 
Account, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for someone to be harmed that they be made 
worse off than they otherwise would have been. Perhaps the lesson we ought to draw from 
this is that harm is not comparative.  
4.1 Introducing the Noncomparative Account 
This thought—that harm is not comparative—has some prominence in the literature. For 
example, Shiffrin says: 
Accounts that identify harms with certain absolute, noncomparative conditions 
(e.g., a list of evils like broken limbs, disabilities, episodes of pain, significant losses, 
death) and benefits with an independently identified set of goods (e.g., material 
enhancement, sensual pleasure, goal-fulfilment, nonessential knowledge, 
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competitive advantages) would not generate these puzzles [associated with com-
parative accounts]. (Shiffrin 1999, 123) 
Elizabeth Harman says ‘an action harms someone if it causes the person to be in a bad 
state. Bad states are understood as states that are in themselves bad, not bad because they 
are worse than the state the person would otherwise have been in’ (Harman 2009, 139). 
Let us formulate this view. 
Noncomparative Account of Harm and Benefit. Y (pro tanto) harms X iff (and be-
cause) Y makes it the case that X is in a noncomparatively bad state. Y (pro 
tanto) benefits X iff (and because) Y makes it the case that X is in a noncom-
paratively good state.124  
The Noncomparative Account is a view of pro tanto and not all-things-considered 
harm.125 This is because, on the all-things-considered reading of the view, one would 
harm someone only if one made it the case that they were in a noncomparatively bad 
state all-things-considered. But this is implausible. For example, luckily, to make my life 
noncomparatively bad all-things-considered, one would have to significantly lessen my well-
being. But surely I can be harmed all-things-considered by events that fall much shorter 
than such drastic changes to my life.  
Given that the Noncomparative Account is an account of pro tanto harm, ‘it is compatible 
with the comparative account since they are about different things’ (Bradley 2012, 399). 
But this disunified account of pro tanto and all-things-considered harm is odd. For exam-
ple, think again of Hitmen (Nonlethal Variant), in which Hitman1 non-fatally shoots Victim 
and, had she not shot, Hitman2 would have nonfatally shot Victim in the same way.126 
 
124 (Shiffrin 1999; 2012; Harman 2004; 2009). Woollard thinks there is a noncomparative and a compara-
tive sense of harming, and that, ‘[o]ther things being equal, our reasons against harming are much stronger 
if we would harm a person in the overall-comparison sense’ (Woollard 2012, 686). Again, we could offer a 
more basic definition of the Noncomparative Account.  
125 Harman says that she is not denying that we sometimes use harm in an all-things-considered way, indi-
cating that she sees her condition as merely a sufficient condition on pro tanto harm (Harman 2004, 109; 
Thomson 2011, 439).  
126 I use a non-lethal variant of Hitmen to avoid discussion of whether the Noncomparative Account can 
recognise death as harmful (Bradley 2012, 400–401). This depends on what makes a state noncomparatively 
bad.  
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Here, given the Noncomparative Account there is (i) pro tanto harm and (ii) no pro tanto 
benefit, but given the Counterfactual Account there is (iii) no all-things-considered harm 
and (iv) no all-things-considered benefit. This is very odd. Underlying the oddness is some-
thing like the following plausible thought: ‘[all-things-considered] harm and pro tanto harm 
are closely related. In fact, they seem interdefinable. Whether something is all-things-con-
sidered harmful is a function of the ways in which it is pro tanto harmful or beneficial’ 
(Bradley 2012, 393). This picture runs afoul of this very plausible thought. So, I am not 
sure where this leaves the defender of the Noncomparative Account when it comes to all-
things-considered harm. (Perhaps they will deny all-things-considered harm.) This does 
mean one will have to endorse the Pro Tanto Thesis from above.127 
So, what reason do we have to endorse the Noncomparative Account? It can recognise 
preempted harm as, at the least, pro tanto harm. In Hitmen (Nonlethal Variant), Hitman1 
makes it that Victim is in a noncomparatively bad state; given this, she (pro tanto) harms 
Victim. The Noncomparative Account seems also to get the cases right when it comes to 
the Problem of Omission. In Golf Clubs, Batman does not make it that Robin is in a 
noncomparatively bad state, so Batman does not harm him. Since receiving gifts seems 
like the sort of thing that would not be out of place on Shiffrin’s list of benefits, Batman 
fails to benefit Robin. Further, since the defender of the Noncomparative Account can 
distinguish between harm and benefit, they are in a good place to answer the Problem of 
the Harm/Failure to Benefit Asymmetry.128 
 
127 Defenders of the Noncomparative Account will have to make similar meta-normative claims when want-
ing the Noncomparative Account to do whatever work it is introduced to do. For example, were one to 
introduce the Noncomparative Account as a solution to the Non-Identity Problem (see the following note), 
one would also have to claim that we have reason not to harm pro tanto where our harming pro tanto 
cannot be justified by bestowing pro tanto benefits.  
128 The Noncomparative Account was primarily offered as a solution to the Non-Identity Problem. Suppose 
Mother is considering conceiving but is suffering from condition x. She is warned by her doctor that if she 
has a child in her current state, her baby will be born with a serious disability; if Mother waits two months 
before conceiving, her child will be born without the disability. Mother decides, on a whim, to have the 
child anyway, whom she calls Child. Child is subsequently born with a serious disability, but one that does 
not make her life not worth living (i.e., Child would not prefer nonexistence to existence with such a hand-
icap). Some people think Mother harms Child by failing to wait two months before conceiving. However, 
were Mother to have waited two months to conceive, a different egg would have been fertilised with a 
different sperm and so a different person would have been born. Accordingly, the Counterfactual Account 
implies Child is not harmed by Mother’s action since she is not worse off than she would have been had 
96 
 
As Shiffrin appreciates, ‘[i]f one could, in addition, provide an account that explained 
what unified such items, why they were together classified as harm, one might make fur-
ther inroads to support […] the asymmetries’ (Shiffrin 1999, 123; 2012, 376). Her own 
account is that ‘harm involves a distinctive sort of frustration or impediment of the will of 
the ability to exert and effect one’s will’ (Shiffrin 2012, 383; 1999, 123). However, this 
account is not very convincing. This is because Shiffrin is confusing two different questions 
(Tadros 2016a, 179). First, we can ask whether the sort of thing that is affected when we 
are harmed is wellbeing, or whether it is those things one has a stake in, or perhaps the 
relationship between one’s will and the real world, and so on.129 Second, we can ask, 
spotting an answer to this first question, how ought we determine whether one has been 
harmed. Ought we compare how their [wellbeing/things they have a stake in/relation-
ship between world and will] fares with how it would have fared otherwise (Counterfac-
tual Account), with how it was prior to acting (Temporal Account), or do we not compare 
it whatsoever (Noncomparative Account)? Shiffrin’s speculation that ‘harm involves con-
ditions that generate a significant chasm or conflict between one’s will and one’s experi-
ence’ concerns the first question, and so is not very helpful when trying to defend the 
Noncomparative Account, which is an answer to the second question.  For example, we 
could think one is harmed when the chasm between one’s will and one’s experience is 
made greater than it otherwise would have been, thereby endorsing a version of the Coun-
terfactual Account. Perhaps Shiffrin’s thought is, “Look, these states are noncompara-
tively bad because they create a chasm between one’s will and one’s experiences.” But it is 
not at all clear why that is true only of noncomparatively bad states.130  
 
Mother waited two months to conceive (Parfit 1984, 351–80). However, Mother harms Child according to 
the Noncomparative Account as she makes it that Child is in a non-comparatively bad state. I am inclined 
to think Mother does not harm Child, nor do I think this would explain why her action is wrong (Boonin 
2014). For further discussion, see (Bradley 2012, 398; Tadros 2016a, 189–90). 
129 The first of these is the view we have been assuming, the second is Feinberg’s view of interests, the setting 
back of which constitute harms (Feinberg 1984, 33–34), and the third is Shiffrin’s. 
130 For explicit objections to this focus on autonomy as determining what sort of thing is affected when we 
are harmed, see (Bradley 2012, 400; Tadros 2016a, 179–80). Given my discussion of autonomy elsewhere 
in this thesis, one should be able to guess what I would say about such an account (e.g., chapter 6, section 
3). 
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Harman says that her ‘list of harms is unified by comparison with a healthy state (though 
I haven’t claimed that all harms meet this condition)’ (Harman 2004, 111). I cannot say I 
like the look of this picture either. But I am not going to take that up. Rather, in the 
following subsection, we see we have good reason to be sceptical of the Noncomparative 
Account independently from not having a robust picture of what states are harmful and 
which are beneficial.  
4.2 Noncomparative Problems 
We spent quite a while introducing the Noncomparative Account. The reasons to reject 
the view can be stated relatively quickly. The principal problem with the Noncomparative 
Account is that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for someone to be (pro tanto) harmed 
that they be left in a noncomparatively bad state.  
First, it is not necessary for one to be harmed that they be left in a noncomparatively bad 
state, for one can be harmed through being moved from a noncomparatively good state 
to a worse, though nonetheless, noncomparatively good state. Here is an example: 
Well Off. Well-Off has a very high IQ. Naughty poisons Well-Off, reducing 
her IQ by a few points, though leaving her IQ well above average.131 
Intuitively, Naughty harms Well-Off. However, since Naughty does not put Well-Off into 
a noncomparatively bad state, the Noncomparative Account cannot arrive at this verdict. 
The explanation of why Naughty harms Well-Off lies in that, as the Counterfactual Ac-
count suggests, Naughty leaves Well-Off worse off than she would have been had Naughty 
not poisoned her, even though she leaves her well off in noncomparative terms. She makes 
a difference, in a negative way, to how Well-Off fares. 
Often, people with sympathies to the Noncomparative Account respond by attempting to 
locate a noncomparatively bad state that Well-Off is in after being poisoned (Thomson 
2011, 440). For example, might one say that Naughty dominates, controls, or manifests 
 
131 See: (Hanser 2008, 432; Tadros 2016a, 188). 
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disrespect towards Well-Off—is not being the subject of these things a noncomparatively 
bad state to be in? 
These sorts of explanations seem misguided to me—Naughty harms Well-Off, in the most 
straightforward sense, because she diminishes her IQ. Any putative noncomparatively 
bad state one postulates is beside the point. If one is unconvinced, here are three further 
reasons to be sceptical. First, the line of argument is appealing to what we might call 
respect-based considerations. Yet, suppose that it is not Naughty that poisons Well-Off, but 
Well-Off who accidently poisons herself by drinking from a dirty stream. Well-Off is still 
harmed by having her IQ diminished. But how so on the Noncomparative Account? The 
water does not dominate, control, or manifest disrespect towards Well-Off. Second, it is 
unclear that harm can play much of a normative role on this account; this is because we 
are already presupposing an account of what is owed to whom, the disrespecting of which 
puts people into these noncomparatively bad states. And third, in any case, it is unclear 
that being the subject of domination, control, or disrespect puts one in a noncompara-
tively bad state in terms of one’s wellbeing independently from the effects this has on one.  
So, it is not necessary to be harmed that one be in a noncomparatively bad state. Yet, it 
is also not sufficient for someone to be harmed that they be put into a noncomparatively 
bad state. This is because one can be benefited, and not harmed, when being moved from 
one noncomparatively bad state to a comparatively better, though still noncomparatively 
bad, state. Consider:  
Badly Off. Badly-Off is in a severely, noncomparatively bad state, such as 
pain so bad it is immobilising. Nice gives Badly-Off some medicine that 
lessens Badly-Off’s pain to be merely nauseating.  
Nice benefits and does not harm Badly-Off. Yet, Nice puts Badly-Off into a noncompar-
atively bad state (nauseating pain is noncomparatively bad). Given the Noncomparative 
Account, Nice harms Badly-Off. This plainly will not do.132 The explanation for why Nice 
 
132 This objection is also raised by (Hanser 2009, 188; Thomson 2011, 441; Tadros 2016a). Shiffrin says if 
someone’s interests are advanced, though they’re still left badly off overall, ‘it seems strained to say that she 
has been benefited’ (Shiffrin 1999, 122–23). I do not see how this seems strained in any way.  
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benefits Badly-Off lies in that, as the Counterfactual Account suggests, Nice leaves Badly-
Off better off than she would otherwise have been, even though she leaves her badly off 
in noncomparative terms. She makes a difference, in a positive way, to how Badly-Off 
fares. 
 
5. Back to the Counterfactual Account 
Here is where we are. I began section 3 by saying that we have reason to think the Coun-
terfactual Account fails because it appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient for one 
to be harmed that one be worse off than they otherwise would have been. This was the 
problem posed by preempted harm and the Problem of Omission respectively. We then 
examined whether there are any accounts that can take the place of the Counterfactual 
Account. We saw that of the two accounts considered, neither comes without its own 
troubles. I pressed at each stage that both accounts are limited because they fail to recognise 
that one can be harmed or benefited by another’s action in virtue of the difference the 
event makes to how one would otherwise have fared. Because of this, even if there was 
nothing else that could be said on behalf of the Counterfactual Account in reply to the 
problem posed by preemption and the Problem of Omission, I think we would be best 
placed to stick with the Counterfactual Account.133 
In the following chapter, I argue that the Problem of Preemption can be solved for the 
Interest Theory. This means even if individuals are not harmed when what otherwise 
would be harmful is preempted by another would-be harmful event, there is no problem 
in our having rights against these actions. (I also argue this is a more plausible way to go 
than tinkering further with the Counterfactual Account.) That still leaves us with the Prob-
lem of Omission and the Problem of the Harm/Failure to Benefit Asymmetry. Though I 
said we are best placed to stick with the Counterfactual Account despite these problems, 
 
133 For example, Placebo showed that the Temporal Account cannot recognise preventative harms: Naughty 
harms Badly-Off through preventing Badly-Off from receiving a benefit (Hanser 2008, 429). Boonin sug-
gests we ought to be more worried if our account of harm cannot recognise preventative harms as harms 
(as the Temporal Account cannot) than if our account cannot recognise preempted harms as harms (as the 
Counterfactual Account cannot) (Boonin 2014, 60).  
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we could bolster this claim if there was something else we could say in reply to the Problem 
of Omission and the Problem of the Harm/Failure to Benefit Asymmetry.  
Space does not permit me to say too much. I focus on the Problem of Omission. If we 
find some differences between what are, intuitively, harms and what are, intuitively, ben-
efits, we could use this to try to explain the putative asymmetry between harm and failure 
to benefit.  
First, recall our more basic definition of the Counterfactual Account, on which, an event, 
e, harms someone, X, iff X is worse off than she would have been had e not occurred.134 
For the vast majority of failures to benefit, it is not the case that there is some event that, 
had that event not occurred, X would have been better off in the closest counterfactual 
world. For example, while writing this thesis, I could have benefited my friend Sean in 
Canada. But it is not the case that, had most of the events that have occurred over that 
time not occurred, then Sean would have been better off in the closest counterfactual 
world.135  
Now, this does not help us with Golf Clubs.136 In that case there are events that, had those 
events not occurred, Robin would have been better off in the closest counterfactual world. 
For example, had Batman not put the clubs back into the Batmobile, we can suppose 
Robin would have been better off as Batman would have gone on to give him the clubs. 
Yet, the preceding point does lessen the Problem of Omission when it comes to other 
cases.  
Next, though Batman may harm Robin by failing to give him the golf clubs, he does not 
do harm to Robin in the sense that is familiar from discussion of the doctrine of doing and 
allowing harm. Rather, he allows harm. For example, on Warren Quinn’s account, Y does 
harm to X iff Y’s most direct contribution to the harm to X is an action (Quinn 1989b). 
But it is unlikely our theory of action will have it that Batman’s most direct contribution 
 
134 Chapter 3, section 3.2. 
135 For relevant discussion, see (Hanser 2008, 427; Klocksiem 2012, 294; Hanna 2016, 252–53; Feit 2017, 
3–5). 
136 Hanna and Feit note this (see previous note). 
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to Robin’s not getting the golf clubs will be an action. Similarly, Jonathan Bennett’s ac-
count says Y does harm to X iff most of the ways Y could have moved her body would 
have led to the harm (Bennett 1995). But most of the ways Batman could have moved his 
body when failing to give the golf clubs to Robin would not have led to the harm. What 
this means is that, even if a defender of the Counterfactual Account is committed to saying 
some of Y’s failures to benefit X are harmful for X, they are not committed to saying that 
Y does harm to X in this case. (We could even say, Y harms X only if she does harm to X; 
so, Batman does not harm Robin.) 
Finally, even if there are events that, had those events not occurred, Robin would have 
been better off, there are only these events because of other things that Batman has done; 
for example, his buying the golf clubs with the intention of giving them to Robin. And it 
is not obvious that had those events not occurred, there would have been some other event 
which, had that event not occurred, then Robin would have been better off in the closest 
counterfactual world. For example, let us take events associated with Batman’s deciding 
to head into the golf shop where he formed the intention to gift Robin the clubs. True, if 
Batman goes into the shop and forms the intention to buy Robin the clubs, Robin might 
be worse off if Batman decides not to give him the clubs. But had Batman not gone into 
the shop, it is not the case that there is some event the non-occurrence of which leaves 
Robin worse off than he would otherwise have been in the closest counterfactual world. 
We can learn two things from this. First, roughly, had Batman not bought the golf clubs 
with the intention of giving them to Robin, then he would not have harmed Robin by not 
giving him the clubs (Klocksiem 2012, 294). Second, the harm to Robin that occurs when 
Batman does not give him the clubs results from the removal of a benefit that Batman 
himself is responsible for. But we have independent reason from the growing literature on 
the removal of benefits to think this already confuses things (McMahan 1993; Hanser 
1999).  
The remarks in this final section have by no means meant to be conclusive. However, I 
hope to have shown there is more to be said on behalf of the Counterfactual Account to 
resist the Problem of Omission. 
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5. Safety  
1. Introduction 
Let us take stock. At the end of chapter 3, I reintroduced the Problem of Harmless Wrong-
ing for the Interest Theory. The problem is that of accommodating our intuitions that 
people can have rights against the performance of actions that do not harm them given a 
commitment to the Interest Theory. According to that theory, necessary for X to have a 
right against Y is that X’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty. And, 
whether X’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty depends, at the least, 
on the extent to which X would be harmed or benefited were Y not to act as the would-
be duty dictates. But if X would not be harmed by the non-performance of the action 
required by the duty, the Interest Theory’s necessary condition is not satisfied, and X has 
no right.  
The Problem of Preemption is one specific form of the Problem of Harmless Wronging. 
Recall the two examples of preempted harm that we focused on in the previous chapter:  
Plane Crash. Passenger is about to board a plane. Attendant takes a disliking 
to Passenger, so denies her admittance onto the plane. On departure, the 
plane crashes and everybody on board dies. 
Hitmen. Suppose that we have two hitmen. Hitman2 admires Hitman1. Hit-
man2 secretly follows Hitman1 on every job she has in the hope that, one 
day, Hitman1 will fail to complete a hit and she will be able to do so instead, 
thereby impressing Hitman1. 
In Plane Crash, Passenger is no worse off through being denied admittance onto the plane 
than she would have been had Attendant not denied her admittance onto the plane. This 
is because the would-be harmfulness of being denied admittance onto the plane is 
preempted by the greater would-be harmfulness of not being denied admittance. And in 
Hitmen, Victim is no worse off through Hitman1’s shooting her than she would have been 
had Hitman1 not shot. This is because the would-be harmfulness of being shot by Hitman1 
is preempted by the would-be harmfulness of being shot by Hitman2.   
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In the previous chapter, we looked at two ways of revising the canonical statement of the 
Interest Theory to respond to the Problem of Preemption: first, by appealing to pro tanto 
aspects of one’s wellbeing; second, by appealing to normality. I argued that neither re-
finement offers a full solution to the problem. We then looked at whether to revise the 
Counterfactual Account of Harm. Yet, I argued that competing accounts come with more 
worrying problems than those raised by the Counterfactual Account.  
In this chapter, I introduce my solution to the Problem of Harmless Wronging: the Safety 
Condition. Roughly, it says for someone to hold a right against one that one not perform 
some action, we look to whether performing that action could easily leave that person 
sufficiently worse off to place one under a duty. Section 2 introduces the Safety Condition. 
Section 3 begins to build an account of why we should endorse the Safety Condition in 
addition to its extensional accuracy; the full defence comes in chapter 8 once we have 
seen how the Safety Condition deals with the Problem of Pure Risk. Section 4 defends the 
Safety Condition against three objections. 
 
2. The Safety Condition and Preemption 
2.1 Introducing Safety 
Retracing some ground from the previous chapter leads us naturally to the Safety Condi-
tion. In Plane Crash, Passenger’s wellbeing is not of sufficient weight to place Attendant 
under a duty not to deny her admittance onto the plane. This is because Passenger is no 
worse off through being denied admittance onto the plane than she otherwise would have 
been. We can see this by comparing the following two worlds.  
World 1. Attendant denies Passenger admittance onto the plane. The plane 
takes off and crashes killing everybody on board. 
World 2. Attendant does not deny Passenger admittance onto the plane. 
The plane takes off and crashes killing everybody on board. 
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Passenger is no worse off in world 1 through Attendant’s denying her admittance onto the 
plane than she would have been in world 2. However, world 2 is not the only possible 
world available for comparison with world 1. We might look to 
World 3. Attendant does not deny Passenger admittance onto the plane. 
The plane takes off and lands safely at its destination. 
Passenger is worse off in world 1 than she is in world 3. The extent to which she is worse 
off is sufficient to place Attendant under a duty not to deny her admittance onto the plane. 
The problem is that when considering what would have happened to Passenger had At-
tendant not denied her admittance onto the plane, world 3 is not the closest counterfactual 
world to world 1; that is world 2.  
World 3 is what would happen under normal circumstances were Attendant not to have 
denied Passenger admittance onto the plane. This was the thought behind the Normality 
Thesis—by looking to what happens in the normal world in which Attendant does not deny 
Passenger admittance onto the plane, we are directed to world 3 and not to world 2. As 
we have seen, the problem with the Normality Thesis is that it is possible for harm to be 
preempted in the normal world. In Hitmen, because Hitman2 always follows Hitman1 on 
every job she has, Victim will be no worse off than she would have been under normal 
circumstances had Hitman1 not shot. There, Hitman2 would have made Victim worse off 
to an equal extent.  
We are faced with a comparison between the following two worlds: 
HM World 1. Hitman1 shoots Victim. (Hitman2 was waiting in the wings.) 
HM World 2. Hitman1 does not shoot Victim. Hitman2 shoots Victim. 
Victim is no worse off in HM world 1 than she is in HM world 2. HM world 2 is what 
would happen under normal circumstances were Hitman1 not to shoot. However, as with 
Plane Crash, there is another close possible world that we can appeal to: 
HM World 3. Hitman1 does not shoot Victim. Hitman2 does not shoot Vic-
tim. 
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Victim is worse off in HM world 1 than she is in HM world 3. The question is how to 
establish the salience of these close worlds (world 3 and HM world 3) in order to accom-
modate the intuition that Passenger and Victim have rights against the relevant conduct. 
I suggest we appeal to modal safety. The idea behind safety is nicely explained by Timothy 
Williamson: 
Imagine a ball at the bottom of a hole, and another balanced on the tip of a 
cone. Both are in equilibrium, but the equilibrium is stable in the former case, 
unstable in the latter. A slight breath of wind would blow the second ball off; 
the first ball is harder to shift. The second ball is in danger of falling; the first 
ball is safe. Although neither ball did in fact fall, the second could easily have 
fallen; the first could not. The stable equilibrium is [safe]; the unstable equilib-
rium, [unsafe]. (Williamson 2000, 123) 
There is a danger an event will occur if that event does occur in some sufficiently similar 
case. Much like as the ball is not safely balanced on the top of the cone, Passenger’s and 
Victim’s wellbeing is not safely protected—though they are not actually made worse off 
by the violation of their rights, there is a danger they could have been. And, it is plausible 
that rights ought to safely protect people’s wellbeing.  
We can make appeal to safety by revising the Interest Theory (Canonical) in the following 
way:  
Interest Theory (Safety). For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, Y’s not Φ-
ing must cause X to be worse off than she would have been in at least one 
close world, and the difference in X’s wellbeing must be of sufficient weight 
to place Y under a duty to Φ.137  
 
137 The Safety Condition resembles the safety condition on knowledge. Roughly, for an agent, X, to know 
some contingent proposition, p, X believes p only when p is true in all nearby worlds (Pritchard 2005, 71). 
More naturally: ‘If one knows, one could not easily have been wrong in a similar case’ (Williamson 2000, 
147; Sosa 1999). My Safety Condition is not structurally identical to the safety condition on knowledge. 
Stated generally, a safety condition states that X satisfies some condition, C, just in case there is no nearby 
world in which some state of affairs, a, holds. My Safety Condition is of the form, X satisfies some condition, 
C, only if there is a nearby world in which some state of affairs, a, holds. (X satisfies the necessary condition 
on holding a right only if there is a nearby world in which she is worse off). 
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For brevity, I refer to this as the Safety Condition. It works by comparing how X fares 
when Y does not act as the would-be duty dictates with how X would have fared in close 
worlds in which Y acts as the would-be duty dictates. Call the world in which Y does not 
act as the would-be duty dictates our world of evaluation. Call the world in which Y does act 
as the duty dictates our world of comparison. In Plane Crash and Hitmen, the world of evalua-
tion is world 1, the actual world. We evaluate how our potential right-holder fares in this 
world through comparison with close worlds in which the potential duty-bearer acts as 
the would-be duty dictates (hence the names: world of evaluation and world of compari-
son). Since Passenger and Victim are worse off in world 1 than they are in world 3, and 
since the extent to which they are worse off is of sufficient weight to place Attendant and 
Hitman1 under their respective duties, Passenger and Victim hold rights. They hold these 
rights in the actual world.  
Strictly speaking, the Safety Condition is only a necessary condition like the Interest The-
ory (Canonical). So it does not follow that Passenger and Victim hold rights just because 
the Safety Condition is satisfied. But we are assuming that the other conditions necessary 
and jointly sufficient for right-holding are satisfied.138 So, for ease of exposition, in our 
cases of harmless wronging, I assume our individual holds a right if the Safety Condition 
is satisfied.   
2.2 Closeness  
For the Safety Condition to be satisfied, X must be worse off as a result of Y’s not acting 
as the duty dictates than she otherwise would have been in at least one close world. It 
would be useful to say a little about the closeness of worlds. The view of the closeness of 
worlds one endorses affects the extension of the Safety Condition (those cases in which it 
is satisfied). In this subsection, I introduce David Lewis’s view of closeness. This should 
 
138 I explained why this is in footnote in 104 in chapter 4. Like the Interest Theory (Canonical), we could 
allow “sufficiently weighty” to do a lot of heavy lifting, thereby making the Safety Condition necessary and 
sufficient (see this chapter, section 2.3). 
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give us a good idea of how the Safety Condition works without too much technical detail. 
I do not take a stand on exactly which view of closeness to endorse.139   
Lewis has us suppose that the worlds under consideration have deterministic laws: these 
worlds start and play out, following the deterministic laws of nature. We discover the 
closeness of two worlds at some time, t, by reference to the size of the violations of those 
laws that would be required at (or close to) t to render those worlds the same after t. The 
size of miracles is determined by the following four ordered rules: 
1. [First,] avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law. 
2. [Second,] maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match of par-
ticular fact prevails. 
3. [Third,] avoid even small, localized, simple violations of law. 
4. [Fourth,] it is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact 
even in matters that concern us greatly. 
(Lewis 1986b, 47–48). 
Two worlds are close to the extent that there is a small miracle at t in one world, conver-
gence between those worlds before t, and no further miracles after t. In this way, the fol-
lowing counterfactual is true: “If Richard Nixon would have pushed the button [referring 
to “the button” to launch nuclear missiles], there would have been a nuclear war”. 
Though worlds in which there is nuclear war are very different from worlds in which there 
is not, the worlds are identical up until the point at which a miracle occurs to make Nixon 
push the button at t, and there are no further violations of the laws of nature after t. It 
would require more miracles to have made Nixon push the button and war not result 
because, for example, the wiring was shoddy.140 
We can see why world 3 in both Plane Crash and Hitmen are very close to the actual world. 
In Plane Crash, we would need two miracles to take us from world 3 to world 1: first, a 
 
139 The following two paragraphs are very similar to two paragraphs from my BPhil thesis introducing 
Lewis’s view of closeness.  
140 The Nixon example comes from (Fine 1975, 452). See Lewis’s discussion of his roulette case also (Lewis 
1973, 76). 
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miracle to make Attendant deny Passenger admittance onto the plane; second, a miracle 
to make the plane crash. Similarly, in Hitmen, we would need: first, a miracle to make 
Hitman1 not shoot; second, a miracle to make Hitman2 not shoot. While in both cases, 
world 2 is closer than world 3 to world 1 (in both cases we need only the first miracle to 
take us from world 2 to world 1), world 3 is still extremely close to world 1. 
It might help to consider an example in which all the other conditions on right-holding 
are satisfied, but the Safety Condition is not satisfied because the relevant world of com-
parison is not close enough to the actual world to matter. Suppose that you bump into me 
on the street. Were you to have taken more care, you would not have bumped into me. 
And, it would not take too much effort not to bump into me. There is a possible world in 
which your bumping into me causes me to bleed out (because, let us suppose, our skins 
are much thinner). Were it to be the case that everyone was susceptible to bleeding out 
were they to be bumped, I think we would be under duties to take a lot more care in 
ensuring that we did not bump up against people when walking on the street: it is a little 
more costly for us to ensure we do not bump up against others, but it would be very costly 
if this would lead to us bleeding out. (Think of the care we are required to take when 
driving.) The reason we do not have rights against others that they not bump us, despite 
our wellbeing being sufficiently weighty to place others under duties were this to be the 
case, is because the possible world in which bumping into others causes such problems is 
not sufficiently close to the actual world to matter.  
If we look back to the relevant part of the Safety Condition (Y’s not Φ-ing must cause X 
to be worse off than she would have been in at least one close world), we see that we need 
not only need a handle on closeness but also on a world being close enough. We turn to this 
in section 4.1. 
2.3 Where Safety Comes into the Picture 
Recall, from the breakdown of the argument offered in chapter 1, section 3:  
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1. Assume the Interest Theory (Canonical): For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, 
X’s wellbeing (her interests) must be of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to 
Φ. 
2. Whether or not X’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to Φ 
depends partly on the extent to which X is harmed by Y’s not Φ-ing or benefited 
by Y’s Φ-ing.  
We could see the Safety Condition as replacing the second premise. Read in this way, it 
would tell us what it is for one’s wellbeing to be of sufficient weight to place others under 
duties:  
2*. Whether or not X’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to Φ 
depends, at the least, on how X fares across close possible worlds as a result of Y’s 
Φ-ing.  
However, as I have formulated it, I see the Safety Condition as a revision to the Interest 
Theory (Canonical). These two ways of reading the Safety Condition are extensionally 
equivalent; and, the difference in their intension is minimal. But let us go my way and 
read the Safety Condition as revising Interest Theory (Canonical): like the Interest Theory 
(Canonical), the Safety Condition itself appeals to how X fares being of sufficient weight 
to place Y under a duty; and, our second premise tells us how we work out whether some-
one’s wellbeing is of sufficient weight to place others under duties.  
 
3. In (Partial) Favour of Safety  
Above, I introduced the Safety Condition. Whereas the canonical statement of the Inter-
est Theory and the refinements considered in chapter 4 fall foul of the Problem of Harm-
less Wronging, the Safety Condition correctly generates rights in the cases of preempted 
harm considered so far. In chapter 8, we see that the Safety Condition also correctly gen-
erates rights in cases of pure risk imposition, where the canonical statement of the Interest 
Theory flounders. What is more, the Safety Condition offers us a unified account of why 
people hold rights across these two different types of harmless wronging: for someone to 
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hold a right against us that we not perform some action, we look to whether our perform-
ing that action could easily leave them sufficiently worse off to place us under a duty.141 
The Safety Condition’s principled extensional accuracy is the primary virtue of the account 
that I would like to stress in this thesis. 
Once we have seen how the Safety Condition solves the Problem of Pure Risk in chapter 
8, I offer a full account of why rights respond to modality in the way the Safety Condition 
prescribes. In the meantime, in subsection 3.1, I offer a sketch of these reasons. In subsec-
tion 3.2, I offer two other examples of harmless wronging that the Safety Condition solves; 
this further extensional accuracy gives us more reason to endorse the Safety Condition. 
3.1 Why Safety?  
One important feature of the Safety Condition is that it removes an objectionable form 
of luck from right-ascriptions (and, derivatively, from right-violations). If we assume the 
Interest Theory (Canonical) then, through sheer luck, Attendant does not violate Passen-
ger’s right not to be denied admittance onto the plane. In this case, it could easily have 
been that Attendant did harm Passenger and so would have violated her rights. By focus-
ing on more than what happens in the actual world, the Safety Condition removes this 
objectionable form of luck from right-ascriptions (and right-violations). This gives us good 
reason to endorse the modal character of the Safety Condition.  
Another reason it matters that rights depend on modality in the way the Safety Condition 
prescribes is that this formally requires that we, as directed duty-bearers, are sensitive to 
others’ wellbeing: that we do not merely not harm others, but that we could not easily 
have harmed them.142 
 
141 In chapter 8, section 2.2, I explain that preemption and pure risk involve symmetrically different types 
of harmless wronging. 
142 In chapter 8, section 3.3, I examine the relationship between these two reasons (anti-luck and sensitivity 
to others’ wellbeing), as well as expanding on them. In saying that duty-bearers are sensitive to others’ 
wellbeing because of safety, one might think I am confusing my modal notions. In epistemology, the truth 
of one’s belief that p is safe just in case there is no close world in which p is false; whereas, one’s believe is 
sensitive just in case, in the closest world in which p is false, one would not believe p (Sosa 1999). Given this, 
we can say: Y’s Φ-ing safely does not harm X just in case there is no close world in which Y’s Φ-ing harms X; 
and Y is sensitive to her Φ-ing not harming X just in case, were Φ-ing harmful, Y would not Φ. That Y safely 
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Recall, the Interest Theory starts with the idea that others’ wellbeing is sufficiently im-
portant to place others under duties. You do not need to be an Interest Theorist to believe 
that. The Interest Theorist is distinctive because they then say, a nice explanation for 
when and why you owe someone a duty is that their wellbeing is the grounds of the duty. 
Commonly, it is taken that duties are just a special type of reason: they have something 
like exclusionary weight, they leave a moral remainder when not acted on, they are de-
mandable, and so on.143 The Safety Condition’s focus on what could happen or what 
could otherwise easily have happened makes it that duty-bearers’ reasons of this form are 
more sensitive to others’ wellbeing than is the case on the modally undemanding, canon-
ical statement of the Interest Theory. Since the Interest Theory began with the idea that 
others’ wellbeing is very important (it both places us under duties and exclusively makes 
those duties owed to others), it is plausible to explain modality’s importance in this way.  
An example may help. Think back to Williamson’s example of the ball on the tip of a 
cone and the ball in the hole. Suppose you have asked two people to put the ball some-
where and keep it still. When all else is equal, the person that puts the ball at the bottom 
of the hole has taken more care to ensure that the ball is still than the person who has 
balanced the ball on the top of the cone. Similarly, the person who turns out not to harm 
others, but could easily have, such as Attendant, has taken less care not to harm others 
than those who robustly do not harm others. This offers an attractive picture of what we 
owe to others—that we take care not to leave them worse off through our actions than 
otherwise could have been the case.  
Or, at least, so I argue at greater length in chapter 8. 
 
does not harm X does not mean that she is sensitive to her Φ-ing not harming X: we can suppose Y would 
still Φ even if Φ-ing is harmful, so her not harming X is not necessarily sensitive, but the world in which her 
Φ-ing is harmful is not sufficiently close, so her not harming X is safe. To be more precise, then, I should 
say, the Safety Condition makes Y sensitive to that her Φ-ing could not be harmful in sufficiently close 
worlds. Since I am already departing from epistemology’s notion of safety (see note 137), I stick with just 
saying the Safety Condition makes duty-bearers sensitive to others’ wellbeing.  
143 See chapter 8, note 228. 
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3.2 Other Cases of Harmless Wronging 
In the introduction to this section, I said the Safety Condition’s principled extensional 
accuracy in reply to cases of preempted harm and pure risk is the primary virtue of the 
Safety Condition that I want to stress in this thesis. Though preemption and pure risk are 
the focus of this thesis (for reasons explained in chapter 1, section 5, and chapter 8, section 
2.2), the Safety Condition helps explain other cases of harmless wronging. This gives us 
more reason to endorse the Safety Condition.  
3.2.1 Suboptimal Benefit  
Consider the following case of what we can call suboptimal obligatory benefit. 
Surgeon. Surgeon is operating upon Patient. Patient will die without the sur-
gery. Because Surgeon has taken a disliking to Patient, she does not want 
to help Patient survive. But she knows that her superiors will be suspicious 
if Patient were to die and so performs the operation, though not to the best 
of her ability. The operation is successful, though not as successful as it 
would have been had Surgeon performed the operation to the best of her 
ability.  
Intuitively, Patient has a right against Surgeon that she performs the operation to the best 
of her ability. Yet, because Patient is no worse off than she would have been had Surgeon 
not acted as she did, Patient is not harmed by Surgeon. Because of this, Patient’s wellbeing 
is not of sufficient weight to place Surgeon under a duty to perform the operation to the 
best of her ability.  
One might amend the Counterfactual Account of Harm to deal with Surgeon. For example, 
Feinberg says that A harms B if ‘B’s personal interest [must be] in a worse state than it 
would be had A acted as he should have instead of as he did’ (Feinberg 1986, 150). Patient 
is worse off than she would have been had Surgeon performed the operation as she should 
have (that is, properly). Given Feinberg’s amended condition, Patient is harmed by Sur-
geon. On the canonical statement of the Interest Theory, Patient can be attributed a right.  
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Feinberg’s condition will not do—it is viciously circular for our purposes. If we do not 
know whether Patient has a right that Surgeon perform the operation to the best of her 
ability, we do not know how Surgeon should perform the operation. But, if we do not know 
how Surgeon should perform the operation, we cannot say that Patient is worse off than 
she would have been had Surgeon performed the operation as she should have. We have 
lost the harm that Feinberg’s condition identifies.144 
While Feinberg’s condition will not do, the Safety Condition is satisfied: Patient is worse 
off in the actual world than she would have been in the close counterfactual world in 
which Surgeon performs the operation to the best of her ability. Accordingly, Patient can 
be attributed a right. 
3.2.2 Suboptimal Supererogation 
Consider the following case of suboptimal supererogation. As the names suggest, subop-
timal obligatory benefit and suboptimal supererogation differ in that the benefit is oblig-
atory in suboptimal obligatory benefit. Partly because of this, let me flag that it is more 
controversial that any wrong (let along any wronging) is done in cases of suboptimal super-
erogation. 
One/Two Arm. Beth is about to lose both of her arms. Ann can save Beth’s 
left arm by pressing Button 1, though at a substantial cost to herself. Ann 
can save both of Beth’s arms by pressing Button 2, though at a trivially 
greater cost to herself than pressing Button 1.145 
 
144 Things might be more complicated if there is some undirected duty that Surgeon is under, a duty whose 
existence could break the circle (e.g., an undirected duty because of the Hippocratic oath). However, we 
could use a case without this noise. And, in any case, see the discussion of deontic normality from chapter 
4, section 2.2. We might add the following complaint to Feinberg’s condition: in a similar way to my ob-
jecting to building normality into harm, sure, Surgeon leaves Patient worse off than she should have been 
given Surgeon’s undirected duty; yet, it is unclear why this matters to whether she has been harmed by Sur-
geon.  
145 (Pummer 2016; Horton 2017; Pummer 2019; Muñoz forthcoming). For discussions in different contexts, 
see: (Parfit 1982, 131; 2011b, 225; Kagan 1989, 16; Tadros 2011b, 162). Cf. (McMahan 2018; Sinclair 
2018), though note these authors object only to the range of cases in which it is wrong to act in the subop-
timal way. Though I stick with the following usage for ease of exposition, it might be misleading to say 
“suboptimal supererogatory act” since one might think an act cannot both be supererogatory and wrong. 
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Suppose that the cost to Ann is substantial enough to make it permissible for Ann not to 
act—Ann’s acting is supererogatory. We might nevertheless think that it would be wrong 
for Ann to save only Beth’s left arm. So, while it would not be wrong for Ann not to act, it 
is wrong for her to act in the suboptimal supererogatory way.  
Since the verdict that it is wrong to act in the suboptimal way is somewhat controversial, 
let me offer two arguments for this claim. One argument runs as follows (Pummer 2016). 
Perhaps the basis of Ann’s moral option not to act lies in the costs, for Ann, of acting 
(Kagan 1989; Scheffler 1994). If the only way that you can save a drowning child is by 
subjecting yourself to some sufficiently large harm, intuitively it is not wrong for you not 
to save the child. But, if the costs are trivial, intuitively it is wrong for you not to save the 
child. Appealing to costs in a similar way explains the verdict of our case of suboptimal 
supererogation above. While there is a sufficiently great cost to ground Ann’s moral op-
tion not to act, there is no sufficiently great cost to ground Ann’s having the moral option 
to save only one, rather than both, of Beth’s arms. 
A different argument for why Ann acts wrongly by saving only Beth’s left arm starts from 
the following idea (Horton 2017): if our actions are not reasonably justifiable to the people 
whom they might affect, those acts are wrong (Scanlon 1998; Parfit 2003). And, while 
Ann might be able to reasonably justify her not acting by appealing to the costs, she can-
not reasonably appeal to costs to justify her saving only one, and not both, of Beth’s arms—
the additional costs are too trivial. So, it is wrong to save only Beth’s left arm. 
Now, while it has been argued in the literature that it is wrong to act in the suboptimal 
way, it seems intuitive that, if Ann were to save Beth’s left arm, Ann does not merely act 
wrongly but wrongs Beth. For example, if Ann is about to save Beth’s arm, Beth may 
demand of Ann that she not save only her left arm; if Ann saves only Beth’s left, she may 
demand of Ann an explanation of what Ann did, perhaps even an apology for saving only 
one arm when she could so easily have saved both. Appealing to the fact that Ann has 
 
(Thanks to Joe Horton for this worry.) Instead, we could say, “the suboptimal act that otherwise would be 
supererogatory…” However, crucially, even if acting in the suboptimal way is not, strictly speaking, super-
erogatory, acting is still supererogatory in the strict sense, since it is both permissible not to act and permis-
sible to act (namely, it is permissible to act in the optimal way). 
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wronged Beth straightforwardly makes sense of these demands. But, if we think Y wrongs 
X only if Y violates a duty she owes to X, this means Ann’s duty not to save only Beth’s 
left arm is owed to Beth.   
However, this is hard to square on the canonical statement of the Interest Theory.146 Beth 
is no worse off than she would have been had Ann not acted as she did—in fact, she is 
much better off. Since Beth is no worse off than she would have been, Beth’s wellbeing is 
not of sufficient weight to place Ann under a duty not to save only her left arm. So, Beth 
cannot have a right against Ann that Ann not save only her left arm.  
The Safety Condition makes sense of One/Two Arm. Beth’s wellbeing is sufficiently weighty 
through comparison of the world in which Ann saves only Beth’s left arm with the world 
in which Ann saves both of Beth’s arms to place Ann under a duty not to save only her 
left arm.147  
(Suppose one does not accept the claim that it is wrong for Ann to save only Beth’s left 
arm. I think one should still think it a virtue of the Safety Condition that it can make sense 
of the following conditional claim: if it is wrong to act in the suboptimal way, the wrong 
is directed (due to a directed duty not to act in the suboptimal way). The canonical state-
ment of the Interest Theory cannot make this conditional claim.) 
In this subsection, we have seen that the Safety Condition has extensional accuracy in two 
further cases of harmless wronging in addition to preemption and pure risk. This, along 
with the Safety Condition’s extensional accuracy in reply to the Problem of Preemption, 
as well as the reasons that rights respond to modality introduced in subsection 3.1, gives 
 
146 Recall, even if we endorse Weak Correlativity, so think Ann could owe this duty to Beth without Beth 
holding a correlative right against her, the Interest Theory (Canonical) explains what it is for one to owe a 
duty to another (chapter 1, section 4.2). 
147 This verdict holds only if the world in which the actor performs the optimal act is sufficiently close to the 
world in which she performs the suboptimal act. Since these cases of suboptimal supererogation tend to be 
cases in which the optimal act is minimally costlier than the suboptimal act, this is a plausible assumption. 
But perhaps there are counterexamples in which the optimal act is performed only in worlds that are not 
sufficiently close for the Safety Condition. This would mean the Safety Condition does not explain subop-
timal supererogation but accidentally gets the right verdict in cases like One/Two Arm.   
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us good reason to endorse the Safety Condition. (At least, good enough reason to stick 
with me for another few chapters.) 
 
4. In Defence of Safety 
In this section, I defend the Safety Condition against three objections. First, that the Safety 
Condition is too obscure to be of help. Second, that it does not offer a full solution to the 
Problem of Preemption. Third, that we ought to build Safety into our account of harm 
instead of rights. I also introduce a fourth problem: that it overgenerates rights. However, 
the full significance of this problem is apparent only once we see how the Safety Condition 
deals with the Problem of Pure Risk in chapter 8; so, I delay replying to this problem until 
it is at its most pointed. 
4.1 The Obscure Problem 
One might object that offering a set of conditions for determining whether a world is close 
enough for it to satisfy the Safety Condition is a hopeless task. Accordingly, the Safety 
Condition itself is hopeless. When discussing a similar problem with his view of counter-
factuals, Lewis says: ‘It may be said that even if possible worlds are tolerable, still the 
notion of comparative overall similarity of worlds is hopelessly unclear, and so no fit foun-
dation for the clarification of counterfactuals or anything else’ (Lewis 1973, 91, emphasis 
mine). Since the objection is, roughly, that the notion of closeness is too obscure to play 
any fundamental role in our theory of rights, let us call this the Obscure Problem.  
There are several things to say in reply to this problem. The first is to note the Safety 
Condition has principled extensional accuracy where other solutions to the Problem of 
Harmless Wronging fail. It accounts for why Passenger has a right against Attendant 
denying her admittance onto the plane. And, in chapter 8, we see it accounts for why 
Target has a right against Shooter subjecting her to risk of harm. The modally undemand-
ing, canonical version of the Interest Theory does not offer such an account. (And recall, 
even if one is not wedded to the Interest Theory, I argued harmless wronging is still 
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problematic.)148 This gives us evidence that we are closer to having the correct theory of 
rights with the Safety Condition than without it, even if we cannot offer a robust account 
of how to determine what worlds count as sufficiently close.149  
Second, the force of the objection itself can be called into question. One might think that 
delineating the set of close worlds is going to be too obscure because either it is “ill-under-
stood” or it is “vague.” With Lewis, I think talk of the closeness of worlds is not ill-under-
stood, but vague (Lewis 1973, 91–95). However, moral theory is already vague, so vague-
ness itself should not worry us. For example, most people think it is permissible to break 
a promise if there is enough good at stake—but how much good is sufficient? Williamson 
notes how with respect to the safety condition on knowledge that closeness will be vague 
because knowledge itself is vague: ‘If one believes p truly in a case α, one must avoid false 
belief in other cases sufficiently similar to α in order to count as reliable enough to know 
p in α. The vagueness in “sufficiently similar” matches the vagueness in “reliable”, and in 
“know”’ (Williamson 2000, 100). We could posit a similar suggestion here: since whether 
one’s wellbeing is sufficiently weighty to place others under a duty is underspecified and 
vague, which worlds count as close enough will be underspecified and vague. But it is not 
fair to say it is ill-understood. Above in section 2.2., we offered the beginnings of a fairly 
robust account of closeness.  
Third, the Obscure Problem can be mitigated by distinguishing between comparative and 
quantitative closeness. We have been comparing degrees of closeness between worlds. Of 
both Plane Crash and Hitmen, I said that world 2 is closer to world 1 than world 3 is to world 
1. But, I said, world 3 is still pretty close to world 1. Implicit in this is some notion of other 
worlds being less close than world 3 to world 1 (think of the worlds in which Passenger 
and Hitman1 do not make it out of bed). However, this need not imply that closeness can 
be measured in some precise way. As Lewis puts it, we need only a comparative and not 
necessarily a quantitative concept of closeness: ‘One world is more similar than another to 
a third; but we need never say how much more, and the question how much more need 
 
148 Chapter 1, section 5, and chapter 3, section 4. 
149 In a similar context, Kagan says ‘insofar as it [his modal personism] can accommodate many of our deeply 
held intuitions […] I think there may well be a great deal to be said for it’ (Kagan 2016, 18). 
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not make sense’ (Lewis 1973, 50).150 The worry that the Safety Condition is too obscure 
should be lessened by bearing this in mind—we need not be relying on some perfectly 
quantifiable account of closeness.  
In discussion of modal safety elsewhere in the literature, most approaches to determining 
which worlds count as sufficiently close focus on identifying limiting cases at either end of 
the spectrum (identifying worlds that are, and are not, close and pointing to some mech-
anisms that explain this) (Williamson 2000, 123–28; Pritchard 2005, 145–78; Pettit 2012, 
32). We might look to Williamson’s remark that we can think of safety in the same way as 
we think of a child being safe if she is six feet from the edge of a cliff, but unsafe if she is 
six inches from the edge. Features of context, such as the severity of the harm that would 
befall the child were the event to occur, will play a role in determining how close a world 
needs to be in order for it to be too close for the child to be safe. Within the context of 
freedom (which, below, I suggest is modally demanding), Phillip Pettit suggests that ‘this 
range of worlds is discernible only on an intuitive, context-sensitive basis’ (Pettit 2012, 32). 
Nicolas Southwood goes as far as to say: ‘It seems to me that to have an understanding of 
the relevant [modally demanding] value just is, in part, to have an understanding of the 
relevant range of circumstances’ (Southwood 2015, 510).  
Perhaps the preceding might only fuel one’s scepticism about the Safety Condition. In 
order to dampen the foregoing worries, let us consider other areas of moral, political, and 
legal theory in which modal safety is required.  
First, consider freedom. Suppose an agent is faced with a set of doors corresponding to 
their  option set (Berlin 1969, xlviii). Perhaps freedom consists of the absence of interfer-
ence with an agent’s preferred option. This view will not do. It is implausible that agents 
are free in making decisions when, even though the door they choose is open, all other 
doors might have been locked. It is also objectionable that agents can make themselves 
 
150 Justin Snedegar offered a similar value-charged example. We might say, “Both £100 and a nice dinner 
are better than a cup of coffee, though £1,000 is much better.” But how much better? It is unclear whether 
there even is an answer to this question. Even a value-monist, who thinks there is an answer to this question, 
must admit that it is not going to be an easy task figuring that out. Yet, does this obscurity lead us to be 
sceptical of Snedegar’s statement?  
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(more) free by adapting their preferences in line with those options available to them 
(Berlin 1969, xxxix). Instead, for an agent to be free perhaps it must be that any door they 
might have pushed is open. Call this the Non-Interference View (Carter 1999; Kramer 
2003). The Non-Interference View requires safety across an agent’s option set.  
Suppose that the set of doors are all open, yet a third-party has the ability to lock any of 
the doors. She decides not to. A third view of freedom, the Non-Domination View, says 
that non-interference (any door being open) is not sufficient for freedom. Instead, ‘[w]hat 
freedom ideally requires is not just that the doors be open but that there be no door-
keeper who has the power of closing a door’ (Pettit 2012, 66). We can see that the Non-
Domination View also appeals to safety. Yet, unlike the Non-Interference View, it is not 
sufficient that we see how agents’ options fare across worlds; we also consider additional 
worlds in which others might be differently disposed towards that agent.  
Second, consider the friendship between two individuals, Homer and Barney. Plausibly, 
both whether Homer and Barney are friends and the value of their friendship requires that 
Homer thinks of and treats Barney in certain ways. He must treat Barney with concern 
and compassion. He must help Barney, even if that help is quite demanding. However, 
both their friendship and its value do not merely require that Homer think of and treat 
Barney in the relevant ways in the actual world. Rather, it requires that Homer would 
think of and treat Barney in certain ways in other worlds, were things to be different (Pettit 
2015, 11–42). For example, both their friendship and its value require that Homer would 
treat Barney in the relevant ways even if he had less time to invest in their friendship, even 
if Barney became less funny, and so on. Both the friendship itself and its value requires 
safety across relevant worlds.  
Now, as with the Safety Condition, both freedom (either as Non-Interference or Non-
Domination) and friendship do not require safety across all worlds. For example, in order 
for an agent to be free in any morally meaningful sense, we need not require that her 
choices not be interfered with or dominated across all states of affairs. That would be too 
demanding.151 Similarly, Homer and Barney’s friendship does not require that Homer 
 
151 See Pettit: ‘this range of worlds […] does not include all possible worlds’ (Pettit 2012, 32). 
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thinks of and treats Barney in the relevant ways across all circumstances. Homer need not 
help Barney move a dead body. As with the Safety Condition, we require safety only 
across some set of close worlds. So, how does this discussion relate to our sceptic who 
thinks we cannot delineate which worlds count as close enough for the Safety Condition? 
Well, if one is sceptical of the positive account of closeness developed across subsection 
2.2 and the first half of this subsection, one is going to need to rethink many other areas 
of moral, legal, and political theory.152 Because of this, I am going to press on with the 
Safety Condition.  
But before doing so, suppose my optimism about the robustness of the account of close-
ness as well as discovering which worlds are sufficiently close is misplaced. This need not 
mean modality is playing no role in rights; rather, it could mean only that modality does 
not help us determine which rights obtain. In the context of replying to a similar challenge 
for the safety condition on knowledge, Williamson says: ‘In many cases, someone with no 
idea of what knowledge is would be unable to determine whether safety obtained […] 
One may have to decide whether safety obtains by first deciding whether knowledge ob-
tains, rather than vice versa’ (Williamson 2009, 305). Williamson thinks safety offers a 
circular account of knowledge. Similarly, we could think the Safety Condition is a circular 
account of rights. 
Now, one might think there is a problem with this circular account of determining 
whether a world is sufficiently close: it means we cannot learn anything about the nature 
of directed duties and rights by appeal to the Safety Condition.153 However, this objection 
is misplaced. Even if we cannot determine whether one is owed a duty and holds a right 
by the lights of the Safety Condition alone, we ought still be interested in why it is neces-
sary that whenever one is owed a duty, that duty is grounded in how one fares across close 
worlds. This is so even if we need a prior understanding of whether one is owed that duty 
to know whether the world is as close enough. 
 
152 For other modally demanding goods, see (Raz 1986, 369–99; Pettit 2015; Southwood 2015; Kagan 2016; 
Lazar 2017). 
153 Those who are not worried about circularity will not be so worried about this problem (Cruft 2019). 
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4.2 Very Preempted Harm 
In Plane Crash, the Safety Condition works by comparing the actual world with the close 
world in which Passenger boards the plane and it does not crash. In Hitmen, the Safety 
Condition works by comparing the actual world in which Hitman1 shoots Victim with the 
close world in which Hitman1 does not shoot Victim and Hitman2 does not shoot Victim. 
In both of these cases, we might say, we are looking past the closest (counterfactual) world 
to some other close (counterfactual) world in which the preempting harm does not occur. 
However, here lies the recipe for a counterexample: make the harm very preempted. 
Smokin’ Aces. Hitman1 is contracted to kill Victim. Unbeknownst to Hit-
man1, there are one hundred other hitmen waiting in the wings. Each is 
ready to kill Victim if the previous hitman fails. 
In Smokin’ Aces, the Safety Condition has to compare 
(SA World 1) Hitman1 shoots Victim (Hitmen2-101 were waiting in the 
wings), 
with 
(SA World 101) Hitman1-Hitman101 all do not shoot Victim. 
Victim is worse off in (SA) world 1 than she is in (SA) world 101—(SA) world 101 is the 
closest world that allows us to say this. However, one might think (SA) world 101 is not a 
close enough world for the purposes of satisfying the Safety Condition. So, Victim will not 
have a right that Hitman1 not shoot her. Like the Pro Tanto and the Normality Thesis, 
the Safety Condition is not a full solution to the Problem of Preemption.   
Why is (SA) world 101 not a particularly close world? Think back to Lewis. We discover 
the closeness of two worlds at t by reference to the number and size of the violations of 
the laws of nature that would be required at t to render those worlds convergent after t. 
On Lewis’s view, we would need 100 miracles to get us from (SA) world 101 to (SA) world 
1. But perhaps that is too many miracles. (If 100 miracles leaves (SA) world 101 close 
enough to satisfy the Safety Condition, the objector could always add more hitmen.)  
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One might object that Smokin’ Aces, and cases of Very Preempted Harm more generally, 
are somewhat gimmicky and so should be set aside. I am not sure they are. Think back to 
the example of harm that is normally preempted in the real world, the polluting factories. 
We supposed that, because of certain factors, these kinds of polluting factories pop up in 
close proximity to each other. On the supposition that one polluting factory is sufficient 
to harm on its own, any harm caused by a particular factory would normally be 
preempted. Salient for our purposes is that many of these factories may pop up in close 
proximity to each other; enough, perhaps, to make a world in which there is no other 
factory present (to avoid preemption) too far away to satisfy the Safety Condition.  
There are at least four ways that we might address to this problem. First, we might relax 
the criteria for how close a world needs to be in order for it to satisfy the Safety Condition. 
We can quickly set this reply aside: however expansive we allow closeness to be, our ob-
jector could always add one more degree of preemption—she could always add one more 
hitman. (This would also make the Safety Condition more likely to overgenerate rights, an 
objection I introduce in the following subsection and engage with in chapter 8.) 
Second, we might amend the Safety Condition. The element of the Safety Condition that 
cases of very preempted harm put pressure on is that X must be worse off than she would 
have been in at least one close world. We could revise this closeness element:  
Interest Theory (Safety, Relevance Variant). For X to have a right against Y that 
Y Φ, Y’s not Φ-ing must cause X to be worse off than she would have been 
in at least one relevant world, and the difference in X’s wellbeing must be 
of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to Φ. 
Since there is no stipulation that the world of comparison needs to be a close world, we 
need not worry that (SA) world 101 is far away from (SA) world 1. It turns only on whether 
we think (SA) world 101 is relevant, and it seems relevant. 
However, there is an obvious complaint with the Relevance Variant: how do we work out 
which worlds are relevant? Despite the Relevance Variant faring better with the Problem 
of Very Preempted Harm than the standard Safety Condition, I am worried about 
whether there is a non-circular way to answer this question. So, while the Relevance 
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Variant may score very well extensionally, it has less explanatory power than the Safety 
Condition.154 
Third, we might lean on our theory of closeness to avoid the verdict that the world in 
which the harm is not preempted is not close. For example, because the differences be-
tween (SA) world 1 through to (SA) world 101 are themselves so similar, one could argue 
(SA) world 101 is not actually all that far from (SA) world 1. Call this the Similarity Strategy. 
Taking this strategy, we have not relaxed how close a world needs to be in order for it to 
be close enough to satisfy the Safety Condition (as suggested and set aside above). Rather, 
we have suggested that (SA) world 101 is not actually that far away, so will satisfy the 
Safety Condition. We might even say, how far away these worlds are tends towards some 
limit no matter how many hitmen we add.155  
There are at least two limitations with the Similarity Strategy. First, I have often moti-
vated the Safety Condition with language such as,  
It could easily have been the case that…  
Even if the Similarity Strategy is a feature of the correct view of closeness, we might won-
der whether it is tracking the locutions that I have been using to motivate safety—if not, 
the specific semantics we are leaning upon undermines (or at least, is not in keeping with) 
the motivational story behind the Safety Condition. In Smokin’ Aces, could it easily have 
been the case that Hitman1 shot Victim and no one else would have? I am not sure.  
Second, the Similarity Strategy works because the many different preempting acts are 
relevantly similar, thereby diminishing their impact on how far away worlds are. But 
maybe this is just a fiat of Smokin’ Aces. Perhaps one could devise a case in which all of the 
 
154 The Safety Condition answers this challenge: “Well, the worlds that are relevant are those that are close!” 
At the end of the preceding section, I said one could offer a circular account of determining which worlds 
are sufficiently close for the Safety Condition. The circularity of the Relevance Variant appears more prob-
lematic than that circularity: the circular account of closeness had an answer to the question why are those 
worlds relevant.  
155 This would imply the distance between the world with one hitman and the world with two hitmen is a 
lot greater than the distance between the world with 100 hitmen and the world with 101 hitmen (which, 
itself, is greater than the distance between the world with 1000 hitmen and 1001 hitmen). 
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different things that cause the harm to be preempted are of a different character, meaning 
that the Similarity Strategy will be of little help. For example, we could suppose that were 
Hitman1 not to have killed Victim, a boulder would have fallen on her and, had the boul-
der not fallen, lightning would have struck her, and so on. 
We have considered three ways of replying to the Problem of Very Preempted Harm. 
The first way, of expanding those worlds which count as close enough, did not help much. 
The second way, of moving to the Relevance Variant of the Safety Condition, weakens 
the explanatory power of the Safety Condition. And the third way, the Similarity Strategy, 
was also not wholly satisfying. A final option is to accept our problem’s conclusion—when 
harm is preempted to a great degree, along many different dimensions, people do not 
have rights against that harm.156 Let me make a few remarks so this bullet is easier to 
swallow. 
First, above we considered only one feature of closeness (the Similarity Strategy) that helps 
solve the problem. We might hold out hope that there are other features of the semantics 
of closeness that will provide a solution to our problem.  
Second, and more substantially, in refining the Interest Theory with the Safety Condition, 
we are attempting to offer a reductive account of rights (and directed duties)—an account 
that explains rights and, correlatively, what it is to owe a duty to another person by ap-
pealing to some other feature(s). The Interest Theory (with the Counterfactual Account) 
began with the idea that rights are difference makers. The Safety Condition adds, “rights 
are difference makers or could-easily-have-been difference makers.” The Problem of Very 
Preempted Harm is, “Well, what if the putative duty-bearer couldn’t easily have been a 
difference maker?” Perhaps it should not be surprising that we need to accept some coun-
terintuitiveness along this line.157 When someone really is doomed to suffer some bad fate, 
 
156 The “along many different dimensions” is included to address the Similarity Strategy. 
157 Steiner says, comparing the Interest Theory to the Will Theory of rights: ‘theories of rights don’t come 
cheap. Buying either one of them involves paying some price in the currency of counter-intuitiveness’ (2000, 
298). More generally, consider the paradox of analysis. 
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perhaps they do not have rights against us that we not make that fate preempted to more 
of an extent.  
What is more, I said that though this thesis is framed in terms of the Interest Theory, the 
Problem of Harmless Wronging poses a problem for other theories of rights. For example, 
most theories of rights say that, other things being equal, the stringency of a right corre-
sponds to the harm that would befall its holder were that right not to be respected. What, 
then, is going to be the stringency of Victim’s right against being harmed in Smokin’ Aces? 
While the problem does damn the Safety Condition, other views are going to be in trouble 
too.  
Third, though I suggested in chapter 4 that there are real-world examples in which it is 
normal for harm to be preempted (as well as suggesting in this subsection that there may 
be realistic cases in which harm may be preempted to a large extent along similar dimen-
sions), we might wonder how prevalent cases are in which harm is preempted to a large 
extent along distinct lines. I did have trouble getting a case going above. This difficulty gives 
us evidence that the counterintuitiveness may be unfounded.158  
4.3 Safety and Harm 
In chapter 4, we considered a response to the Problem of Preemption that insisted, intui-
tively people are harmed when harm is preempted. Any view of harm that says otherwise 
is mistaken. Once we have an account that arrives at the putatively correct verdict that 
people are harmed by preempted harm, the canonical statement of the Interest Theory 
arrives at the correct verdict that people have rights against preempted harm. But I argued 
we ought not go that way because the other accounts of harm we considered were found 
wanting. However, I have now suggested the Safety Condition is extensionally accurate 
(notwithstanding the complications of the Problem of Very Preempted Harm) in generat-
ing rights against preempted harm. Why not make a directed appeal to something like 
 
158 Theron Pummer has suggested climate change on a global scale might be an example. Climate change 
will cause large amounts of harm that is preempted along many degrees by lots of different types of cause.  
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the Safety Condition in our account of harm and benefit? This view looks something like 
this. 
Safety Account of Harm and Benefit. Y harms X iff (and because) Y makes X 
worse off than she would have been in at least one close world in which Y 
does not act as Y did. Y benefits X iff (and because) Y makes X better off 
than she would have been in at least one close world in which Y does not 
act as Y did. 
If we amended the Interest Theory (Canonical) with the Safety Condition, we say people 
are not harmed by preempted harm, though have rights against preempted harm. If we 
amend the Counterfactual Account with the Safety Account, we say people are harmed 
by preempted harm, and so have rights against preempted harm (on the canonical state-
ment of the Interest Theory). These views are extensionally equivalent, though intension-
ally different.  
The Safety Account of Harm and Benefit is similar to Tadros’s Complex Counterfactual View, 
according to which, ‘E harms X only if X is worse off than he would have been in a 
relevant possible world where E did not occur. Comparison with more than one possible 
world may be warranted in a single case, yielding different verdicts about harm and ben-
efit’ (Tadros 2016a, 177). Key to the Safety Account of Harm and Benefit, as with 
Tadros’s Complex Counterfactual View, is that it is possible for X to be both harmed and 
benefited by a single act since there can be close worlds in which X is worse off than X 
would have been had Y not acted as she did as well as close worlds in which X is better off 
than X would have been had Y not acted as she did. 
I would not be too worried if one takes all I say about the Safety Condition and builds it 
into their account of harm. However, let me offer two reasons why I prefer building safety 
into rights. Both of these reasons need to be taken on good faith since they reply on argu-
ments not yet presented. However, it is worth flagging the Safety Condition’s relevance 
to harm now. 
First, in chapter 6, I argue that merely being subjected to risk is not itself harmful. And 
then in chapter 8, I show that the Safety Condition is satisfied in cases of pure risk, such 
as Roulette. If we build safety into our account of harm, this means being subjected to risk 
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is itself harmful. So, it is preferable to build the Safety Condition into our account of rights 
and say of our example of pure risk imposition, Roulette, though Shooter does not harm 
Target by playing roulette with her while she sleeps, she does violate her rights. 
The second reason requires a little more introduction. Whereas the Problem of Very 
Preempted Harm suggests that the Safety Condition will undergenerate rights, the Safety 
Condition may also overgenerate rights. The Safety Condition requires only that there is 
one close world in which the right-holder fares sufficiently better through the duty-bearer 
acting as the duty requires. But there are many close worlds. Will not the Safety Condition 
be too easy to satisfy?  
Take Plane Crash. There is a close world, through comparison with which, Passenger is 
made worse off by being denied admittance onto the plane. The Safety Condition is sat-
isfied, so Passenger has a right against being denied admittance onto the plane.159 How-
ever, there is also another close world, through comparison with which, Passenger is made 
better off by being denied admittance onto the plane: through comparison of world 1 and 
world 2. Does this imply that Passenger has a right against Attendant that Attendant deny 
Passenger admittance onto the plane? It might appear so—the Safety Condition has been 
satisfied. This is one example of the Problem of Overgeneration.  
The Problem of Overgeneration gets worse after showing how the Safety Condition solves 
cases of pure risk. Currently, we are comparing the duty-bearer not acting as the duty 
requires with close worlds to the world in which the duty-bearer acts as the duty requires. 
By the end of chapter 8, we see the Safety Condition also requires that we look not only 
to the closest world in which the duty-bearer does not act as the duty dictates, but to other 
worlds close to that world. Because the Problem of Overgeneration is not yet at its mean-
est, I delay addressing it until chapter 8. 
Relevant for our purposes at this point is that the Safety Account of Harm and Benefit 
will overgenerate harms and benefits. (So much is obvious from Tadros’s saying: ‘Com-
parison with more than one possible world may be warranted in a single case, yielding 
 
159 Again, subject to the other necessary and jointly sufficient conditions being satisfied. 
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different verdicts about harm and benefit’.) One of the ways that I suggest we resist the 
Problem of Overgeneration is by appealing to the other considerations on rights, includ-
ing the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.160 While one 
could try and appeal to these sorts of considerations to avoid the verdict that the Safety 
Account overgenerates harms and benefits, these agential considerations do not look like 
the sorts of considerations that affect whether one has been harmed. For example, if one 
accepts Doctrine of Double Effect, why would whether I intend the harm done to you 
affect if it is harmful or beneficial? But, it is plausible that it affects whether you hold a 
right against me. Because of this, it is better to build safety into rights and not harm so 
that we can resist the Problem of Overgeneration in these ways. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the Safety Condition as a solution to the Problem of Harm-
less Wronging through focusing on the Problem of Preemption. In section 3, I gave a 
taster of the reasons we have to endorse the Safety Condition in addition to its extensional 
accuracy. And in section 4, I defended the Safety Condition against three objections. First, 
that the Safety Condition’s reliance on the closeness of worlds is too obscure to affect 
rights. Second, that the Safety Condition will undergenerate rights when harm is very 
preempted. And, third, that we ought build safety into our account of harm and not rights. 
In the next chapter, we turn to the Problem of Pure Risk. 
  
 
160 Introduced in chapter 3, section 3.3. 
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6. Risk and Harm 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the Safety Condition as a solution to the Problem 
of Harmless Wronging through focus on the Problem of Preemption. Let us turn to our 
other more specific version of the Problem of Harmless Wronging, the Problem of Pure 
Risk. Recall our example of pure risk imposition:  
Roulette. Target is asleep. Her housemate, Shooter, comes into her room 
and plays Russian roulette with her. She pulls the trigger but, luckily, no 
bullet is fired. Shooter, content with having played a round of roulette, 
never plays roulette again. 
Intuitively, Target has a right against Shooter playing roulette with her—a right that 
Shooter violates. However, since the risked harm that Shooter subjects Target to does not 
materialise, Shooter does not harm target. Since Target is not harmed by the violation of 
her putative right, her wellbeing is not of sufficient weight to place Shooter under a duty 
not to play roulette with her. This means the necessary condition set for the ascription of 
a right on the canonical statement of the Interest Theory is not satisfied. So, Target has 
no right against Shooter that Shooter not play roulette with her.  
There are at least two ways that we might object to the preceding. First, though the risked 
harm does not materialise in Roulette, one might nonetheless argue that Shooter harms 
Target. If Shooter harms Target merely by subjecting her to risk of harm, Target can 
have a right against Shooter that she not play roulette with her given the canonical state-
ment of the Interest Theory. Second, though Shooter does not harm Target as things turn 
out, Shooter did not know this when she acted. If our directed duties and others correla-
tive rights are determined not by the facts, given how things turn out, but instead by the 
beliefs of potential duty-bearers or the evidence available to them, Target’s wellbeing may 
well be of sufficient weight to place Shooter under a duty not to play roulette with her.  
This and the following chapter argue that neither of these ways of proceeding are success-
ful: risk is not itself harmful and our duties and others’ rights are determined by the facts. 
Then, in chapter 8, I show how the Safety Condition solves Roulette—though Shooter does 
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not harm Target, she could easily have; and, the Safety Condition normatively requires 
not only that we are not harmed, but that we could not easily have been harmed.  
Returning to this chapter, some think that Shooter harms Target even though the risked 
harm does not materialise. They might further think that the moral significance of Tar-
get’s action lies in this fact.161 This chapter answers two questions. First, is risk of harm 
itself harmful?162 (For brevity, is risk harmful?) Second, if risk is harmful, does risk being 
harmful solve the Problem of Pure Risk? I argue that risk is not harmful. If risk is not 
harmful, solving the Problem of Pure Risk cannot lie in it being harmful. For reasons that 
become clear below, some people might not follow me all the way to thinking that risk is 
never harmful. If this is correct, I argue, at the least, risk is harmful only in a small range of 
cases. If risk is harmful only in a subset of the much larger set of cases in which it looks 
like we have rights against risk, the solution to the Problem of Pure Risk cannot lie only 
in it being harmful.  
Let me outline the structure of this chapter. We see that there are at least two arguments 
for the idea that risk is harmful. First (section 2), often people desire not to be subjected 
to risk. Perhaps people are harmed through being at risk because their desires are frus-
trated. Second (section 3), by exposing others to risk, one might frustrate their autonomy. 
Perhaps people are harmed through having their autonomy frustrated. I argue that both 
views are found wanting. In section 4, I argue against the view that risk is harmful, how-
ever the view is worked out.  
Before beginning, a preliminary is required. In Roulette, the following morning, if Shooter 
were to explain to Target what happened, Target might reasonably become psychologi-
cally distressed. She might fear that Shooter will, again, break into her room and play 
roulette with her (despite Target’s assurances to the contrary). She might buy a lock for 
her door, spend time at friends’ houses, or even move. In all of these cases, Target might 
 
161 (Finkelstein 2003; Adler 2003; Oberdiek 2009; 2012; 2017a; Lazar 2015; 2017; Placani 2017). With the 
exception of, perhaps, Lazar, all seem to imply that the moral significance of risk lies in its being harmful.  
162 Among other reasons, determining whether risk is harmful is also of significance because the law needs 
an answer to this question. The paradigm case is Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750 
(HL). For discussion, see (Perry 1995, 2014, 45–48; Finkelstein 2003, 975–90). 
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be harmed by Shooter. But these harms (the psychological distress, fear, and disruption) 
are downstream from the risk imposition and, as Roulette makes salient, contingent. While of 
moral significance, they are not the subject of our discussion. 
 
2. The Desire Solution  
Often, people desire not to be subjected to risk of harm. Desires might play some role in 
harm. Perhaps people are harmed through being at risk because their desires are frus-
trated. Perhaps Target is harmed because she has a desire not to be the subject of risk, a 
desire that Shooter frustrates. Let us call this the Desire Solution.  
There are several ways that the Desire Solution might work, depending on the account of 
wellbeing that is correct. Assume the Desire Theory of wellbeing, on which wellbeing 
consists only in the satisfaction of one’s desires. In Roulette, if Target has a desire that 
Shooter not subject her to risk, Target is harmed by Shooter. This is because Shooter 
makes Target worse off than Target would have been, had she not played Russian roulette 
with Target. She makes Target worse off than Target would have been because she causes 
Target’s desires to be more frustrated than they would have been, had she not acted as 
she did. This is one version of the Desire Solution. 
The Desire Solution is different from the Desire Theory. The Desire Theory is a view about 
wellbeing. The Desire Solution is an answer to the question, “Is risk harmful?” One need 
not hold the Desire Theory to defend the Desire Solution. There are other views of well-
being in addition to the Desire Theory that see the frustration of one’s desires as bad for 
an individual (though, unlike the Desire Theory, they do not imply that it is the only thing 
that is bad for an individual). (For example, Hybrid Theories that subsume the Desire 
Theory will think the frustration of one’s desires are bad for one.) On these views, risk will 
be harmful in virtue of one’s desires not to be at risk being frustrated. Let us assume the 
Desire Theory. The objections considered below applies equally to these other views of 
wellbeing. 
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2.1 Actual and Informed Desires 
Some try to force a dilemma upon the defender of the Desire Solution, both horns of 
which they take to be problematic (Adler 2003, 1251–53; Perry 2007, 200–201; Oberdiek 
2012, 346–47). In this subsection I argue this dilemma can be dissolved. In the following 
subsection, I introduce a problem that is not so easy to avoid.  
The Desire Theory says that what is good for an individual is the satisfaction of their 
desires. We might ask whether the desires that are relevant for the Desire Theory are an 
individual’s actual or informed desires.163 In Cherry Pie, suppose that I want some cherry pie 
and there is one in front of me. Unbeknownst to me, I have developed a severe allergy to 
cherries (Heathwood 2016, 139). If the Desire Theory cares about my actual desires (call 
this version of the Desire Theory the Actual Desire Theory), my life goes better, for me, 
if I get the pie than if I do not. This verdict seems odd. My life seems to go worse for me 
if I get the pie. (Below, we turn to a more sympathetic reading of this case.) More gener-
ally, as James Griffin writes, ‘notoriously, we mistake our own interest’ (Griffin 1986, 10).  
In Cherry Pie, were I to be presented with all of the non-evaluative facts, I probably would 
not continue to desire a slice of pie. This might give us reason to think that the desires 
that are relevant for the Desire Theory are our informed desires. Call this the Informed 
Desire Theory.  
Above, I said that some people try to force a dilemma upon defenders of the Desire Solu-
tion. On the first horn of the dilemma, assume we hold the Actual Desire Theory. Stephen 
Perry suggests, if one holds the Actual Desire Theory, ‘people can prefer or disprefer al-
most anything, so there would seem to be nothing in principle to prevent someone from 
preferring a risky to a non-risky state of affairs’ (Perry 2007, 200). I take the worry to be 
that this means risk is not necessarily harmful because someone may not desire not to be 
at risk in some particular circumstances. John Oberdiek rejects this horn of the dilemma 
because he thinks that the Actual Desire Theory is too implausible in general. He writes, 
 
163 E.g., (Sidgwick 1981, 109–15; Rawls 1999, 365–72; Griffin 1986, 10–20). By actual desires, I mean 
something closer to an individual’s hypothetical desires—the desire she would have, were someone to ask her. 
See Sumner on the move from revealed to hypothetical desires (Sumner 1996, 119). 
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‘we often prefer, through ignorance or whatnot, what is in fact bad for us [and this] is 
decisive’ (Oberdiek 2012, 347). 
On the second horn of the dilemma, assume we hold the Informed Desire Theory. That 
theory says that what is good for an individual is having the desires satisfied that she would 
have were she in possession of all the non-evaluative facts. But, it is pressed, from this 
‘omniscient perspective’ of fully informed desires, ‘risk just disappears’ (Oberdiek 2012, 
346). The idea is supposed to be, if one knows that some risk will materialise, there is no 
risk of harm, but harm in the straightforward sense; and if, on the contrary, one knows 
that the risk will not materialise, it will not be the case that one does not desire to be sub-
jected to the putative risk. On either horn of the dilemma, then, the Desire Solution fails. 
The Desire Solution can be defended on both fronts. Let us begin with the first horn of 
the dilemma. In response to Perry, suppose that it is not the case that someone desires 
that they not be subjected to some particular risk. Perry is correct in thinking that this 
means that that risk is not harmful to that particular person in those particular circum-
stances. But this is not so much an objection to the Desire Solution as statement of the 
Actual Desire Theory itself.164 This fiat of the Desire Theory results from its subjective char-
acter as a theory of wellbeing: on the Desire Theory, ‘getting a good life has to do with 
one’s attitudes towards what one gets in life rather than the nature of those things them-
selves’ (Heathwood 2016, 135). Many people endorse the Desire Theory because of its sub-
jective character. 
What of Oberdiek’s rejection of the Actual Desire Theory because of its implausibility in 
reply to cases like Cherry Pie? We might not need to embrace the Informed Desire Theory 
to get the intuitively correct verdict in Cherry Pie. This is because the Actual Desire Theory 
is ambiguous between saying that it is good for me, all-things-considered, to eat the pie 
and that it is good for me, pro tanto, to eat the pie. If we embrace the second disambigu-
ation, the Actual Desire Theory can maintain that it is good for me, pro tanto, to eat the 
cherry pie, but that it is not good for me all-things-considered. It might not be good for 
 
164 It is also the case that one may desire a risky state of affairs over a non-risky state of affairs, fully informed, 
so Perry’s objection applies equally to the Informed Desire Theory.  
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me all-things-considered because doing so will frustrate many of my other (pro tanto) de-
sires. In favour of this line of thinking, compare the following two states of affairs: (S1) I 
do not have a desire to eat the cherry pie, eat it nonetheless, and have an allergic reaction; 
(S2) I do have a desire to eat the cherry pie, eat it, and have an allergic reaction. My life 
goes worse for me in S1 than S2. The pro tanto disambiguation can explain this.165  
Given the preceding two paragraphs, the Actual Desire Theory horn of the dilemma does 
not seem as worrying as some have thought. Let us move on to consider the second horn 
of the dilemma. One might respond to the second horn of the dilemma by suggesting that 
there is a distinction between, on the one hand, being fully informed of all of the non-
evaluative facts in relation to the circumstances of a decision before deciding, and, on the 
other hand, being fully informed in relation to the outcome of the decision. We might put 
the point in the following way: agents can be more (or fully) informed about their choices 
from an ex ante perspective (before the fact) without becoming fully informed about their 
choices from an ex post perspective (after the fact, in knowledge of whether the risk has, 
or has not, materialised). And, risk disappears in the way that Oberdiek suggests only on 
the second disambiguation of informed desires.166 
For example, let us amend Cherry Pie. As above, suppose I want a slice of cherry pie and 
there is one in front of me. Unbeknownst to me, I have developed a severe allergy to 
 
165 See (Sumner 1996, 131; Heathwood 2005). The purpose of this paragraph has been to show that the 
Actual Desire Theory is not simply to be set aside. That said, I am sceptical of whether this pro tanto 
disambiguation will work in all cases, for similar reasons as those that lead me to be sceptical of the Pro 
Tanto Thesis as a full solution to the Problem of Preemption (chapter 4, section 2.1). The pro tanto disam-
biguation provides the intuitively correct verdict in Cherry Pie because the aspects of wellbeing at stake are 
fairly distinct—(i) enjoyment from eating pie versus (ii) pain from an allergic reaction. However, how plau-
sible is this solution when the pro tanto aspects of one’s wellbeing that play off against each other in the all-
things-considered judgement are more similar? Suppose that I desire state of affairs S3 over S4 because I 
think that S4 will be painful and S3 not painful. I am mistaken. S3 is painful and S4 would not have been. 
What pro tanto desire is satisfied by my choosing S3? What is more, the Informed Desire Theory can rec-
ognise the putative advantage of the pro tanto disambiguation of the Actual Desire Theory noted directly 
above in the text. The Informed Desire Theory can say that, even if I knew all of the facts, I would rather 
have an allergic reaction from a pie that I enjoyed than an allergic reaction from a pie that I did not enjoy 
(that is to say, fully informed, I would desire S2 over S1).  
166 This will need to be slightly refined for one might think, if determinism is true and one knew all of the ex 
ante facts, they will be able to figure out all of the ex post facts. Thanks to Antony Duff and Sandra Marshall 
for this point. We could go for a Reasonably Informed Ex Ante Desire Theory. 
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cherries. Unlike above, suppose that this allergy results in an allergic reaction fifty percent 
of the time. When the allergy does not manifest, I have no adverse reaction. The Informed 
Desire Theory might say that what is good for me should be decided from the informed 
ex ante perspective (given knowledge of my allergy and the propensity of its occurrence) 
or from the ex post perspective (given both knowledge of my allergy and knowledge of 
whether, in this instance, I will have an allergic reaction to the pie). Risk does not disap-
pear on the ex ante perspective of the Informed Desire Theory.  
We have been considering the following dilemma that threatens the Desire Solution. If 
one endorses the Actual Desire Theory, agents may desire a risky state of affairs over a 
non-risky state of affairs and so risk will not necessarily be harmful. However, this does 
not so much seem to be an objection to the Actual Desire Theory rather than a fiat of the 
Desire Theory’s subjective character as a theory of wellbeing. If one endorses the In-
formed Desire Theory, one might think that risk just disappears insofar as the agent will 
be informed of whether or not the risk will manifest itself, and so would only desire not to 
be subject to risks that will materialise. While this might be true on the Informed Desire 
Theory (Ex Post Perspective), this is not true on the Informed Desire Theory (Ex Ante 
Perspective). Risk might itself be harmful on the Actual Desire Theory or on the Informed 
Desire Theory (Ex Ante Perspective). 
2.2 Derivative and Non-Derivative Desires 
We are trying to argue that risk of harm is itself harmful. If risk is itself harmful, we can 
easily accommodate why we have rights against risk of harm. Since it might be bad for us 
when our desires are frustrated, and we have desires not to be at risk of harm, risk might 
be harmful when our desires not to be at risk are frustrated. 
Recall again that the Desire Theory says that what is good for an individual is the fulfil-
ment of their desires. There are several choice-points for the Desire Theorist. We just 
considered whether the desires that are relevant for the Desire Theory are individuals’ 
actual or informed desires. The choice-point that is important for our purposes in this sub-
section is whether the desires that are relevant are both individuals’ derivative and non-
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derivative desires or only their non-derivative desires.167 Let us say a person’s desire for some-
thing is non-derivative if she desires it for its own sake, and her desire for something is 
derivative if she desires it, but not for its own sake. On what we can call the Non-Deriva-
tive Desire Theory, what is good for an individual is only the fulfilment of their non-
derivative desires. On the Unrestricted Desire Theory, what is good for an individual is 
both the fulfilment of their derivative and non-derivative desires. 
Suppose that Dan wants it to snow in the mountains so that he can get some good skiing 
in. It does snow but, as it turns out, Dan does not end up going skiing (Heathwood 2016, 
139). Does the satisfaction of Dan’s desire that it snow in the mountains make his life go 
better for him, even though he does not end up going skiing? Dan’s desire that it snow 
was only a derivative desire. The satisfaction of Dan’s desire that it snows seems only to 
derive its value from his desire to get some good skiing in. Dan’s desire that he get some 
good skiing in is a non-derivative desire (or, at the least, closer to a non-derivative desire). 
The Non-Derivative Desire Theory says Dan’s life does not go better for him. The Unre-
stricted Desire Theory says his life does go better for him. 
We have good reason to endorse the Non-Derivative Desire Theory. First, the Unre-
stricted Desire Theory is intuitively implausible. As Chris Heathwood suggests, ‘intui-
tively, the fulfillment of [Dan’s] desire that it snow was not in the end of any benefit to 
[Dan]’ (2016, 139).  
Second, compare the following two worlds.168 In both worlds, I want to eat an apple. In 
both worlds, one apple remains on a tree. In world 1, I need only to reach out to get the 
apple. In world 2, I need a ladder to reach the apple. To satisfy my desire to get the apple, 
I will also desire a ladder, though this desire will be only derivative. Luckily, there will be 
a ladder nearby. If the Unrestricted Desire Theory is correct, my life goes better for me 
in world 2 than it does in world 1. This is because, in both worlds, I get to satisfy my desire 
to eat an apple. But in world 2, I get to satisfy an additional desire—my desire for a ladder. 
 
167 (Sidgwick 1981, 109; Heathwood 2005; 2016, 139). See (Parfit 1984, 117; 2011a, 58–59) for relevant 
discussion concerning the Desire Theory of reasons. 
168 The case is inspired by (Parfit 2011a, 59).  
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But it is implausible that my life goes better for me in world 2 than world 1 in virtue of 
the satisfaction of the additional derivative desire.  
So, we have good reason to prefer the Non-Derivative Desire Theory. Returning to risk, 
the Desire Solution works in the following way: if the Desire Theory (of wellbeing) is cor-
rect, and if Target has a desire that Shooter not subject her to risk, Shooter harms Target. 
She does so by frustrating Target’s desire not to be at risk. And, relating this to the broader 
problem under consideration in the thesis, the Problem of Pure Risk, if Shooter harms 
Target in Roulette, we can easily accommodate why Target has a right against Shooter 
subjecting her to risk of harm. However, Target’s desire that she not be at risk is a deriv-
ative desire—it is derivative upon, at the least, her non-derivative desire that she not be 
harmed. And, if we ought to endorse the Non-Derivative Desire Theory, Target is not 
made worse off by the frustration of her desire not to be at risk. But this means that Target 
is not harmed by the frustration of that desire. So, the Desire Solution fails. 
The preceding argument rests upon the claim that Target’s desire that Shooter not subject 
her to risk is merely a derivative desire. This seems fairly obvious to me—why would one 
desire not to be at risk of harm for its own sake? But perhaps it is not as obvious to everyone.  
One way to support this claim is to consider a case in which one holds the desire not to 
be at risk of harm, though not the desire not to be harmed. Suppose that Bloggs is indif-
ferent between being harmed to some degree and not being harmed. Suppose also that 
Bloggs’s indifference is rational—suppose, were she to be harmed, she would be compen-
sated to the level that would leave her indifferent between not being harmed, and being 
harmed and compensated. Finally suppose that despite this indifference, Bloggs desires 
that she not be subject to risk of harm. Once we factor away any non-derivative reasons 
for which she might hold this desire not to be at risk, the desire looks very peculiar. (It is 
not that Bloggs desires not to be at risk because being so will make her anxious or on edge. 
The desire also cannot be explained away with recourse to Bloggs’s being risk-adverse for 
her risk aversion will already be accommodated when determining the compensation 
owed.) The explanation for why this desire looks peculiar, I submit, is that it is a derivative 
desire without a non-derivative desire to latch onto. 
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One might object that showing how peculiar the desire not to be at risk would have to be 
in order for it to be non-derivative, as I have done, does not show that having a non-
derivative desire not to be at risk is not possible. Rather, it shows only that it is peculiar. 
And, because of this, risk can sometimes be itself harmful given the Desire Solution—
namely, when someone has a non-derivative desire not to be at risk of harm. 
Perhaps this objection is onto something. However, I am inclined to think that these rare 
cases may be captured by other restrictions not discussed here on which desires get to 
count for the Desire Theory (for example, perhaps desires need to be sufficiently rational 
for their satisfaction or frustration to count towards one’s wellbeing, and perhaps non-
derivative desires not to be subject to risk are not sufficiently rational). But I do not de-
velop this here. Instead, note that this objection shows only that the Desire Solution would 
work in these extremely peculiar, rare cases in which someone has the desire not to be at 
risk for a non-derivative reason. And so, even if this objection is correct, the solution to 
the Problem of Pure Risk cannot lie in it being harmful given the Desire Solution—this 
would mean we have rights against risk only in these rare cases.   
I have argued that the Desire Solution fails because the desire that we not be at risk of 
harm is a derivative desire (derivative upon our non-derivative desire not to be harmed); 
and, the frustration of derivative desires does not itself constitute a diminishment to one’s 
wellbeing and, thereby, a harm. In section 4, we consider an argument against any view 
on which risk itself is harmful; this objection tells against the Desire Solution. 
 
3. The Autonomy Solution 
3.1 Autonomy and Harm 
There is another way that risk might be harmful. One reason why we might think the 
satisfaction of Dan’s desire that it snows in the mountains does promote his wellbeing is 
that it gives him the option of getting some good skiing in. And, this is true even if he does 
not end up going skiing. More generally, we might think having the option to do things is 
valuable to us, even if we do not end up doing those things.  
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One reason why one may think this is if one beleives having options is partly constitutive 
of autonomy. In particular, one might endorse:  
Adequate Range. For an individual’s choice to be autonomous, she must 
have an adequate range of valuable options (Raz 1986, 372). 
Oberdiek motivates Adequate Range by saying that ‘one is autonomous when one can 
plot and pursue one’s own worthwhile path, and to do this, one needs to have access to a 
range of valuable options’ (Oberdiek 2017a, 9). We return to Adequate Range below (sec-
tion 3.2.1). 
Returning to risk, suppose that autonomy plays some role in wellbeing—one’s life goes 
better or worse, for them, when their autonomy is promoted or frustrated. Consider: 
Two Doors. Chooser is faced with a choice. Let choosing between two 
doors, A and B, stand in for an autonomous choice between two different 
valuable things. Unbeknown to Chooser, Locker locks door B (he stops 
her from being able to do whatever valuable thing door B takes the place 
of). Chooser chooses door A.  
Locker risks harm to Chooser. Straightforwardly, he risks it being the case that Chooser 
chooses door B and is unable to do whatever valuable thing door B takes the place of. If 
Adequate Range is correct, Locker frustrates Chooser’s autonomy, even if Chooser is un-
aware of this. Locker frustrates Chooser’s autonomy because he stops her from having an 
adequate range of valuable options to choose from. Because he frustrates Chooser’s au-
tonomy and because, we are assuming, Chooser’s autonomy is partly constitutive of her 
wellbeing, he harms Chooser. More generally, 
if Y subjects X to risk and, thereby, frustrates X’s autonomy, Y harms X. 
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Let us call this the Autonomy Solution. Given the Autonomy Solution, risk is sometimes 
harmful.169 Given that risk is sometimes harmful, we can have rights against risk on the 
Interest Theory (Canonical). 
The Autonomy Solution has support in the literature. Oberdiek suggests that, ‘while im-
posing risk does not involve material harm […] it can nevertheless constitute a setback to 
a nonmaterial autonomy interest of a certain kind’ (Oberdiek 2012, 342). By subjecting 
someone to risk, 
it effectively attaches sanctions to or normatively forecloses certain options that 
would otherwise be available to the individual, thereby narrowing the risked 
person’s set of worthwhile opportunities. Narrowing one’s open future dimin-
ishes one’s autonomy suitably understood, and it is in this that the moral signif-
icance and thus the potential impermissibility of pure risking lies. (Oberdiek 
2012, 351–52) 
Oberdiek offers us the following analogy. By laying a trap, though I may not experientially 
affect anyone, I do nonexperientially affect people: ‘This is because the trap takes away 
the option, or more accurately renders unacceptable the exercise of the option, of stepping 
where the trap has been set’ (Oberdiek 2012, 352). If enough traps were laid, one’s au-
tonomy would be completely frustrated.  
Seth Lazar holds a somewhat similar view. He says, ‘if others avoidably make us depend-
ant on [luck] for our avoidance of wrongful harm, they harm us’ and that, when one 
subjects another to risk, this ‘contravenes [an] important interest […] in being secure’ (Lazar 
2015, 102, 2017, 7). He thinks this for at least two reasons: first, being secure serves ‘con-
tingent benefits such as peace of mind, or the ability to plan for the future’; second, ‘the 
more you depend on luck, the less control you have over your life, and so the less auton-
omy you have’ (Lazar 2017, 8; 2015, 102).170 The first of these reasons does not concern 
 
169 Ben Colburn has pointed out that it is possible that one can remove options from others but not make it 
the case that Adequate Range is not satisfied. This is possible if the individual whose options have been 
limited still has an adequate range of sufficiently valuable and diverse options. In cases of this sort, exposing 
others to risk will not be harmful. The defender of the Autonomy Solution could reply by revising Adequate 
Range and saying that, whenever one’s options are diminished, one’s autonomy is frustrated to some extent.  
170 See note 174 for a third reason.  
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pure risk, so can be set aside. The second reason appeals to autonomy, and so makes 
Lazar vulnerable to the objections raised against the Autonomy Solution below.171  
Maria Ferretti holds another similar view. She thinks, ‘what is specifically morally prob-
lematic about risk’ consists in not ‘respecting people as moral agents’, which she cashes 
out in terms of a diminishment of overall freedom (Ferretti 2016, 262). While this account 
is not directly answering the questions of whether risk is harmful, it does fall foul of prob-
lems similar to those discussed below (sections 3.2.2-3). 
3.2 Against the Autonomy Solution 
This subsection raises three objections against the Autonomy Solution.  
3.2.1 Theoretical Commitments  
The Autonomy Solution relies upon substantive, controversial theoretical commitments 
concerning autonomy. First, one needs to accept Adequate Range. Second, one needs to 
think that autonomy is non-derivatively valuable. Let us take these components in turn. 
Adequate Range says that, in order for one to enjoy an autonomous choice, one needs to 
have chosen from an adequate range of valuable options. Some views of autonomy deny 
this. On these views, whether a choice is autonomous depends only on how the decision 
was arrived at. Here is a toy view of that sort.  
Serena Olsaretti thinks that a choice is not voluntary ‘if it was made because no other 
acceptable alternative was available’ (Olsaretti 1998, 54). Olsaretti continues that we 
should distinguish between ‘first-order desires and wishes, which is what we focus on when 
considering the voluntariness of actions, and autonomy as the second-order capacity to 
reflect critically over one’s first-order preferences and desires, and to decide which ones 
to act on’ (Olsaretti 1998, 73). This view of autonomy would say that a choice is autono-
mous only if, first, it was not made because no other acceptable alternative was available 
 
171 I end up explaining risk’s moral significance by appeal to something close to security (in my terms, safety). 
However, I do not think that safety is itself partly constitutive of wellbeing. See chapter 5, section 4.3. Fur-
ther, having security as partly constitutive of wellbeing makes the view vulnerable to the Magnitude of 
Harm Problem raised below (section 4).  
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and, second, because it was consistent with a second-order desire (that itself does not exist 
because no other acceptable alternatives are available).172 Given this, one does not actu-
ally need an adequate range of valuable options to choose from. Rather, one needs, first, 
not to have chosen because no other acceptable option was available and, second, one’s 
choice needs to be consistent with one’s second-order desires. There is no mention of one 
having an adequate range of options to choose from.173 So, it is not obvious that everyone 
will endorse Adequate Range.  
Now for the second restriction to the Autonomy Solution. Some people think that auton-
omy is non-derivatively valuable. These people think that autonomy is valuable in and of 
itself. Others think that autonomy is only derivatively valuable. Suppose that one is a He-
donist. It is hard to know what will maximise pleasure for others. Since individuals are 
best placed to work this out, one might value autonomy. But, on this view, autonomy’s 
value is derivative upon hedonic value. It is consistent with this view that an individual’s 
autonomy is frustrated and yet their wellbeing promoted—if the frustration of autonomy 
brings about more pleasure than would otherwise have been the case. On this view, the 
frustration of that individual’s autonomy would not, in these circumstances, be harmful. 
Returning to risk, if one thinks that autonomy is only derivatively valuable, the Autonomy 
Solution fails. This is because, in cases of pure risk imposition, we are supposing that the 
risk does not materialise. But this means that the frustration of the individual’s autonomy 
does not affect the non-derivative value on which the value of autonomy depends.  
The objection raised in this subsection is limited in scope (it was meant only to point out, 
rather than undermine, the two theoretical commitments) but raises two issues. First, the 
Autonomy Solution can be appealed to only by those who accept Adequate Range and 
think autonomy is non-derivatively valuable. Second, we might think that, other things 
being equal, an answer to the question “Is risk harmful?” is unattractive to the extent that 
 
172 I say “only if” and not “if, and only if,” because there might be other necessary conditions on autonomy.  
173 While lacking an adequate range of valuable options will often stop one from making a choice because 
no other option was available, this is contingent. And, because we are considering pure risk, where one is 
unaware that one’s options are limited, one’s autonomy will not be frustrated in this way.  
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it relies upon controversial normative commitments—the Autonomy Solution relies upon 
two such commitments. 
3.2.2 Non-Autonomous Individuals  
The Autonomy Solution implies that risk is harmful only for people who are capable, at 
that time, of leading autonomous lives. This is because it is only those people who are 
capable of having their autonomy frustrated in virtue of having valuable options removed. 
This precludes, among others, agents with undeveloped, compromised, or damaged ra-
tional capacities (for example, very young children, the severely mentally disabled, and 
those suffering from the later stages of Alzheimer’s disease). We can draw two conclusions 
from this. First, the Autonomy Solution does not say that risk is harmful for those without 
autonomy. If the solution to the Problem of Pure Risk lies in risk’s being harmful, this 
means those without a capacity for autonomy do not have rights against risk of harm. So, 
the Autonomy Solution does not provide us with a full solution to the Problem of Pure 
Risk.  
Second, we can posit the following argument. The Autonomy Solution leaves us with an 
asymmetry: exposing autonomous individuals to risk is itself harmful, whereas exposing 
agents with undeveloped, compromised, or damaged rational capacities to risk is not itself 
harmful. This asymmetry itself is intuitively implausible. This suggests the Autonomy So-
lution is implausible. 
Let me say a little more about why the Autonomy Solution implies risk is not itself harmful 
for those without a capacity for autonomy. Suppose that Villain kills someone with severe 
mental disabilities. Villain does not frustrate this person’s autonomy for they have no au-
tonomy for the Villain to frustrate. A fortiori, Villain does not frustrate this person’s auton-
omy by exposing them to risk of death. So, subjecting this person to risk is not itself harmful 
(given the Autonomy Solution).  
The same holds if Villain subjects a baby to risk of death. If Villain were to kill the baby, 
we would not say she frustrates the baby’s autonomy (for, again, the baby has no auton-
omy for Villain to frustrate)—and, we certainly would not say that she frustrates the baby’s 
autonomy in virtue of denying her a valuable range of options to choose from. So, we 
should not say Villain frustrates the baby’s autonomy by exposing her to risk of death. 
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What the Villain may do were she to kill the baby is deny the baby the opportunity of having 
an autonomous life. However, if the risked harm does not materialise and so the baby 
lives, Villain does not deny the baby this opportunity. So, she has not interfered with the 
autonomous life the baby will later come to have. This is related to the objection raised in 
the following subsection.  
3.2.3 Roulette and Autonomy 
The Autonomy Solution works by showing that, when one subjects another to risk, one 
may frustrate the other’s autonomy by stopping them from having an adequate range of 
valuable options to choose from, independently of whether or not the risk materialises. In 
Two Doors, Locker frustrates Chooser’s autonomy by removing the option of going 
through door B. Thereby, he stops Chooser from having an adequate range of valuable 
options. But this means that the Autonomy Solution applies only to cases in which the 
risk affects the exercise of a potentially autonomous choice—and it applies only in virtue 
of stopping that choice from being autonomous. This analysis does not straightforwardly 
extend to Roulette. Target is asleep. She is not exercising any autonomous choices at the 
time at which the risk is imposed. And so, it is not obvious that Shooter’s subjecting her 
to risk removes any valuable options from her in a way that undermines her autonomy. 
We can ask, what valuable option does Shooter remove? So, it is not obvious that Auton-
omy Solution solves the Problem of Pure Risk.   
Now, Shooter risks it being the case that Target does not have “any future choice”, au-
tonomous or otherwise. But that itself does not frustrate Target’s autonomy—it merely risks 
frustrating her autonomy. To see this, consider the following case. 
Two Doors (Two Choices). Chooser is faced with a choice. Let choosing be-
tween two doors, A and B, stand in for a potentially autonomous choice. 
After going through either door, Chooser will then be faced with another 
choice. Let choosing between A1 and A2 stand in for a potentially auton-
omous choice that she would face if she went through door A. Let choos-
ing between B1 and B2 stand in for a potentially autonomous choice that 
she would face if she went through door B. Unbeknownst to Chooser, 
Locker locks door B. Chooser chooses door A.  
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Suppose that Chooser is now choosing between A1 and A2. Is that choice autonomous? It 
seems so. Before going through the door, Chooser faced two potentially autonomous 
choices: Choice 1, between doors A and B, and Choice 2, between A1 and A2 or between 
B1 and B2, depending on which door she went through. If Adequate Range is correct, 
Locker stops Choice 1 from being autonomous—he does so by stopping Chooser from 
having an adequate range of valuable options. However, he does not stop Choice 2 from 
being autonomous. He merely risks Chooser not being able to make that Choice. Simi-
larly, in Roulette, though Shooter might stop Target’s choice of going to sleep from being 
autonomous for example, she does not stop any of Target’s future choices from being 
autonomous. 
In support of the verdict that Choice 2 was autonomous, despite Choice 1 not being au-
tonomous: if Choice 2 is rendered non-autonomous in virtue of Choice 1 not being au-
tonomous, this implies a single non-autonomous choice can taint all future choices, ren-
dering them non-autonomous. But this is implausible.  
3.3 Moving Beyond Autonomy 
The previous objection leads to a more general one. The Autonomy Solution says that 
risk is harmful because, when one is exposed to risk, one’s autonomy is frustrated. Accepting 
for the sake of augment that risk is harmful, is autonomy the correct sort of explanation 
why risk would itself be harmful? I am not convinced.   
Let us conclude our discussion of the Autonomy Solution. We have seen that the Auton-
omy Solution can be appealed to only by those who accept both Adequate Range and 
that autonomy is non-derivatively valuable. These are both fairly controversial theses. 
More substantively, the Autonomy Solution leaves us with several asymmetries—some 
cases of risk are harmful, and some cases of risk are not harmful. But it is odd to think that 
exposing adults with autonomy to risk is (in some circumstances) harmful, while exposing 
individuals with undeveloped, compromised, or damaged rational capacities to risk is not 
harmful. It is also odd that Locker exposing Chooser to risk is harmful in Two Doors but 
that Shooter’s exposing Target to risk in Roulette is not harmful. I have also just suggested 
that explaining why risk is itself harmful by reference to autonomy does not seem wholly 
satisfying. In the following section, I argue that any view on which risk is harmful leads to 
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some intuitively implausible results concerning the magnitudes of harm. All of this gives 
us good reason to think that the Autonomy Solution fails to show that risk is harmful.  
Some might object to the preceding along the following lines. First, they say, “While you 
are undecided on our two controversial theoretical commitments, I think that Adequate 
Range is correct, and that autonomy is non-derivatively valuable.” Second, they might 
object that the second and third objections do not necessarily impugn the Autonomy So-
lution as an answer to the question “Is risk itself harmful?” This is because these objections 
show only that there are some cases in which risk is not harmful. But this does not show 
that risk is not harmful in all cases. For those who say this, we can note a conservative 
conclusion: the Autonomy Solution does not provide us with a full solution to the Problem 
of Pure Risk. 
 
4. The Magnitude of Harm Problem  
We have seen that the Desire Solution fails. I have also argued that the Autonomy Solu-
tion fails (though I noted the more conservative conclusion that even if, against what I 
have argued, the Autonomy Solution says risk is harmful in some cases, it is too restrictive 
to offer us a full solution to the Problem of Pure Risk). But perhaps there might be other 
ways to claim that risk is harmful.174 This section raises a general worry with the very idea 
that risk is harmful. 
 
174 Here are three further views not focused on in detail. (Placani 2017) thinks, in cases in which risk under-
mines peoples’ moral status as agents, risk is harmful in virtue of setting back agents’ dignity-interests. I 
think Placani’s account gets things backwards—subjecting others to risk is disrespectful because we are under 
directed duties not to subject others to risk of harm, so appealing to disrespect is not going to help us ground 
the right (see (Kagan 1989, 176) for a similar argument about the role of respect in moral theory). There 
are two further problems with Placani’s account. First, it can only accommodate risk of harm being itself 
harmful when imposed by other agents. This is because only other agents can disrespect us. However, things 
other than agents can harm us, such as trees and animals. Placani’s view leaves a strange asymmetry: 
whether risk is harmful depends on whether it was caused by an agent. For general discussion on neutrality 
between harms caused by agents and non-agents, see chapter 3, section 3.2 and (Bradley 2012, 394; He-
rington 2018, 182). More generally, it will not offer us a full solution to the Problem of Pure Risk because 
of this. Second, suppose I subject someone to risk of harm. Whether this is itself harmful will depend, on 
Placani’s account, on whether I am acting justifiably or not—since I do not disrespect a culpable aggressor 
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Commonly, we do not think that risk of harm is itself harmful. That much should be 
indicated by my saying “risk of harm” and not, “risk of more harm”. While this itself is 
perhaps not a decisive objection, it does lead to a problem with the very idea that risk is 
harmful. Suppose that Threatener imposes a 0.5 risk of harm, h, onto Victim1, and a 0.25 
risk of the same harm, h, onto Victim2. For example, Threatener will electrocute each 
victim. All else is equal (specifically, each victim responds to Threatener’s electrocution in 
the same way). It seems clear that if risk is harmful, the greater the probability of some 
harm, h, occurring, the more harmful the risk is. This implies, if the risks do not materialise 
for either victim, Victim1 is harmed more than Victim2. Assuming that risk is harmful, 
this is intuitively plausible. 
But if risk is itself harmful then, were both risks to materialise, Threatener harms Victim1 
more than she harms Victim2. This is because both victims suffer the same harm (the 
electrocution) and Victim1 also suffers a greater additional harm (having been at a greater 
risk) than Victim2. This is intuitively implausible. Were one to be presented with the orig-
inal case and told that both risks materialise, we would want to say that each victim has 
been harmed to the same extent. Call this the Magnitude of Harm Problem.175  
 
when I justifiably act in self-defence. This again leaves a strange asymmetry: wrongful risk of harm is itself 
harmful, but risk of harm that is not wrongful is not itself harmful.  
Lazar offers a third reason for his view in addition to the two mentioned at the end of section 3.1. 
He says, ‘one’s security is often grounded in others’ positive dispositions towards one’ and ‘[e]ven if I need 
never draw on others’ concern, I am better off just by their having this positive disposition towards me’ 
(Lazar 2017, 8–9). It is unclear how others’ disposition towards me in itself affects my wellbeing. Perhaps 
others’ dispositions towards me may affect others’ valuable relationships with me. Even if this is correct, it 
leaves his view vulnerable to the two objections raised against Placani’s view. 
(John 2011) thinks that risk of harm is itself harmful because it undermines agents’ capacity to form 
reasonable plans. I am largely sympathetic to Herington’s objection that one needs only to believe one is free 
from risk for one to enjoy the good of planning (Herington 2018, 194–98); one’s beliefs of this sort are not 
affected in cases of pure risk (see the discussion above in section 1 on such harms being downstream from 
the risk imposition). What is more, John’s focus on planning leaves his view vulnerable to objections similar 
to those raised against the Autonomy Solution (especially, sections 3.2 and 3.3): for example, babies do not 
enjoy the good of planning, so cannot be harmed in virtue of frustrating that good.  
175 Two notes. First, the Magnitude of Harm Problem relies on an intuition—that Victim1 and Victim2 are 
harmed to the same extent. Finkelstein thinks risk of harm is itself harmful and has this intuition in a similar 
case she considers (Finkelstein 2003, 990-1). One way to move beyond the intuition is to think about the 
problem’s implications. For example, if risk of harm is itself harmful, given that we tend to think the level 
of compensation that is owed is proportionate to the harm caused, this would imply that Victim1 is owed 
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Put differently, we can distinguish between the risk harm (the harmfulness of being ex-
posed to some risk), the outcome harm (the harmfulness of the materialisation of the risk), 
and the all-things-considered harm. Since the risk harm is greater for Victim1 than Vic-
tim2, and the outcome harm is the same for each victim, the all-things-considered harm 
must be greater for Victim1 than Victim2. But this seems implausible.   
In support of the Magnitude of Harm Problem, recall how the Counterfactual Account 
of Harm allows events caused by non-agents to be harmful.176 A tree falling in the wind 
can harm me just as much as a person’s dropping a tree on me can. The Magnitude of 
Harm Problem seems even more counterintuitive when we think of non-agential harms. 
Suppose Victim1 and Victim2 are at different risks of being harmed by some natural event, 
for example, being struck by lightning. Now suppose both victims are struck. It is very 
implausible that Victim1 is harmed more than Victim2 insofar as she was subjected to 
greater risk than Vicitm2. 
Note, the Magnitude of Harm Problem is consistent with the verdict that Threatener 
wrongs Victim1 to a greater extent than she wrongs Victim2. Being able to say this simply 
requires offering an account of the moral significance of risk that does not rely on risks’ 
being harmful.  
One might reply to the Magnitude of Harm Problem by suggesting that, when we say 
Victim1 and Victim2 suffer the same harm, we implicitly disambiguate the harms they 
suffer. First, we have the different risk harms they suffer through being subjected to dif-
ferent risks of the same harm. Second, we have the same outcome harm that they suffer 
from the electrocution. When we say that both victims are harmed to the same extent, we 
are referring to the same outcome harm that they suffer from the electrocution. We are 
not referring to the different risk harms they suffer. 
 
more in compensation than Victim2. But that is odd. Second, here’s another version of the Magnitude of 
Harm Problem: Victim3 is exposed to probability, x, of harm h; Victim4 is exposed to a greater probability, 
y, of a smaller harm, g. If both risks materialise, there is a some set of values for our four variables that mean 
that the victims have been harmed to the same extent. That is implausible. 
176 Chapter 3, section 3.2. 
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This reply will not do. If the oddness of thinking that Victim1 and Victim2 suffer different 
harms was reducible to an ambiguity relating to which harm we were asking after, the 
counterintuitiveness that the Magnitude of Harm Problem identifies would vanish when 
we re-ask,  
all-things-considered, is Victim1 harmed more than Victim2?  
But the answer to this unambiguous question seems to be: “No, both victims are harmed 
equally.” The counterintuitiveness of saying that the victims are harmed to a different 
extent cannot be explained away by appealing to ambiguity.   
Claire Finkelstein offers us a potential solution to the Magnitude of Harm Problem.177 She 
says that ‘the disvalue of the risk harm is absorbed into the loss in welfare if the risk actually 
materializes’ (Finkelstein 2003, 993). So, in reply to our case above, if neither of Threat-
ener’s risks materialise, both victims are harmed merely by being subject to risk. Victim1 
is harmed more than Victim2. But, if both risks materialise, the different risk harms they 
suffer are absorbed into the outcome harms. And, the outcome harms are equal. Call this 
the Absorption Solution.  
There are at least two problems with the Absorption Solution. First, it is very difficult to 
see what principled explanation might lie behind the Absorption Solution. Why does risk 
harm persist only when the risked harm does not materialise?178 Second, I am very unsure 
of how the Absorption Solution is actually supposed to work.  
Suppose the outcome harm of either victim being electrocuted is 100. And suppose, for 
illustrative purposes, we apply a crude form of expected utility theory to determine how 
 
177 Finkelstein is responding to two slightly different problems (Finkelstein 2003, 990-1). She thinks we 
should distinguish between intentionally harmful acts and risky harmful acts. This dichotomy is inconsistent 
with the idea that individuals can intentionally subject others to risk of harm. But this is clearly possible. 
178 One might reply, in cases in which the risked harm materialises, this shows the risk of harm is actually 
1. So, both Victim1 and Victim2 are harmed by the same amount. Yet, on what basis do we get to say that 
the probability of harm is actually 1? I do not pursue this question here because whatever we say will imply, 
on grounds of parity, that if the risked harm does not materialise, the risk was actually 0; thereby, the risk 
harm will be nothing. So, the Problem of Pure Risk will not be solved by arguing the risk is harmful. 
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harmful the risk of being electrocuted is.179 Victim1 has a 0.5 chance of being electrocuted: 
she is harmed by 50 through being subjected to risk of being electrocuted. Victim2 has a 
0.25 chance of being electrocuted: she is harmed by 25 through being subjected to risk of 
being electrocuted. The Magnitude of Harm Problem says that, if both risks materialise, 
the all-things-considered harm for Victim1 is 150 and for Victim2 is 125. This is implau-
sible.  
The Absorption Solution says the all-things-considered harms are equal because the risk 
harm is absorbed into the outcome harm, and the outcome harms are equal. Yet, how 
can this be? If the risked harms do not materialise, Victim1 is harmed by 50 and Victim2 
is harmed by 25. If the risked harms do materialise, both victims are harmed by 100, all-
things-considered. But, this means the extent to which Victim1 is worse off if the risked 
harm materialises than if it does not materialise is 50 and the extent to which Victim2 is 
worse off if the risked harm materialises than if it does not materialise is 75. The extent to 
which either victim is worse off if the risked harm materialises than if it does not just is the 
outcome harm. So, if the Absorption Solution is correct, the outcome harms cannot be 
equal—the outcome harm for Victim1 is 50 and for Victim2 75. But this is implausible. 
How can the outcome harms be different depending on the level of risk one was subjected 
to?180 
This section has shown that, if risk is harmful, then two agents who are subjected to dif-
ferent levels of risk of the same outcome harm are, if both risked harms materialise, 
 
179 We will multiply the probability of her being harmed by the harm that she will suffer, were the risked 
harm to materialise. All I say should be consistent with other ways of determining how harmful some risk of 
harm is.  
180 Perhaps one might suggest the outcome harms are 100 for each victim, even though Victim1 is only 
worse off by 50 and Victim2 is only worse off by 75 if the risked harms materialise. They might explain this 
by saying the risk harm preempts some of the outcome harm. While we are familiar with preempted harm 
from chapter 4, a simple example should be helpful. Suppose Ann shoots Beth. Had Ann not shot Beth, 
Annabelle would have shot Beth. We might think the outcome harm is like Ann’s shooting Beth and the 
risk harm is like Annabelle’s shooting Beth. I have argued that defenders of the Counterfactual Account of 
Harm should accept the intuitively problematic conclusion that people are not actually harmed by 
preempted harm. Luckily, we can still account for preempted harm’s moral significance by appealing to the 
Safety Condition as suggested in the previous chapter. In any case, if a defender of the Absorption Solution 
were to go this way, they would owe us a compelling explanation of why risk harm preempts some of the 
harmfulness of the outcome harm. 
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harmed to different extents all-things-considered. This is counterintuitive. This was the 
Magnitude of Harm Problem. We then considered the Absorption Solution to this prob-
lem—when risked harms materialise, the risk harm is absorbed into the outcome harm. 
Yet, this was even more implausible for it implies, when all else is equal, outcome harms 
are different depending on the level of risk one was exposed to.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has answered two questions. First, is risk itself harmful? Second, if risk is 
harmful, does risk’s being harmful solve the Problem of Pure Risk? I have answered “No” 
to both questions. In reply to whether risk is harmful, we have just seen that the Magni-
tude of Harm Problem implies that any view on which risk is harmful leads to implausible 
results. We have also seen that the Desire Solution fails because the desire that we not be 
at risk of harm is a derivative desire, and the setting back of derivative desires does not 
itself constitute a harm. And we have seen that the Autonomy Solution says that risk is 
harmful only if one accepts Adequate Range and if one values autonomy for non-deriva-
tive reasons. But, even then, the Autonomy Solution leaves us with implausible asymme-
tries: it says that exposing autonomous individuals to risk is, in some circumstances, harm-
ful, while exposing individuals with undeveloped, compromised, or damaged rational ca-
pacities to risk is not harmful; and it says that Locker’s exposing Chooser to risk is harmful 
in Two Doors but that Target’s exposing Target to risk in Roulette is not harmful.  
In reply to our second question (whether risk being harmful solves the Problem of Pure 
Risk), since risk is not harmful, risk being harmful cannot solve the Problem of Pure Risk. 
I did note a conservative conclusion. Even if a defender of the Autonomy Solution is will-
ing to accept all the objections and restrictions raised against it, risk being harmful does 
not offer a full solution to the Problem of Pure Risk. 
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7. Facts, Evidence, or Beliefs? 
1. Introduction  
The previous chapter argued that risk of harm is not itself harmful. This means that in 
Roulette Shooter does not harm Target. Since the risked harm Shooter subjects Target to 
does not materialise, Target’s wellbeing is not of sufficient weight to place Shooter under 
a duty not to play roulette with her. And this means that the necessary condition set for 
the ascription of a right on the canonical statement of the Interest Theory is not satisfied. 
So, Target has no right against Shooter that Shooter not play roulette with her.  
Arguing that risk is harmful is one way to dissolve the Problem of Pure Risk. Let me 
reintroduce the other way we could go. Suppose Ann is morally conscientious. She is 
trying to work out whether Beth holds a right against her. She then begins to wonder 
whether it is because of, first, her beliefs that Beth holds a right against her. Or, second, 
because of the best available evidence that Beth holds a right against her. Or, third, the 
facts—how things actually are—that makes it that Beth holds a right against her. All of 
this is to say that Ann wonders whether the rights that others hold against her and, cor-
relatively, the directed duties she is under are determined by her beliefs, the evidence, or 
the facts. 
That was fairly abstract. Think of Shooter. We can suppose she thinks there is a one in 
six chance that she will kill Target. And we can suppose the best available evidence sup-
ports this. If rights do not depend on the facts but on duty-bearers’ beliefs or the evidence 
available to them, Target’s wellbeing will be of sufficient weight to place Shooter under a 
duty not to play roulette with her. The Problem of Pure Risk is solved.181  
 
181 Moving from a fact-y view may also provide a solution to the Problem of Preemption: it certainly solves 
Plane Crash where, presumably, Attendant does not believe nor does the evidence support that she is bene-
fiting Passenger by denying her admittance onto the plane. Whether this move from focusing on the facts 
is a full solution to the Problem of Harmless Wronging depends on what we think of a variant in which one 
performs some would-be harmful act in the knowledge it is preempted. I am tempted to think Hitman1 
violates Victim’s rights even if she knows Hitman2 will deliver a lethal shot if she does not shoot. Appealing 
to her beliefs or the evidence will not help us there.  
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This chapter argues that rights depend on the facts. So, the Problem of Pure Risk is not 
so easily solved. (That said, there will be a note of trepidation in that I leave an important 
question unanswered.) This paves the way for my showing how the Safety Condition 
solves the Problem of Pure Risk in the following final chapter. In section 2, I distinguish 
further between beliefs, evidence, and facts. In section 3 and 4, I argue against what I call 
the Belief- and Evidence-Relative Views. And in section 5, I consider two objections to 
what I call the Fact-Relative View. 
Before beginning, three preliminaries. First, suppose I am wrong and that we ought to 
endorse the Belief- or Evidence-Relative View. This would provide us with a solution to 
the Problem of Pure Risk. Even still, the Safety Condition provides a solution to the Prob-
lem of Harmless Wronging whichever view is correct. This gives us reason to endorse the 
Safety Condition independently of whether the Fact-Relative View is correct.182  
Second, if one does not endorse the view that rights are grounded in one’s beliefs, one will 
want to make use of blameless wrongings. Y blamelessly wrongs X iff Y infringes a directed 
duty owed to X, though is not blameworthy for doing so. We have good independent 
reason to think there are blameless wrongings. For example, when someone acts under 
duress, in extreme cases we tend to think that she acts wrongly, though is not blameworthy 
for doing so. And in less extreme cases, we tend to think that she is still blameworthy, 
though not as blameworthy as she would have been without the duress. This is sufficient 
to give us reason to think wronging and blameworthiness come apart.183 
Third, most people think that rights obtain in virtue of something. Interest Theorists think 
that rights hold in virtue of their holders’ wellbeing. Will Theorists think that rights hold 
in virtue of right-holders’ autonomy. Even theories that have a non-instrumental charac-
ter tend to say that rights obtain in virtue of something. For example, Frances Kamm says 
 
182 My hunch is that the strength of this reason is inversely proportionate to our confidence in either the 
Belief- or Evidence-Relative View. For example, suppose we are very sure of the Evidence-Relative View. 
Then, that the Safety Condition solves the Problem of Pure Risk whichever view is correct does not really 
matter. Now suppose we think the Evidence-Relative View is correct, but we are not very sure. Then, we 
have good reason to endorse the Safety Condition.  
183 See (Zimmerman 1997) for defence of the view that one can be blameworthy for acting in the right way. 
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that rights obtain in virtue of their reflecting our inviolability.184 Whether rights depend 
on the facts, evidence, or beliefs is of interest whichever of these views we endorse. The 
Fact-, Evidence-, and Belief-Relative Views are written so as to be agnostic on which view 
about the nature of rights is correct (though obviously enough wellbeing matters for us).185  
 
2. The Distinction 
In Case 1 (Belief-Relative),  
Doctor believes, against the best evidence available to her, that giving 
treatment will kill Patient. Doctor gives the treatment to Patient, and Pa-
tient lives. 
In Case 1, in some sense, Doctor does not act wrongly. She does what the evidence tells 
her to do. And she saves Patient when, suppose, Patient would otherwise have died. How-
ever, there is some sense in which Doctor acts wrongly. She does what she believes will 
kill Patient. 
In Case 2 (Evidence-Relative), 
Doctor believes, against the best evidence available to her, that giving 
treatment will save Patient’s life. Doctor gives the treatment to Patient, and 
Patient lives. 
In Case 2, in some sense, Doctor does not act wrongly. She does what she believes will 
save Patient. And, as it turns out, she saves Patient when Patient otherwise would have 
 
184 ‘[F]undamental human rights […] are not concerned with protecting a person’s interests, but with ex-
pressing his nature as a being of a certain sort, one whose interests are worth protecting’ (Kamm 2007, 253).  
185 Suppose we endorse the Will Theory and that rights depend on potential duty-bearers’ beliefs. Then, X 
will have a right against Y that Y Φ, iff, relative to Y’s beliefs, X has the power to alter Y’s duty to Φ. Suppose 
we endorse Kamm’s picture of the nature of rights and that rights depend on the evidence. Then, X’s right 
will depend on whether the evidence supports that X is inviolable.  
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died. However, there is some sense in which Doctor acts wrongly. She does not do what 
the best available evidence tells her to do.  
And in Case 3 (Fact-Relative),  
Doctor believes, on the best evidence available to her, that giving treat-
ment will save Patient’s life. Doctor gives the treatment to Patient and Pa-
tient dies.186 
In Case 3, in some sense, Doctor does not act wrongly. She does what she believes will save 
Patient. And she does what, on the best available evidence to her, will save Patient. But, as 
it turns out, she in fact kills Patient (suppose that Patient would have survived were it not 
for the treatment). In some other sense, then, she acts wrongly.187 
In Case 1, Doctor acts wrongly in the belief-relative sense, but not in any other sense. In 
Case 2, Doctor acts wrongly in the evidence-relative sense, but not in any other sense. And 
in Case 3, Doctor acts wrongly in the fact-relative sense, but not in any other sense. 
Before seeing how this tripartite distinction applies to rights, two clarifications. First, so 
far, I have only presented three cases that support the idea that we can distinguish between 
these three senses of wrong. I have not said anything about which of these senses we ought 
to be concerned with.188  
Second, people often distinguish between the objective and the subjective. In reply to Case 1, 
they say that Doctor does not act wrongly in the objective sense but does act wrongly in 
the subjective sense. And in reply to Case 3, they say that Doctor does not act wrongly in 
the subjective sense but does act wrongly in the objective sense. While this distinction is 
good in as far as it goes, it does not enable us to account for the wrong of Case 2. There 
 
186 For more on this tripartite distinction, see (Parfit 2011a, 151–53; Tadros 2011b, 217–20).  
187 For support for the sense in which one can act wrongly in the fact-relative sense, see section 5.1 and 
(Parfit 2011a, 151–53; Thomson 1990, 79–104). 
188 Some try to argue for only one perspective (Thomson 1990, 79–104). Others do not deny the existence 
of all kinds of perspectives, but suggest that one is fundamental (Parfit 2011a, 161–62) or that one is that 
with which we are really interested (Zimmerman 2014, 18–24). Others, still, are pluralists about which per-
spective is important (Smith 2018). 
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seems to be a sense in which Doctor acts wrongly, but not by reference to the subjective 
or objective senses. Appealing to the evidence-relative sense fills this gap.189  
 
3. Beliefs  
We might hold the 
 Belief-Relative View. X’s right that Y Φ depends on Y’s beliefs.190 
The idea behind the Belief-Relative View is supposed to be that Y has certain beliefs about 
what will happen in the world were she to Φ and were she not to Φ.191 If, relative to her 
beliefs, she would be under a duty to Φ owed to X, she is under a duty to Φ, correlating 
with X holding a right against her. Here is another way to think about it: if, were those 
beliefs to be true, she would be under a duty to Φ owed to X, then she is under a duty to Φ 
correlating with X holding a right that Y Φ. For example, I have a set of beliefs about what 
would happen were I to stab you—you would begin to profusely bleed, and so on. Were 
those beliefs to be true, whatever our view of rights (but especially on the Interest Theory), 
you would have a right that I not stab you. So, on the Belief-Relative View, you have a 
right that I not stab you. This holds irrespective of what is likely to happen were I to stab 
you or of what will actually happen. 
The way I have formulated the Belief-Relative View has it that the beliefs that are relevant 
for rights are those of the potential duty-bearers. The reason for this is that, when all else 
 
189 This gap is often filled by the “reasonable person”. The reasonable person is one specification of the 
evidence-relative view (the evidence set that the reasonable person would have available to them that they 
are able to respond to) (Oberdiek 2017, 49). Others use Prospectivism to fill the gap between the belief-rela-
tive/subjective and the fact-relative/objective, where what is prospectively best is that which gives the best 
‘prospect of achieving what is of value in the situation […] and of avoiding what is of disvalue’ (Zimmerman 
2014, 32). 
190 So, an Interest Theorists of this flavour would say something like, for X to have a right against Y that Y 
Φ, X’s interests must be of sufficient weight, relative to Y’s beliefs, to place Y to be under a duty to Φ.  
191 If one endorses the Belief-Relative View and thinks there are both directed and undirected duties, it is 
likely one will think undirected duties depend on one’s beliefs, too. Yet, it is possible that one might hold a 
fact-relative account of undirected duties, but think whether you owe something to someone, correlating 
with their holding a right against you, is a matter of your evidence.  
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is equal, the right in question requires something of the potential duty-bearer; so, it should 
be their beliefs that are relevant. We could specify the view in other ways, for example, 
that the beliefs that are relevant are those of potential right-holders. 
Here is a much less plausible way that the Belief-Relative View could work:  
Moral Belief-Relative View. X’s right that Y Φ depends on Y’s believing: “X 
has a right that I Φ.” 
The Moral Belief-Relative View is much less plausible than the Belief-Relative View. It is 
deeply implausible that one party holds a right against another party only when the sec-
ond party thinks that the first party holds a right against her. 
An initial problem with the Belief-Relative View is that, however one motivates the Belief-
Relative View, it is unclear why the Moral Belief-Relative View should not be correct in 
place of the Belief-Relative View. Put differently, what reason could be given in favour of 
the Belief-Relative View that does not speak, to a greater extent, in favour of the Moral 
Belief-Relative View? For example, on the Evidence- and Fact-Relative Views (to be de-
fined below), X can hold a right against Y, even when Y has no beliefs about how her 
actions might affect X. Perhaps one might motivate the Belief-Relative View by saying 
that it is unfair that Y can owe something to X when she is unaware of the features of the 
world that place her under that duty. But if this is true, why is it not also unfair that X can 
hold a right against Y when she is unaware that X holds a right against her?  
A second problem with the Belief-Relative View is that it will implausibly overgenerate 
rights. This is because Y might mistakenly believe something about the world that would 
mean X holds a right against Y were those mistaken beliefs to be true. But it might be 
intuitively implausible that X holds this right against Y. Consider, 
Voodoo. Believer wants to cause Victim great pain. Believer believes in voo-
doo. Unbeknownst to Victim, Believer creates and then stabs a voodoo 
doll of Victim. 
I find it implausible that Believer infringes Victim’s rights. But, were Believer’s beliefs 
about the world to be correct, Victim would have a right that Believer not stab a voodoo 
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doll of him. So, on the Belief-Relative View, Victim has a right against Believer that Be-
liever not stab a voodoo doll of him. 
Perhaps others might think that Victim does have a right that Believer not stab a voodoo 
doll of him, a right that Believer violates.192 However, the Belief-Relative View pulls in 
the opposite direction too: it implausibly undergenerates rights. And, even if one is not 
worried about the overgenerations, it is harder to ignore the undergenerations. The Be-
lief-Relative View undergenerates rights because Y might mistakenly believe something 
about the world that would mean that X does not have a right against Y were those mis-
taken beliefs to be true. But it might be highly implausible that X does not hold such a 
right against Y. Consider, 
Real Gun. Non-Believer has a gun in front of her. She has good evidence 
that the gun is real, though she has failed to avail herself of that evidence. 
She fires the gun at Victim, thinking that it is a toy gun. 
Non-Believer violates Victim’s rights. Some might want to say that she is not blameworthy 
for doing so, but she violates Victim’s rights nonetheless. However, firing toy guns is not 
the sort of thing that others have rights against you that you not do. Non-Believer believes 
she is about to fire a toy gun. Given the Belief-Relative View, Victim does not have a right 
that Non-Believer not fire the gun at her.193 
So, the Belief-Relative View implausibly undergenerates rights. The reason underlying 
why the Belief-Relative View implausibly undergenerates rights gives us a more general, 
fourth reason not to endorse the view: the Belief-Relative View makes what rights I have 
 
192 I must admit, my intuitions are less clear on whether Believer has wronged Victim. 
193 One might think this case is under-described. Suppose there is an envelope on top of the gun saying, 
“Herein contains whether or not this is a real gun.” After reading this, Non-Believer believes she may find 
out whether the gun is real by opening the envelope but decides not to. Given the high stakes of the case 
and Non-Believer’s beliefs about what is contained in the envelope, one might think Non-Believer owes it 
to Victim to open the envelope, and Victim has a correlative right against Non-Believer that she do so. 
Even if this is correct, this would imply only that Victim has a right that Non-Believer open the envelope, 
and not a right that Non-Believer not fire the gun at her. But Non-Believer clearly has the second of these 
rights regardless of whether she has the first. And, in any case, we might not always be able to trace back to 
such a belief. 
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depend upon others’ beliefs about the world. But that is implausible. What rights I have 
should not depend on others’ beliefs. That fails to pay attention to the importance that I 
have—an importance that should be reflected by the rights that I hold.  
 
4. Evidence 
The natural remedy for the Belief-Relative View’s tendency to undergenerate rights is to 
say, “Well, Non-Believer should’ve known that the gun was real—there was good evidence 
available to her!” We might thus hold the 
Evidence-Relative View. X’s right that Y Φ depends on the best available evi-
dence to Y.194 
In its most general form, the Evidence-Relative View will say that X’s right that Y Φ de-
pends on the evidence. We can then specify different evidence-relative sets to have differ-
ent disambiguations of the view. I have gone with the “best available” specification as it 
seems most intuitive.  
We can get at what is meant by evidence by thinking about Real Gun.195 Suppose that the 
gun looks very real, there are signs all around saying “WARNING: Live Firearms”, and 
so on. Non-Believer has good evidence available to her that the gun is real, even though 
she never avails herself of this evidence and never forms the belief that the gun is real. 
Similarly, when a doctor receives some blood test results, she has evidence available to 
her as to whether her patient has this-or-that condition before she opens the results.  
This points to another salient feature of evidence: whether some piece of evidence is avail-
able to Y, and so whether it impacts what rights others hold, also depends on whether Y 
 
194 So, an Interest Theorist of this flavour would say, for X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, X’s interest 
must be of sufficient weight, relative to the best available evidence to Y, to place Y under a duty to Φ. 
195 What is meant by evidence here is not what is tended to be meant by epistemologists. For example, 
Williamson sees one’s evidence as the totality of propositions one knows. Conee and Feldman see one’s 
evidence as all of one’s current mental states (Williamson 2000; Conee and Feldman 2004). It is hard to 
square these accounts of evidence with how the moral theorist wants to use it. 
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can respond to that evidence. For example, while the doctor may have good evidence 
available to her in the form of the test results, the patient does not—the patient simply 
could not avail herself of that evidence. 
So, we have a working understanding of what is meant by the best evidence available to 
the duty-bearer. While there is more to be said, this should be sufficient for our purposes. 
A final feature of the Evidence-Relative View is that what rights people have depends on 
the evidence to potential duty-bearers. I take it the thought behind this is again that rights 
place demands on the correlative duty-bearer. And so, it is the best available evidence to 
them that determines whether others hold rights against them.196  
With that in place, let us assess the Evidence-Relative View. First, when objecting to the 
Belief-Relative View, I said 
The Belief-Relative View makes what rights I have depend upon others’ 
beliefs about the world. But that is implausible. What rights I have should 
not depend on others’ beliefs. That fails to pay attention to the importance 
that I have, an importance that should be reflected by the rights that I 
have.  
We might be sceptical that questions about the evidence others possess and are able to 
respond to determines what rights I hold. Again, we might think this does not pay enough 
attention to the significance that rights reflect about their holder.  
I am unsure of whether this objection will move those who feel the force of the Evidence-
Relative View.197 So, let us move onto our second objection. Because the Evidence-
 
196 Recall the similar remarks I made about the Belief-Relative View. These sorts of considerations are most 
explicit in (Scanlon 2008; Quong 2015; Oberdiek 2017). 
197 Saying that, Zimmerman ‘acknowledges the force of this objection’ (Zimmerman 2014, 117–18). It is 
interesting that, if we focus on directed duties rather than their correlative claims, this objection is a lot less 
powerful (i.e., it does not seem implausible that what duties I owe others depends on the evidence available 
to me—in fact, that sounds plausible). Perhaps this gives us some reason to doubt correlativity. It also takes 
us into interesting questions of whether we ought to see rights or duties as prior in justificatory terms (Raz 
1986, 170–71; Waldron 1985, 14; Kramer 2000, 39). I am inclined to see rights as prior, so am tempted to 
focus more on the implausibility of my rights depending on the evidence available to others, and not the 
plausibility of others’ duties depending on the evidence available to them. 
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Relative View says that what rights we have depends on the best available evidence to the 
duty-bearer, this means when new evidence comes into existence, the rights we have 
changes. This verdict is odd. Consider 
Day’s End. [Resident] always comes home at 9:00 pm., and the first thing he does 
is to flip the light switch in his hallway. He did so this evening. [Resident] flipping 
the switch caused a circuit to close. By virtue of an extraordinary series of coinci-
dences, unpredictable in advance by anybody, the circuit’s closing caused a re-
lease of electricity (a small lightning flash) in [Neighbour’s] house next door. Un-
luckily, [Neighbour] was in the path and was therefore badly burnt. (Thomson 
1990, 229) 
Given the Evidence-Relative View, when Resident harms Neighbour, Resident does not 
infringe Neighbour’s rights. Some find this implausible. I am on the fence. (It is unlikely 
that one would want to say that Resident is blameworthy for doing so—but this is con-
sistent with Resident infringing Neighbour’s rights. Again, there are blameless wrongs.) 
Instead of focusing on this feature of the case, let us focus on our present challenge of what 
happens when new evidence becomes available to potential correlative duty-bearers.  
Suppose that some evidence becomes available to the electrical board about what is going 
to happen when Resident flips his light switch. They call Resident to warn him. While on 
a first-order level I am unsure of whether Neighbour has a right that Resident not flip the 
switch, I am more sure that it would be weird for the electrical board to say, “Look Resi-
dent, we’re aware of some evidence that you’re not. Were we to make this evidence avail-
able to you, it will be true to say that Neighbour has a right that you not flip that light 
switch; but it will not be true to say that he has the right if we don’t make that evidence 
available to you.” It seems more natural for them to say, “We’ve become aware of some 
evidence about whether Neighbour has a right that you not flip that switch.” But if the 
Evidence-Relative View is correct, Neighbour only gets a right that Resident not flip the 
switch once the evidence becomes available to Resident. That seems implausible.198 
Might one object that, given the electrical board is aware of the problem, this means that 
there is evidence available to Resident that means he is under a duty not to flip the switch, 
 
198 Thomson uses a similar argument to this against the belief-relative ought (Thomson 1990, 223).  
167 
 
correlating with Neighbour holding a right that he not flip the switch? On the one hand, 
I am not sure that the evidence is available to Resident. Is there evidence available to you 
whether your spouse has lied to you on the grounds they could tell you? This is odd. In 
any case, on the other hand, this only pushes the point back—when the evidence became 
available to the electrical board, new rights came into existence. And this is what I find 
odd. 
T. M. Scanlon says, ‘[i]n the original example, the injury to [Neighbour] was said to be 
due to “an extraordinary series of coincidences, unpredictable in advance by anybody.” 
In the modified example, [the electrical board] knows about this effect and could easily 
tell [Resident]. So the situation is quite different’ (Scanlon 2008, 51). Similarly, Jonathan 
Quong says, ‘[t]he initial description of the example stipulates that the harm [Resident’s] 
flipping of the switch will cause is unpredictable. But if this statement is true, then the 
situation is unpredictable in advance by anybody’ (Quong 2015, 251). These two remarks 
are confused. Something can be unpredictable at t1 but become predictable at t2 (for ex-
ample, because evidence has become available at t2 that was not previously available at 
t1). And in such cases, the Evidence-Relative View will say a right comes into existence be-
tween t1 and t2. But it seems more natural to say that people find out (or, get better evidence 
about) what rights hold. This speaks in favour of the Fact-Relative View.  
So far, we have two reasons to be sceptical of the Evidence-Relative View: first, that it is 
implausible that our rights depend on the evidence available to others and others’ ability 
to respond to evidence; second, that it implies when new evidence comes into existence, 
new rights come into existence rather than us gaining better evidence about what rights 
exist. Let us move onto a third problem with the Evidence-Relative View (one that we 
might think is the most worrying): the Evidence-Relative View counterintuitively under-
generates rights. Consider  
Duped Soldiers. A group of young soldiers are successfully fooled by a totalitarian 
regime into believing that the regime is good and just, and is under repeated at-
tacks from their evil neighbours, the Gloops. The regime’s misinformation cam-
paign is subtle and absolutely convincing: the soldiers are justified in believing 
what they are told by the regime. Once the misinformation campaign is complete, 
these Duped Soldiers are given orders to attack and destroy a Gloop village on 
the border, which, they are told, is really a Gloop terrorist camp plotting a major 
attack. In fact, everything the regime has said is a lie, and the Gloop village 
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contains only innocent civilians. The Duped Soldiers prepare to shell the village 
and are about to (unknowingly) kill all the innocent civilians in it. A peacekeeping 
force from a neutral third country patrols the border and could avert the attack, 
but only by killing the Duped Soldiers. (Quong 2015, 261) 
By posing an unjustified threat to others, individuals can make themselves liable to be 
harmed. To say that an individual is liable to be harmed is to say that harming them 
would not wrong them nor would it violate their rights, and so they would not be justified 
in defending themselves.199 In Duped Soldiers, the best available evidence to the soldiers says 
that the Gloop villagers are liable to be attacked, so have no rights against being attacked. 
This means, given the Evidence-Relative View, the soldiers (1) do not violate the villagers’ 
rights, (2) do not wrong the villagers, nor are they (3) liable to be harmed themselves in 
defence of the Gloop villagers (for example, by the peacekeeping force). All three of these 
verdicts are deeply implausible. 
Quong agrees that these verdicts are ‘unacceptable’ (Quong 2015, 261). However, he does 
not think his version of the Evidence-Relative View is committed to them.200 He begins 
by separating the following two questions:  
(i) Under what conditions does a person have a claim[-right] not to be harmed by a 
particular type of act performed by another person?  
(ii) Has some particular person, A, waived, transferred or forfeited this claim[-right] not 
to be harmed by another person, B?  
(Quong 2015, 261) 
When answering the first question, Quong thinks we should appeal to evidence-relativity 
(for our purposes, the Evidence-Relative View). But when answering the second question, 
we should appeal to ‘what A has actually done, and not on B’s evidence about what A has 
done’ (Quong 2015, 261).  
 
199 Some might add that, for an individual to be liable to some harm, they must have forfeited rights that 
they previously held against that harm (McMahan 2005, 386; Frowe 2014, 3); cf. (Tadros 2016b). Some 
might think that it does not necessarily follow from Y’s being liable to X defending herself that Y is not 
permitted to defend herself—one might think liabilities can be symmetrical. We return to this below. 
200 Zimmerman accepts these implications in individual cases of self-defence (Zimmerman 2008, 97–117). 
169 
 
(Quong thinks that the fact-relative view of forfeiture and waiver ‘grants the right-holder 
a more effective degree of control over the right, something that is typically of central 
importance in the justification of the right’ (Quong 2015, 262). I take it that this is meant 
to explain why the fact-relative view of forfeiture is not ad hoc.201 However, it is not clear 
why something like this is not true of claim-rights against being harmed in general, which 
are determined from the evidence-relative perspective for Quong: the Fact-Relative View 
gives the right-holder a more effective degree of protection over her wellbeing, something 
that is typically of central importance in the justification of that right.) 
Quong’s distinction between (i) claims against being harmed and (ii) whether one is liable 
to be harmed is unstable.  
(1) Recall from chapter 1, if X has a claim that Y not Φ, Y owes X a duty not to Φ. If 
you have a claim against me that I not hit you, I owe you a duty not to hit you.  
(2) And recall from a few paragraphs above, if X is liable to be harmed by Y, Y does 
not owe X a duty not to harm her (say, by Φ-ing). If you are liable to me hitting 
you, I do not owe you a duty not to hit you.  
(3) If Y is not under a duty not to Φ, X has no claim that Y not Φ. If I am not under a 
duty not to hit you, you have no claim against me that I not hit you.  
(4) So, whether X is liable to be harmed by Y affects whether X has a claim against Y. 
Whether you are liable to my hitting you affects whether you have a claim against 
me that I not hit you. 
Here is the problem: in (1), we began by asking whether X has a claim that Y not Φ. 
According to Quong, that is determined by the evidence available to Y. In (2), we asked 
what happens if X is liable to be harmed by Y. According to Quong, that is determined 
by what X has in fact done. But from (2), which was determined by what X has in fact 
done, we arrived at the verdict that (3) X has no claim against Y. But, whether or not X 
 
201 This would leave Quong’s view unmotivated when it comes to those for whom control has no value. See 
discussion of the Incapacity Undergeneration from chapter 2, section 4. 
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has a claim against Y was supposed to be determined by the evidence available to Y, and 
not by what X has in fact done. So, something has gone wrong—you cannot separate 
claim-rights from liabilities to be harmed. 
To put this in simpler terms, according to Quong, whether you have a claim that I not 
hit you depends on the evidence available to me. But, whether you have made yourself 
liable to be harmed by me (for example, whether you have made yourself liable to my 
hitting you) depends on what you have in fact done. But, whether you have made yourself 
liable to be harmed by me, which depends on what you have in fact done, affects whether 
you have a claim that I not hit you. Yet, whether you have a claim that I not hit you was 
supposed to be determined by the evidence available to me, and not by what you have in 
fact done. 
Given the correlativity of claims against being harmed and the absence of a liability to be 
harmed, here is what I think a defender of the Evidence-Relative View is forced to say 
about Duped Soldiers: given the best available evidence to the soldiers, the villagers have no 
claim against the soldiers that they not be harmed since the villagers have (given the evi-
dence) made themselves liable to be harmed. And, given the best available evidence to 
the villagers, the soldiers have no claim against the villagers not to be harmed since the 
soldiers have (both given the evidence and the facts) made themselves liable to be harmed. 
And so, what we actually have is both parties having a liberty-right to harm the other 
party, much like a boxing match. Yet, that is deeply implausible. One way to see this is to 
think of what a third-party may do if they see the events unfold. It is unclear what might 
explain why the third-party ought to intervene on behalf of the villagers—after all, both 
parties have a liberty right to try and harm the other party.202  
Suppose the villagers knew that the soldiers had been duped. Then, things might get worse 
for the Evidence-Relative View. What might justify the villager’s liberty-right to defend 
themselves? They cannot point to their right not to be killed as a justification for using 
defensive force for, by hypothesis, they have no right against the soldiers not to be attacked 
and they know this. If one thinks others become liable to be harmed only when they subject 
 
202 (Frowe 2015, 271–74) raises further problems with Quong’s attempt to deal with Days End. 
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others to unjustified threats of harm, the villagers are not permitted to defend themselves. 
This is even more implausible than the verdict that each party has a liberty-right to defend 
themselves.203  
5. Facts 
I have argued we have three reasons to be sceptical of the Evidence-Relative View. First, 
the rights people hold should not depend upon the evidence available to others; second, 
when new evidence becomes available, we gain evidence of what rights already exist ra-
ther than new rights coming into existence; third, the Evidence-Relative View implausibly 
undergenerates rights.204 Given these problems and those with the Belief-Relative View, 
we ought to look elsewhere. Namely, to the 
Fact-Relative View. X’s right that Y Φ depends on the facts. 
The Fact-Relative View should not need much explaining. Instead, I would like to con-
sider two problems with it.  
 4.1 Fact-Relative Oughts 
The first problem begins with the very plausible idea that there must be some sort of 
connection between what rights others hold against us and what we ought all-things-
 
203 This will follow on accounts of liability defended by, e.g., (McMahan 2005; Fabre 2012; Frowe 2014). 
One might posit an agent-relative prerogative to defend oneself (Quong 2009; 2016; Fabre 2012, 61), yet 
this move would still struggle to explain why a third-party may intervene on behalf of the villagers. Obvi-
ously enough, it also requires we endorse agent-relative prerogatives to do great amounts of harm, which 
might strike one as implausible (Frowe, n.d.). 
204 Helen Frowe has suggested that one way to respond to these problems from the perspective of the Evi-
dence-Relative View is to reject the correlativity between rights and directed duties. Then we can say, my 
rights are determined by the evidence available to me, but your duties owed to me are determined by the 
evidence available to you. So, my rights do not change as new evidence comes available to you (though, my 
rights change as new evidence becomes available to me). And the villagers will have rights against the sol-
diers harming them. However, abandoning correlativity comes with costs. For example, even if the villagers 
have rights against being harmed by the soldiers, the soldiers are under no duty not to attack the villagers, 
so have liberty-rights to attack the villagers. Further, it is difficult to see how a third-party could prioritise 
saving the villagers (both parties are acting within their rights). Finally, there are more general costs of 
abandoning correlativity, namely that it strips rights of their relationality; this will be problematic if we think 
rights’ relationality explains what is distinctive (and perhaps indispensable) of rights. 
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considered to do.205 But now suppose one could show there is no fact-relative ought—no 
sense of what we ought to do relative to the facts. How, then, does the Fact-Relative View 
relate to what we ought to do?206 
Happily, we have good reason to think there is a fact-relative ought. Consider 
Fever. Bloggs’s baby has a fever. The best available evidence to Bloggs 
says that it would be best to starve the baby. (Feed a cold, starve a fever.) 
Bloggs starves the baby, and the baby dies. 
Bloggs’s belief- and evidence-relative “oughts” say that she ought to have starved the 
baby. Now suppose that, at the hospital after the case has unfolded, a doctor says to 
Bloggs, “I realise that you are not at fault, but you really ought not to have starved the 
baby. You ought to have fed it aspirin dissolved in apple juice.” This seems perfectly nat-
ural. However, this “ought” can only be made sense of if the doctor is referring to what 
Bloggs ought to have done in the fact-relative sense (Thomson 1990, 172–73). This gives 
us reason to think there is a fact-relative sense of ought. 
Tadros doubts that there is a fact-relative ought.207 Yet, he agrees that the doctor’s com-
ment seems natural and that, ‘[w]hen Bloggs is given the information, we say, [s]he finds 
out what [s]he ought to have done’ (Tadros 2011b, 223). How, then, to account for this 
ought without appeal to fact-relativity?  
Tadros suggests that, were Bloggs to have had better evidence, it would have been the 
case that she ought to have fed the baby aspirin dissolved in apple juice. Given this, when 
we say that Bloggs ought to have fed the baby aspirin dissolved in apple juice, we are 
 
205 In chapter 1 I said we ought to be interested in the connection between what rights obtain and what 
duty-bearers are required to do all-things-considered. However, in this section I am going to speak of 
“ought”. This is because the felicity of some of the examples changes when we move from oughts to re-
quirements. In conversation, Justin Snedegar has suggested the felicity of the examples changes, despite 
requirements being what we are really interested in, because of the different pragmatics of requirement 
from ought.  
206 Note, the objection raised in this section is going to be especially worrying if we endorse the All-Things-
Considered View on which, if X has a claim-right against Y that Y Φ, Y is required [entailing Y ought] to Φ.  
207 Though I do not have space to discuss it here, see (Tadros 2011b, 220–24).  
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comparing, on the one hand, what Bloggs ought to have done relative to the evidence 
that she had available to her at the time with, on the other hand, ‘what Bloggs ought to 
have done relative to some better set of evidence’ (Tadros 2011b, 223). More generally,  
when we say that something is [fact-relative wrong] but not [evidence-relative 
wrong] what we really do is to contrast the epistemic circumstances of the per-
son with some superior epistemic circumstances that might have been available 
to [them]. So fact relativity is better understood as superior epistemic relativity 
(Tadros 2011b, 224). 
I am not convinced. First, a dialectical worry. Consider what sorts of reasons one might 
have for thinking there is an evidence-, but no fact-relative ought. Perhaps one finds it 
implausible that agents ought to do things if the evidence that they ought to do those things 
is not available to them. What we might call the first-person evidence-relative ought re-
sponds to this reason: it says what agents ought to do is that which the best available 
evidence, to them, that they can respond to, tells them to do. However, once we move away 
from the first-person evidence-relative ought to superior evidence sets—as Tadros sug-
gests—we undercut the very reason we have for preferring the evidence-relative over the 
fact-relative ought. It is no longer that the evidence is accessible to the person the ought 
requires action of. (We could go further than merely pointing out this dialectical worry: 
once we have abandoned relativising ought to what the agent can actually respond to, 
why stop short of the facts?) 
Second, some fact-relative oughts do not look like superior evidence-relative oughts. Let 
us amend Fever. Suppose that, luckily, Blogg’s baby survives despite Bloggs having starved 
the baby when better evidence would have told Bloggs to feed the baby aspirin. This is 
because Bloggs’s baby has a rare, unpredictable condition: sometimes, when the baby 
presents with feverish symptoms, starving the baby saves it, whereas feeding it aspirin 
would kill it; but, more often than not, feeding the baby aspirin saves the baby.  
Now, it seems natural for the doctor to say something along the following lines: “In case 
this happens again, you ought to feed the baby aspirin dissolved in apple juice. I guess 
you were lucky, though, for you ought not to have done that this time, for that would have 
killed the baby—you ought to have starved the baby, as you did.” Here, doctor uses two 
conflicting senses of ought. The second ought is the fact-relative ought. Tadros says that 
the fact-relative ought should be understood as a superior evidence-relative ought. I find 
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it incredibly difficult to see how this fact-relativity ‘is better understood as superior epis-
temic relativity’. Getting lucky, as Bloggs has done, cannot constitute a superior evidence-
set. 
(If one wants to dig their heels in and hold onto Tadros’s strategy, we end up with the 
following dialectical point—an incredibly important dialectical point for the purposes of 
this thesis. To make sense of what appears to be the fact-relative ought, we are saying 
there are superior evidence-relative oughts. Sometimes, as in our amended Fever, this su-
perior epistemic ought is determined by what, in fact, turns out to happen. If the evidence-
relative ought can be determined in this way, the problem made salient by harmless 
wronging reemerges—the superior epistemic ought tracks what turns out in our cases of 
harmless wronging. But this means one cannot solve the Problem of Harmless Wronging 
by appealing to evidence-relativity, for evidence-relativity has been made so expansive so 
as to respond to what, in fact, happens. For example, in Plane Crash, relative to some su-
perior epistemic ought, what Attendant ought to do is deny Passenger admittance on the 
plane. In Roulette, if harm is all we care about then, relative to some superior epistemic 
ought, it is not the case that Shooter ought not to play roulette with Target.)  
So, we have good reason to think there is a fact-relative ought. Given this, we can say that 
rights contribute to, at the least, the fact-relative ought.  
4.2 Jackson Cases 
The second problem with the Fact-Relative View is that one might think it gets the wrong 
verdict in some cases.208 Consider, 
Jackson’s Case. All the evidence at Doctor’s disposal indicates, in keeping 
with the facts, that giving Patient drug A would cure her partially and giv-
ing her no drug would render her permanently incurable. However, the 
evidence leaves it completely open whether it is giving her drug B or drug 
 
208 Another way to put the problem is that, even if the rights correspond to what one ought to do in the fact-
relative sense, Jackson’s Case shows that what one ought to do in the fact-relative sense is not particularly 
important; and so, if rights correspond to the fact-relative ought, rights are not particularly important. 
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C that would cure her completely, and whether it is giving her drug B or 
drug C that would kill her.209  
Suppose that it is drug B that would completely cure Patient, and so drug C that would 
kill Patient. Given the Fact-Relative View, Patient will have a right that Doctor give her 
drug B. Yet, we might find this counterintuitive. In fact, we might think that Patient has 
a right, given all the available evidence, that Doctor give her drug A (as well as rights that 
Doctor not give her either drugs B or C).  
Given that, on the Evidence-Relative View, X’s right that Y Φ depends on the best avail-
able evidence to Y, Patient will have a right that Doctor give her drug A (as well as rights 
that Doctor not give her drugs B and C). We can say that this holds because giving drug 
A is the expectably best option. So, it seems that cases like Jackson’s Case speak in favour of 
the Evidence-Relative View, and against the Fact-Relative View. 
There are a few options available to the defender of the Fact-Relative View. First, we 
might argue that the Fact-Relative View can recognise that Patient has a right to drug A. 
I make some remarks to this effect in the conclusion to this chapter. However, I also raise 
doubts with this way of proceeding. So, here I would like to examine other ways we may 
go. 
Second, we might bite the bullet and suggest that, though the Fact-Relative View says 
that Patient has a right to drug B, this is not as counterintuitive as one might think. For 
example, we might say it is just unclear which treatment Patient has a right to. We will 
presumably have a second-best ought to deal with these sorts of case. However, one might 
press, do we have second-best rights that adhere to this second-best ought? Further, what 
is the relationship between these second-best rights and the Evidence-Relative View?  
I am going to take a third option and suggest that the Evidence-Relative View is suscep-
tible to structurally analogous counterexamples like Jackson’s Case. Thereby, cases like 
 
209 This case is taken from (Zimmerman 2014, 30) with some slight alterations, originating in (Jackson 1991, 
462–63). See the Miners case also, discussed in (Parfit 2011a, 159–61; Tadros 2011b, 222). Tadros says he 
is not sure who invented the much-discussed Miners case; since there is a fact-relative ought, he really ought 
to know. 
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Jackson’s Case give us no reason to prefer the Evidence-Relative View over the Fact-Rela-
tive View. Since I have suggested we have reason to prefer the Fact-Relative View over 
the Evidence-Relative View in the previous section, this means we have most reason to 
endorse the Fact-Relative View.  
Before that, note that even if I am wrong, and so if cases like Jackson’s Case do give us 
reason to prefer the Evidence-Relative View, we still have countervailing reason to prefer 
the Fact-Relative View from the previous subsection. On the balance of reasons, I prefer 
the Fact-Relative View. The argument I make below that Jackson’s Case gives us no reason 
to prefer the Evidence-Relative View simply makes this verdict more secure.  
The problem underlying the Fact-Relative View can be stated as follows.210 We have two 
standards of what X has a right to, Standard 1 and Standard 2. We have at least three 
acts that the potential duty-bearer could perform. We then have a case in which the po-
tential duty-bearer is unsure of what X has a right to on Standard 1, but knows that it has 
no chance of being act 1. And yet, because the other options could go so badly, we think 
that the verdict of Standard 2 is correct, and that X has a right to act 1. In Jackson’s Case, 
we have Standard 1 (Fact-Relative View) and Standard 2 (Evidence-Relative View). Doc-
tor is unsure whether Patient has a right to drugs B or C on the Fact-Relative View, but 
knows both could go badly. So, we think Patient has a right to drug A, as the Evidence-
Relative View suggests. 
Yet, we can run cases of this structure against the Evidence-Relative View. This is because 
the best available evidence to duty-bearers—that which fixes what rights obtain on the 
Evidence-Relative View—is not always going to be luminous: we are not always going to 
know what the Evidence-Relative View says that we have a right to. And when we do not 
know, there are some cases where we ought to adhere to some more risk adverse standard 
than the Evidence-Relative View. Consider, 
Smith’s Case. Patient has some condition. Doctor has three available op-
tions: drugs D, E, or F. Suppose that Doctor has to give some treatment. 
 
210 This formulation of the problem owes a lot to (Smith 2011, 5–7; Littlejohn 2009, 238–41). 
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Doctor knows that giving each of them may cure Patient. However, Doc-
tor also knows that giving drug D may leave Patient badly off (e.g., with a 
bad rash). Giving drug E may leave Patient extremely badly off (e.g., with 
the loss of a foot). And, giving drug F may leave Patient incredibly badly 
off (e.g., with the loss of a hand). There is no evidence available to Doctor 
as to the likelihood of each treatment’s success or failure. Doctor calls Col-
league to ask her what to do. Colleague says that, “Drug D is not best. As 
to which of E or F is best…” and then the phone goes dead. Doctor tries 
to call back, but there’s no luck. Doctor needs to give a treatment now.211 
Suppose Colleague is both Doctor’s epistemic superior and a very reliable testifier. Doctor 
has no evidence of the respective probabilities of the treatments, so the evidence does not 
support any of D, E, or F. However, she has excellent evidence that drug D is not best. 
So, Doctor knows that Patient will not have a right that she give her drug D. It is just that 
Doctor does not know whether it is drug E or F that is best.212 And yet, because either 
treatment could go so badly, intuitively Patient has a right to drug D—this is true, even 
though Doctor knows, relative to the best available evidence to her, that option has no 
chance of being the one Patient has a right to on the Evidence-Relative View. 
(Here is another example (Littlejohn 2009, 238–41). Suppose there is evidence available 
to you as to what treatment is best, though you are not sure whether you will respond to 
that evidence correctly due to other pressures. Suppose you know that D is not best but 
are not sure whether E or F is best—were you to have a little more time, you could figure 
 
211 This case is based on (Smith 2011, 5), with some details changed. For discussion, see (Zimmerman 2014, 
69–76).   
212 What does Patient have a right to in Smith’s Case given the Evidence-Relative View? With a further as-
sumption, the Evidence-Relative View arrives at the verdict that Patient has a right that Doctor give her 
drug E. This is because the Evidence-Relative View needs to say something about what rights obtain when 
potential duty-bearers have no probabilities (or insufficiently robust probabilities) concerning what to do. 
For example, suppose that Colleague never answered the phone in the first place. If Doctor has to prescribe 
some drug, Patient has a right that Doctor give her drug D, and rights against Doctor giving her drugs E 
and F. When faced with no probabilities, Zimmerman plausibly suggests that we ought to apply a principle 
of indifference, on which all of the options should be assigned equal probabilities. Given that Doctor has 
good evidence that drug D is not best, drug D is off the table. We assign equal arbitrary probabilities to the 
remaining options, and so drug E comes out as best, and so the drug Patient has a right to. 
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it out with more confidence. Knowing that if you get it wrong, things could go disas-
trously, you ought to take the conservative option that you know has no chance of being 
best relative to your evidence.) 
Just as Jackson’s Case presents us with an example in which the Fact-Relative View tells us 
that Patient has a right that Doctor give her drug B where, intuitively, Patient has a right 
that Doctor give her drug A, Smith’s Case presents us with an example in which the Evi-
dence-Relative View tells us that Patient has a right that Doctor give her drug E, where, 
intuitively, Patient has a right that Doctor give her drug D. If Jackson’s Case and Smith’s 
Case are analogous in all morally relevant ways, Jackson’s Case gives us no reason to prefer 
the Evidence-Relative View over the Fact-Relative View. 
Now, the defender of the Evidence-Relative View cannot appeal to just any old solution 
to Smith’s Case. This is because the defender of the Fact-Relative View could then use that 
solution to solve Jackson’s Case. What the defender of the Evidence-Relative View needs is 
a solution only to Smith’s Case. They need to find a disanalogy between Jackson’s Case and 
Smith’s Case and draw on that disanalogy to solve Smith’s Case. 
The most obvious disanalogy between the cases is that, in Smith’s Case, Doctor receives 
evidence that D is not best through testimony, whereas there is no testimony in Jackson’s 
Case. Further, the testimony is not of probabilities on which she can base her judgement. 
Rather, it is testimony that drug D is not best. A defender of the Evidence-Relative View 
could say that testimony of what is best does not give you evidence of which option is best. 
So, Colleague’s testimony that drug D is not best does not give Doctor evidence that drug 
D is not best.  
However, this move has unacceptable consequences. Let us amend Smith’s Case such that 
the phone does not cut out, and Colleague says “Drug D will not be best. As to whether 
to give either drug E or F, drug E is best.” Colleague is Doctor’s epistemic superior. She 
is a reliable testifier. It is very implausible that, on the Evidence-Relative View, this does 
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not make it the case that Patient has a right that Doctor give her drug E. So, testimony of 
what option is best must give Doctor evidence.213  
To conclude this subsection, Jackson’s Case gives us no reason to prefer the Evidence-Rel-
ative View over the Fact-Relative View, as the Evidence-Relative View is susceptible to 
structurally analogous counterexamples. The task for the defender of the Evidence-Rela-
tive View is to find a solution to Smith’s Case that both (i) does not lead to implausible 
results in other cases and (ii) is not available to a defender of the Fact-Relative View. I am 
not sure such an answer is available. Again, even if I am mistaken and Jackson’s Case does 
speak in favour of the Evidence-Relative View, we have countervailing reasons to be scep-
tical of the Evidence-Relative View.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has questioned whether rights depend on duty-bearers’ beliefs, the evidence 
available to them, or the facts. If rights do not depend on the facts, we have our solution 
to the Problem of Pure Risk. This is because, when it is intuitively plausible that others 
have rights that we not subject them to risk, often our beliefs and the evidence supports 
others’ wellbeing being sufficiently weighty to place us under duties. I have argued that 
rights depend on the facts, and so we cannot solve the Problem of Pure Risk in this way.  
Against the Belief-Relative View, I argued that it is unclear why the Moral Belief-Relative 
View would not be true in place of the Belief-Relative View, but that we have good reason 
to reject the Moral Belief-Relative View. Further, the Belief Relative View implausibly 
 
213 Zimmerman makes a similar move to solve Smith’s Case, distinguishing between ‘evidence available to 
someone and the evidence of which that person in fact avails himself of’ (Zimmerman 2014, 72). Whereas 
he used to formulate his view in terms of evidence available to agents as we have been doing (Zimmerman 
2008), he has revised his view so that it responds only to evidence that agents have availed themselves of. 
Yet, first, Doctor has availed herself of the evidence available to her in terms of Colleague’s testimony. 
Notwithstanding this, second, Zimmerman’s view is going to get our revised version of Smith’s Case wrong. 
Third, it gets Real Gun wrong too, for Non-Believer has not availed herself of the evidence as to whether the 
gun is real. 
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over and undergenerates rights. Finally, more generally, I argued it is implausible that our 
rights depend on others’ beliefs about the world. 
Against the Evidence-Relative View, I argued that it is implausible that our rights depends 
on the evidence available to others and others’ ability to respond to evidence. I also argued 
that the Evidence-Relative View implies, when new evidence becomes available, new 
rights come into existence rather than us gaining better evidence about which rights ob-
tain; but this seems mistaken. And, finally, I argued that the Evidence-Relative View im-
plausibly undergenerates rights.  
All of this gives us good reason to endorse the Fact-Relative View. Yet, there remains the 
question what to say about Jackson’s and Smith’s Case. What I hope to have shown above 
is that Jackson’s Case gives us no reason to prefer the Evidence-Relative View over the Fact-
Relative View.  
During discussion of whether the fact-relative ought can reach the verdict that Doctor 
ought  give drug A in Jackson’s Case, Littlejohn considers what Doctor may think to herself. 
He says, ‘if I know I don’t know whether it is drug [B] or C that is best and know that guessing could 
be disastrous, I ought to give drug A’ (Littlejohn 2009, 238). He builds on this, saying we might 
actually have a conditional, fact-relative ought to give drug A. On this view, we can see 
facts about uncertainty entering the picture. Similar to this, we might think that Patient 
has a conditional right to drug A, conditional on Doctor not knowing which of drugs B 
and C will fully cure Patient. However, I am unsure whether we are going to reconcile 
deficient evidence in cases like Jackson’s Case with the deficient evidence of the soldiers in 
Duped Soldiers. For example, might not the soldiers think to themselves, “Given that I don’t 
know that those people over the border whom we might attack are innocent, and given I 
know that not attacking could be disastrous (after all, I’ve great evidence they are terror-
ists, planning a terrible attack), we ought to attack them.” I think further discussion of 
cases like Real Gun, Duped Soldiers, and Jackson’s Case may point to a gap between what 
rights obtain and what one ought to do, where that ought has a more practical, decision-
theoretic flavour. This is something I look to pursue moving forward. Before that, let us 
see whether we can hold rights against risk on a Fact-Relative View given the Safety Con-
dition.   
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8. Safer Still 
1. Introduction 
This third part of the thesis focuses on the Problem of Pure Risk. Here again is our pri-
mary example:  
Roulette. Target is asleep. Her housemate, Shooter, comes into her room 
and decides to play Russian roulette with her. Luckily, no bullet is fired. 
Shooter, content with having had a round of roulette, will never play rou-
lette again. 
In chapter 6, I argued risk of harm is not itself harmful. This means Shooter does not 
harm Target by exposing her to risk of harm. Since, nonetheless, intuitively Shooter vio-
lates Target’s rights and wrongs Target, Roulette is an example of harmless wronging. In 
chapter 7, I argued that rights depend on the facts, and not on duty-bearers’ beliefs or the 
evidence available to them. So, though Shooter does not believe nor does the evidence 
decisively support that she will not harm Target, this does not affect Target’s rights. 
Since Target is not harmed by the violation of Shooter’s putative duty not to play roulette 
with her, and since rights are determined by the facts, Target’s wellbeing is not of suffi-
cient weight to place Shooter under a duty not to play roulette with her. Given the ca-
nonical formulation of the Interest Theory, this means Target does not hold a right 
against Shooter that Shooter not play roulette with her. This is the Problem of Pure Risk. 
Like the Problem of Preemption, it is a specific version of the Problem of Harmless 
Wronging for the Interest Theory.   
In chapter 5, I introduced the Safety Condition as a reply to the Problem of Harmless 
Wronging, focusing on the Problem of Preemption. The Safety Condition looks beyond 
what happens in the actual world to close possible worlds to ensure that people could not 
easily have been harmed. In this chapter, I further make the case for the Safety Condition. 
In section 2, I show how the Safety Condition solves the Problem of Pure Risk. With this, 
we see that the Safety Condition is a unified solution to the Problem of Harmless Wrong-
ing. In section 3, I say more about why rights respond to modality as the Safety Condition 
requires. In section 4, I defend the Safety Condition against some further objections. 
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2. The Safety Condition and Pure Risk 
2.1 Making Safety Safer 
Showing how the Safety Condition solves Roulette requires looking back to preemption. 
The Problem of Preemption arises because the right-holder is no worse off due to the 
violation of her right than she would otherwise have been. This is because a different 
event would have made the right-holder worse off to an equal or greater extent. The 
Safety Condition appeals to some close counterfactual world by reference to which the 
right-holder is left worse off: 
For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, Y’s not Φ-ing must cause X to be 
worse off than she would have been in at least one close world, and the 
difference in X’s wellbeing must be of sufficient weight to place Y under a 
duty to Φ. 
Think again of Hitmen, in which Hitman2 follows Hitman1 on every job she has, ready to 
complete a hit on Victim were Hitman1 not to. In that case, rather than comparing the 
following two worlds: 
HM World 1. Hitman1 shoots Victim. (Hitman2 was waiting in the wings.) 
HM World 2. Hitman1 does not shoot Victim. Hitman2 shoots Victim. 
the Safety Condition has us compare HM world 1 with 
HM World 3. Hitman1 does not shoot Victim. Hitman2 does not shoot Vic-
tim. 
Victim is sufficiently worse off in HM world 1 than she is in HM world 3 to place Hitman1 
under a duty not to shoot. This duty correlates with Victim’s having a right that Hitman1 
not shoot.  
When it comes to pure risk imposition, something slightly different is occurring. Like Vic-
tim in Hitmen, Target is no worse off than she would have been had the correlative duty 
been respected. But, unlike in cases of preemption (where, put most naturally, Victim is 
no worse off than she would have been had Hitman1 not shot because she would have 
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been made equally worse off by Hitman2), this is because the risked harm does not materi-
alise. In Roulette, we are comparing: 
R World 1. Shooter plays Russian Roulette. No bullet is fired. 
R World 3. Shooter does not play Russian Roulette. 
Target is no worse off in R world 1 than she is in R world 3. However, as with preemption, 
there is an extremely close world by reference to which Target is made worse off because 
of Shooter playing roulette with her—the world in which there is a bullet in the chamber 
when she pulls the trigger: 
R World 2. Shooter plays Russian Roulette. Shooter fatally shoots Target. 
Two quick clarifications. First, a terminological matter. The orderings of the worlds cor-
respond to closeness with the actual world. HM world 2 is closer than HM world 3 to 
HM world 1, the actual world. When it comes to Roulette, R world 2 is closer than R world 
3 to R world 1, the actual world. That is to say, it requires less of a departure from reality 
(less Lewisian miracles) to have a bullet in the chamber when Shooter pulls the trigger, as 
in R world 2, than to have Shooter not play roulette, as in R world 3.  
Second, in Plane Crash and Hitmen, Y Φs in both world 2 and 3 (she acts as the duty dictates). 
Attendant does not deny Passenger admittance onto the plane in both world 2 and 3. 
Hitman1 does not shoot Victim in both world 2 and 3. This is different from Roulette. Y 
does not Φ in world 2 (she fires the gun) but does Φ in world 3 (does not fire the gun). All 
of this is returned to below, but, to anticipate that discussion, this difference is explained 
by the way in which preemption and pure risk differ as cases of harmless wronging. 
Returning to the Problem of Pure Risk, unlike when dealing with preemption, in which 
we compare world 1 with world 3 in order to locate Passenger’s and Victim’s being worse 
off as a result of the duty’s being violated, in cases of pure risk imposition we need to 
compare world 2 with world 3. Target is worse off in R world 2 than she is in R world 3. 
The extent to which she is worse off is sufficient to place Shooter under a duty not to make 
Target the subject of her risky behaviour. The Safety Condition can accommodate this 
verdict. It requires recognising R world 2 as our focus when Y fails to act as the duty 
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dictates instead of the actual world, R world 1. That is, it requires recognising R world 2 
as the world of evaluation (to borrow some jargon from chapter 5) rather than the actual 
world, R world 1.214 To make this especially explicit, we can amend the Safety Condition: 
For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, Y’s not Φ-ing must cause X to be 
worse off in the world of evaluation than she would have been in at least 
one close world, and the difference in X’s wellbeing must be of sufficient 
weight to place Y under a duty to Φ. 
Target is worse off in R world 2 because of Shooter playing roulette with her than she is 
in R world 3. The extent to which she is worse off is sufficient to place Shooter under a 
duty not to play roulette with her. The Safety Condition is satisfied.  
In cases of preemption, our focus when Y does not act as the duty dictates (our world of 
evaluation) is world 1, the actual world. In Roulette (and cases of pure risk imposition more 
generally), our focus is world 2 (a world close to the actual world). It is in keeping with the 
Safety Condition for our focus on what happens when Y fails to act as the duty dictates to 
be worlds close to the actual world, rather than only the actual world itself. This is because 
we could easily have been in those close worlds. This is just to say that it could easily have 
been that there was a bullet in the chamber when Shooter pulls the trigger. While different 
events occur between R world 1 and R world 2 (Victim is not shot and Victim is shot), 
Shooter acts in the same way in both worlds.215 And this is in keeping with the Safety 
Condition: we are unsafe to the extent that our wellbeing is not safely protected; as 
Shooter could easily have shot Target, Target’s wellbeing was not safely protected; by 
allowing us to focus on worlds in which Shooter acts in the same way close to the actual 
 
214 This is discussed below, but to preempt that discussion: the world(s) of evaluation is the world(s) in which 
Y does not act as the would-be duty dictates and the world(s) of comparison is the worlds in which Y does 
act as the would-be duty dictates.  
215 Might one object that Shooter cannot have acted in exactly the same way in both worlds since something 
different happens in either world (viz., there is, and is not, a bullet in the chamber)? While there is something 
to this objection, it would force us to say that Shooter acts differently in the world in which she pulls the 
trigger, and there is a bullet in the chamber, from the world in which she pulls the trigger, and there is no 
bullet in the chamber. This seems strange. Whether there is a bullet in the chamber seems too far beyond 
Shooter’s control for it to properly be described as an act of her own. Notwithstanding this, we could say: 
those close worlds in which Shooter acts, in the relevant sense, in the same way.  
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world, rather than only the actual world, Target’s wellbeing is safely protected. So far so 
good.  
At this stage, one might wonder how we determine which world to focus on as our world 
of evaluation when Y does not act as the duty dictates. Why focus on the actual world in 
cases of preemption but then focus on worlds close to the actual world in cases of pure 
risk? Yet, we do not need to determine which of these worlds to uniquely focus on. While 
the Safety Condition speaks of the world of evaluation, this need not imply there is only 
one world of evaluation. Rather, there are multiple worlds of evaluation—those close 
worlds in which the potential duty-bearer performs the act that she may be under a duty 
not to perform. (This includes the actual world for the actual world is close to itself.) In 
Roulette, worlds of evaluation are close worlds in which Shooter puts a bullet in the cylinder 
of the gun, spins the cylinder, and pulls the trigger. In Plane Crash, worlds of evaluation 
are close worlds in which Attendant denies Passenger admittance onto the plane. In Hit-
men, worlds of evaluation are close worlds in which Hitman1 shoots Victim. Again, this is 
in keeping with the Safety Condition: it ensures Target’s wellbeing is robustly protected. 
We do not need to determine which world to focus on when Y does not act as the duty 
dictates since the Safety Condition looks to all close worlds in which the duty-bearer acts 
in the same way. 
We could just as easily make another amendment to the Safety Condition to make explicit 
that there is not only one world of evaluation:  
For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, there must be some set of close 
worlds in which Y’s Φ-ing makes X worse off, and the extent to which she 
is worse off must be of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to Φ. 
2.2 Preemption, Pure Risk, and Safety  
Now that we have seen how the Safety Condition deals with cases of pure risk, we can 
better appreciate how the Safety Condition works. It makes for a two-part comparison. 
We have worlds of evaluation and worlds of comparison. Worlds of evaluation are worlds 
in which the potential correlative duty-bearer performs the action that she may be under 
a duty not to perform. Worlds of comparison are worlds in which the potential correlative 
duty-bearer does not perform this action. Whereas the canonical statement of the Interest 
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Theory focuses only on the closest worlds in which the duty is and is not respected, the 
Safety Condition also looks to other worlds (sufficiently) close to the closest worlds in 
which the duty is and is not respected.216 And, if the potential right-holder is worse off in 
a world of evaluation than she is in a world of comparison, and if the extent to which she 
is worse off is of sufficient weight to place the potential correlative duty-bearer under a 
duty, the Safety Condition is satisfied, and she holds a right.217  
Above we saw that, while the world of evaluation in Plane Crash and Hitmen is world 1 (the 
actual world), by contrast the world of evaluation in Roulette is world 2 (a world close to 
the actual world). This is because cases of preemption and cases of pure risk involve dif-
ferent types of harmless wronging.  
As a point of comparison, consider a mundane case in which one’s rights are violated: 
suppose Threatener punches Innocent. Here, we compare the actual world, in which 
Threatener punches Innocent, with the closest counterfactual world in which Threatener 
does not punch Innocent. Our world of evaluation is the closest world (to the actual world) 
in which Threatener punches Innocent: namely, the actual world. Our world of compar-
ison is the closest world (to the world in which Threatener punches Innocent) in which 
Threatener does not punch Innocent. Since Innocent is sufficiently worse off in the world 
in which Threatener punches her, than in the world in which Threatener does not punch 
 
216 To be a little more precise, worlds of evaluation are worlds (1) in which the potential correlative duty-
bearer performs the action that she may be under a duty not to perform and (2) that are close to the closest 
world in which she acts in this way. Similarly, worlds of comparison for the Safety Condition are worlds (1) 
in which the potential correlative duty-bearer acts as the would-be duty requires and (2) that are close to 
the closest world in which she acts in this way.  
217 Again, subject to our satisfying the other necessary and sufficient conditions on rights. As a matter of 
pragmatics, we could begin with the closest worlds and see if the potential right-holder is sufficiently worse 
off for the Safety Condition to be satisfied. In effect, we begin with the canonical statement of the Interest 
Theory. If not, we move from the closest worlds to the next closest. We keep doing this until either the 
Safety Condition is satisfied or we have run out of sufficiently close worlds. A different way to go would be 
to begin with the closest worlds of evaluation and comparison that leave our potential right-holder suffi-
ciently worse off to place our potential duty-bearer under a duty. We then look to whether these worlds of 
evaluation and comparison are sufficiently close. If they are not, we know the Safety Condition is not satis-
fied. 
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her, Threatener is under a duty not to punch Innocent correlative to Innocent having a 
right that Threatener not punch her. 
In cases of preemption, we compare how our potential right-holder actually fares not with 
how she fares in the closest counterfactual world in which the potential duty is respected, 
but with a different counterfactual world. In cases of pure risk, we do use the closest coun-
terfactual world in which the potential duty is respected. However, we do not use the 
actual world as our world of evaluation, but some world close to the actual world. So, 
preemption and pure risk differ from the mundane case in symmetrical ways.218 This is 
laid out in the following table: 
 World of Evaluation World of Compari-
son 
Mundane Case Actual world. Closest counterfactual 
world in which duty is 
respected. 
Preemption Actual world. Not closest counterfac-
tual world in which duty 
is respected, but a world 
close to this world in 
which the duty is re-
spected. 
Pure Risk Not actual world, but a 
world close to this world 
in which the duty is in-
fringed.   
Closest counterfactual 
world in which the duty 
is respected. 
 
(In this table I mean the world of evaluation and world of comparison that enables the 
Safety Condition to be satisfied. Strictly speaking, as I said in the opening paragraph to 
 
218 We could have a case of preempted pure risk. Suppose that, were Shooter not to have played roulette 
with Target, Shooter’s friend would have. And suppose that, were Shooter’s friend to have played roulette 
with Target, no bullet would have been fired. There, our world of evaluation would not be the actual world, 
nor would our world of comparison be the closest counterfactual world in which the potential duty is re-
spected. Rather, we would compare the close world in which Shooter fires a bullet when she pulls the trigger 
to the world in which neither she nor her friend plays roulette with Target.  
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this subsection, worlds of evaluation are all those close worlds in which the potential cor-
relative duty-bearer performs the action that she may be under a duty not to perform. So, 
in Roulette for example, the actual world is a world of evaluation; it is just that, with that 
as the world of evaluation, the Safety Condition is not satisfied.)  
To be precise when expounding the Safety Condition, I have used some jargon. Here is 
a more natural gloss on the Safety Condition. For someone to hold a right against us that 
we not perform some action, we look to whether our performing that action could easily 
leave them sufficiently worse off to place us under a duty.  
 
3. In Favour of Safety 
Here is where we are at. The canonical statement of the Interest Theory falls foul of the 
Problem of Harmless Wronging. Further, I argued that seemingly plausible ways of re-
sponding to the problem considered in chapters 4, 6, and 7 are not wholly satisfactory. 
The Safety Condition solves the Problem of Harmless Wronging—it correctly generates 
rights in cases of preemption and pure risk while being sympathetic to the Interest The-
ory’s welfarist grounds of rights.219 What is more, the Safety Condition offers us a unified 
account of why people are attributed rights across these two different types of case of harm-
less wronging: the right-holder could easily be left worse off by the non-performance of 
the action required by the duty. The Safety Condition’s principled extensional accuracy is 
the primary virtue of the account that I would like to stress in this thesis. 
In section 4, I respond to some objections to the Safety Condition. Before that, in this 
section I explain why rights respond to modality in the that way the Safety Condition 
prescribes. I suggest the explanations considered in subsections 3.1-2 are not found wholly 
satisfying. In subsection 3.3, I return to the ideas introduced in chapter 5 that rights re-
spond to modality because this removes an objectionable form of luck from rights and 
makes duty-bearers sensitive to others’ wellbeing.  
 
219 Possibly notwithstanding some cases of Very Preempted Harm (chapter 5, section 4.2).  
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3.1 Protection from Harm 
Endorsing the Safety Condition would have instrumental benefits. This might explain 
why rights respond to modality in the way the Safety Condition prescribes. First, the 
Safety Condition does a better job protecting right-holders’ wellbeing than the canonical 
statement of the Interest Theory. As Lazar argues regarding a similar condition: ‘If I am 
secure [if my wellbeing is robustly protected], then I escape harms that might otherwise 
have befallen me’ (Lazar 2015, 12).220 To determine whether this is true, we need to com-
pare the world in which we endorse the Safety Condition to the world in which we do not 
endorse the Safety Condition. If right-holders are harmed less in the world with the Safety 
Condition than the world without the Safety Condition, it better protects right-holders’ 
wellbeing. And, we have reason to think this is the case. In the world without the Safety 
Condition, people may commit acts they think to be harmless that end up causing harm—
acts that they otherwise would not have performed were others to have rights against 
them that they not perform those acts. For example, people may subject others to risks 
they think to be harmless that end up materialising into harm.221  
Second, that one’s wellbeing is securely protected provides other instrumental benefits. 
For example, as said in the introduction to chapter 6, Target may become distressed, 
fearful, and her life disrupted were she to find out about Shooter’s escapades. If we know 
our wellbeing is robustly protected because of the Safety Condition, we might feel gener-
ally secure from these burdens. Further, some think that knowing our wellbeing is robustly 
protected is necessary for us to enjoy other benefits, such as the benefit of planning our 
future (John 2011; Lazar 2017, 8).222  
 
220 Lazar is arguing for what he calls ‘Risky Killing’: ‘Other things equal, when A’s Φing kills an innocent 
person, her action is objectively worse the higher the probability when she Φed that her action would kill 
an innocent person’ (Lazar 2017, 5; 2015). Lazar motivates Risky Killing on the grounds that it makes our 
wellbeing more secure. For problems with Lazar’s particular formulation of the view, see section 3.2 of 
chapter 6, note 174, and below in the text. 
221 For similar discussion on what we can call the instrumental version of the harm principle, see (Tadros 
2011a; Edwards 2014). Roughly, on the instrumental version of the harm principle, criminalisation of some 
action, Φ, is permissible only if criminalising Φ-ing would prevent harm to people other than the actor.  
222 See chapter 6, note 17 for discussion.  
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However, there are at least three problems. First, if the Safety Condition was grounded 
in these instrumental considerations, it is difficult to see why when it comes to harmless 
wronging the duty-bearer would owe her duty to the right-holder—why she would wrong 
the right-holder. For, by hypothesis, the duty-bearer has not frustrated any of these goods. 
While generally Target may be better off if others do not subject her to risk of harm, in 
this particular case Shooter has not made her worse off by subjecting her to risk of harm. 
Second, it is not the existence of the Safety Condition that secures these instrumental 
benefits, but people believing their rights are robustly protected. But that is compatible with 
the Safety Condition being false as a matter of moral theory. And third, we might think 
these are just the wrong sorts of reasons for why we have rights in these cases of harmless 
wronging. So one might say: “Look, you just don’t need to work out whether having rights 
against having roulette played with you reduces harm in general to work out whether you 
have that right. Just look at the act!”223  
Let us look elsewhere for reasons to endorse the Safety Condition.  
3.2 Freedom and Autonomy   
Recall, I argued that the two dominant views of freedom are modally demanding.224 The 
liberal Non-Interference View says that the extent to which an agent is free depends not 
only on whether she is subject to interference, but also on whether she would have been 
subject to interference in other possible worlds had she chosen differently. The republican 
Non-Domination View goes further, suggesting that the extent to which an agent is free 
depends both on whether our agent would have been subject to interference had she cho-
sen differently and on additional possible worlds in which others are disposed differently 
towards her. Further, I said some views of autonomy (those that endorse Adequate Range) 
are modally demanding. For example, Oberdiek says, ‘one is autonomous when one can 
 
223 For analogous complaints about instrumental versions of the harm principle, see (Ripstein 2006, 218; 
Duff 2007, 129; Stewart 2010, 30; Tadros 2011a, 50); cf. (Edwards 2014, 276). 
224 Chapter 5, subsection 4.1. 
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plot and pursue one’s own worthwhile path, and to do this, one needs to have access to a 
range of valuable options’ (Oberdiek 2017, 9).225  
Because the Safety Condition secures protection from harm across nearby worlds, it se-
cures non-interference for people across nearby worlds. Thereby, the Safety Condition 
secures right-holders’ freedom and, according to Adequate Range, satisfies a condition 
partly constitutive of autonomy. Put differently, satisfying the Safety Condition is partly 
constitutive of securing freedom and autonomy for right-holders. 
Lazar takes this route.226 Taking these two considerations together, he says that ‘I am 
better off if my freedom from wrongful harm does not avoidably depend on luck’ (Lazar 
2015, 12). He thinks this is because luck is antithetical to control, control is partly consti-
tutive of autonomy, and ‘[b]eing autonomous is non-instrumentally valuable; most of us 
aspire to this ideal for its own sake, not because of other goods it brings us’ (Lazar 2015, 
12). More recently, he says ‘it is non-instrumentally worse to avoid wrongful harm merely 
through good luck, than to do so robustly, because the more you depend on luck, the less 
control you have over your life, and so the less autonomous you are’ (Lazar 2017, 8).  
However, there are at least two reasons to be sceptical that this offers a full explanation 
of why to endorse the Safety Condition. First, recall there are some people for whom 
autonomy has no value. For example, very young children, the severely mentally disabled, 
and those suffering from the later stages of Alzheimer’s disease. If we have reason to en-
dorse the Safety Condition insofar as it secures autonomy, why would it matter for those 
for whom autonomy has no value that their wellbeing be robustly protected?227 Things 
are a little less clear when it comes to freedom. But I am sceptical that freedom has non-
instrumental value for those for whom autonomy has no value. So I am sceptical that 
 
225 Chapter 6, subsection 3.1. 
226 Among those discussed in the previous subsection and in chapter 6, note 174.   
227 See chapter 2, section 4, and chapter 6, subsection 3.2.2. Of course, one could say those for whom 
autonomy has no value have rights against harm, though no rights against harmless wrongs. But I find this 
implausible.  
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interfering with the freedom of those for whom autonomy has no value is bad for those 
people when that interference causes no harm (as in cases of harmless wronging). 
Second, at the beginning of chapter 3, I noted that the Will Theory says rights are exclu-
sively grounded in the control they endow their holders with. Yet, I objected that this fails 
to pay attention to why at least some rights are important—in virtue of the harm that 
would befall one were those rights to be violated. Yet, if we say the Safety Condition is 
important in virtue of the fact that it secures freedom and autonomy for people, is not the 
Safety Condition making a similar mistake?   
3.3 Sensitivity  
In the previous two subsections, I considered two types of reason for why rights respond 
to modality in the way the Safety Condition prescribes. I suggested neither type of reason 
was wholly compelling. Instead, I think our best reason for endorsing the Safety Condition 
to support its extensional accuracy comes from the fact that the Safety Condition removes 
an objectionable form of luck from rights and formally requires that we as duty-bearers 
are sensitive to others’ wellbeing. This idea was first introduced in chapter 5.  
If the canonical statement of the Interest Theory is correct, duty-bearers can through 
sheer luck respect others’ rights. For example, given that canonical statement, through 
sheer luck Attendant does not violate Passenger’s rights. It could easily have been that 
Attendant did harm Passenger, and so would have violated her rights. Similarly, through 
sheer luck—because there is no bullet in the chamber when Shooter pulls the trigger—
Shooter does not violate Target’s rights. However, it could easily have been that there 
was a bullet in the chamber, and so Shooter would have violated Target’s rights. The 
Safety Condition removes this form of luck from rights.  
At this stage, some may wonder why it matters that rights do not depend on luck in this 
way. This is where our second reason comes in: the Safety Condition makes duty-bearers 
sensitive to others’ wellbeing. (If rights did depend on luck in the way the Safety Condition 
rules out, duty-bearers would not be sensitive to others’ wellbeing.)  
When X holds a right against Y that Y Φ, Y is not merely under a duty to Φ but owes that 
duty to X. Were Y not to Φ, Y would not merely act wrongly, but would wrong X. I 
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suggested that a theory of rights and directed duties should explain why this is. So far, 
fairly uncontroversial. Something else fairly uncontroversial is that many people think 
rights are a particular form of reason.228 If the Safety Condition is correct, one has reasons 
of this form not to treat others in certain ways in virtue of how one could easily affect 
them. For example, Shooter has a reason not to play roulette with Target because she could 
easily leave Target very badly off. That we do not merely have a reason not to harm 
others but ensure that we could not easily harm others is a plausible upshot of the im-
portance of others’ wellbeing. This explains why Shooter owes it to Target not to play 
roulette with her—why she would not merely act wrongly but would wrong Target.  
This idea that rights ought to respond to modality in the way the Safety Condition pre-
scribes inasmuch as it makes us sensitive to others’ wellbeing is supported by the plausible 
thought that we ought to be diligent when it comes to how our actions affect others. For 
example, Tom Dougherty suggests: 
If your actions might harm [others] or infringe [others’] rights, then you owe it 
to [them] to gather evidence about whether your actions do so […] This is not 
just to say that someone who had failed to carry out these investigations would 
have a bad character. It is also to say that these investigations are required of 
them. (Dougherty 2018, 100) 
The Safety Condition goes further than this, building it into our reasons as duty-bearers 
that we are diligent as to how our actions could easily affect others.229 
 
228 Some people think they are reasons that are demandable, other things being equal (Cruft 2019, 33). 
Suppose you have most reason to go to the pub but decide not to. It is inappropriate for me to demand of 
you that you go to the pub. I may try and reason with you: explain that the pub is great fun, that we can 
have a nice drink. But compare that to a scenario in which I know you have promised someone that you 
will meet them at the pub. Then, I can demand of you: “You need to go to the pub—you made a promise.” 
If the duty is directed, I think this adds that those reasons are, other things being equal, remainder inducing. 
When you fail to satisfy reasons corresponding to directed duties, when all else is equal, you owe an apology 
to the person to whom you owed the duty. The person to whom you owed the duty has special standing to 
blame and resent you. Some add that the reasons that correspond to directed duties have something like 
exclusionary weight. When I owe it to you to meet you at the pub, I have to exclude from my deliberation 
other reasons I may have not to go to the pub; for example, that it is cold out. 
229 Dougherty attempts to motivate this duty of due diligence by suggesting, when Y does not act with due 
diligence as regards X, she subjects Y to a dignitary harm regardless of whether she otherwise harms X or 
violates X’s primary rights (Dougherty 2018, 100). As suggested earlier (chapter 6, note 174), this dignitary 
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At this stage, two questions present themselves. First, is there an analogous condition to 
the Safety Condition for undirected duties? Second, does it matter that duty-bearers’ rea-
sons are sensitive to right-holders’ wellbeing only because we are epistemically limited?  
On the one hand, if there is an analogous condition to the Safety Condition for undirected 
duties, this does not speak against the Safety Condition; in fact, on grounds of parity, it 
gives us more reason to endorse the Safety Condition. On the other hand, I am tempted 
by the thought that it is only in virtue of directed duties and rights’ relationality that the 
Safety Condition is true. It is because one owes their duty to the right-holder that one is 
formally required to ensure that one could not easily fail to respect the grounds of the duty 
(in the Interest Theory’s case, wellbeing). While one might well display bad character or 
not live up to full virtue by luckily respecting their undirected duties, one does not act 
wrongly; this can be explained by saying there is no one to whom one owes their undi-
rected duty. 
Let us turn to our second question of whether it is important that duty-bearers are sensi-
tive to right-holders’ wellbeing only because we are epistemically limited agents. Again, it 
is not obvious which way to go here. So, I again offer an argument in the alternative. On 
the one hand, it seems plausible that Hitman1 owes it to Victim not to shoot her even if she 
knows Hitman2 will shoot whatever happens. This can be explained by the modal fact 
that there are close possible worlds by reference to which Hitman1 does harm Victim.230  
What to say of a full knowledge variant of Roulette? It is hard to even conceptualise such a 
case—can one play roulette with someone else if one knows one will not shoot? Perhaps 
this gives us reason to think that, on the other hand, if we know we will not harm someone 
with our action then they do not have a right against us, even if we could easily harm 
them. Recall that I suggested it was implausible in Voodoo that Victim had a right that 
 
harm is an upshot of our owing others duties (of due diligence in this case), so cannot be used to ground the 
duty.  
230 In section 4.1, we examine how the stringency of rights is determined by the Safety Condition; those 
considerations may help when thinking about this case. Another thing that is worth bearing in mind is, if 
the duty-bearer knows she will not harm the right-holder and were to inform the right-holder of this, the 
right-holder may have no independent reason to refuse to permitting the duty-bearer performing the action 
they are under a duty not to perform.  
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Believer not stab a voodoo doll of them.231 On the Interest Theorists’ picture, rights obtain 
in virtue of the difference they would make to one’s wellbeing. Believer could not make a 
difference to Victim’s wellbeing in this case. Perhaps this is relevantly like cases in which 
one knows they will not harm others, though could (in the modal sense) harm them.  
If we go this way and suggest that the Safety Condition mattering depends on our being 
epistemically limited agents, this is not to end up endorsing an Evidence-Relative View of 
the sort I rejected in the previous chapter. To see why, let us see how the Safety Condition 
fares with the three objections raised against the Evidence-Relative View. First, the most 
worrying of the problems: unlike the Evidence-Relative View, the Safety Condition does 
not undergenerate rights when duty-bearers’ evidence sets are poor. Evidence affects 
whether others hold rights only if that evidence is sufficiently good for the duty-bearer to 
know they will not harm the right-holder. 
Things are less clear when it comes to the other two problems with the Evidence-Relative 
View. The second objection was that the Evidence-Relative View says what rights I have 
depends on the evidence available to others and others’ ability to respond to evidence; 
and this fails to pay attention to the importance of me, the right-holder. The third objec-
tion was that, on the Evidence-Relative View, what rights we hold changes when the 
evidence changes; but it is more plausible to think that we gain more evidence of what 
rights obtain. On this second way of understanding the Safety Condition, strictly speaking 
rights do depend on the evidence available to others and do change when better evidence 
becomes available. But evidence is playing a different sort of role on this picture. Evidence 
only affects rights when would-be duty-bearers have sufficiently good evidence about the 
modal space to know they will not harm the would-be right-holder. Since the Interest The-
orists think rights are difference makers, perhaps it is unobjectionable that rights depend 
on evidence in this way. (But again, I must admit that I am not sure which way to go. If 
the second way of thinking about the Safety Condition does end up inheriting the prob-
lems of the Evidence-Relative View, this gives us reason to endorse the Safety Condition 
whatever the duty-bearers’ knowledge of modal space.) 
 
231 Chapter 7, section 3.  
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4. In Defence of Safety (Again) 
In the previous section, I completed my explanation of why it matters that our rights 
respond to modality in the way the Safety Condition prescribes. I suggested it matters 
because this removes an objectionable form of luck from rights and it makes us sensitive 
to others’ wellbeing. In this section, I conclude our discussion of the Safety Condition by 
defending it against three objections. The first and second objection concern how we de-
termine right-violations and right-ascriptions on the Safety Condition. The third objec-
tion suggests the Safety Condition overgenerates rights. 
4.1 Violations   
In Roulette, the Safety Condition says that Shooter violates Target’s rights because of the 
comparison between the world in which Shooter does not play roulette with the world in 
which Shooter does play roulette and kills Target. However, does this not imply that Tar-
get’s right to life has been violated? That is strange—no bullet was fired, and Target was 
left unharmed in bed. How, then, is her right to life violated?232  
Here is one reply: if one has to look beyond the comparison between the actual world 
with the closest counterfactual world, we have a different type of right violation. This 
would imply Target’s right to life has not been violated because the world of evaluation is 
not the actual world. Rather, say, her right that her life be robustly protected has been 
violated. However, going this way implies in Hitmen that Victim’s right to life has not been 
violated, but her right that her life be robustly protected. This is because, in Hitmen, we 
do not look to the closest counterfactual world in which the duty is respected, but to a 
world close to that. This looks problematic to me. Victim has been killed by Hitman1. It 
looks like her right to life has been violated. 
Because of this, we should say, if the world of evaluation is the actual world, one’s right 
against the actual conduct has been violated: since the world of evaluation in Hitmen is the 
actual world, Victim’s right to life is violated by Hitman1. But, if the world of evaluation 
is not the actual world, but some world close to that world, one’s right against that conduct 
 
232 Thanks to Bodhi Melnitzer for pressing this objection. 
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has not itself been violated—rather, one’s right that one be safely protected from that 
conduct has been violated. Since the world of evaluation in Roulette is not the actual world, 
this implies that Beth’s right that her life not be robustly protected has been violated.  
There is a subtler version of the problem under consideration. The Safety Condition says 
that Shooter violates Target’s rights because of the comparison between the world in which 
Shooter does not play roulette with the world in which Shooter does play roulette and 
kills Target. This implies Shooter’s right is as stringent as it would be were it certain (or 
more probable) that there was a bullet in the chamber. Similarly, the Safety Condition 
says Hitman1 violates Victim’s rights because of the comparison between the world in which 
no one shoots Victim and Hitman1 shoots Victim. This implies Victim’s right is as strin-
gent as it would be were the harm to Victim not to be preempted. One might find both 
of these things implausible.  
One option is to accept these conclusions. However, they are in tension with the following 
two asymmetries that I find plausible. First, other things being equal, one should stop 
someone who is certain to fatally shoot someone else from doing so, rather than stop 
Shooter from subjecting Target from a one in six chance of death. Second, other things 
being equal, one should stop someone from fatally shooting someone else rather than stop 
Hitman1 from shooting Victim given that the harm is preempted. Yet, if Target’s and 
Victim’s rights are just as stringent as in harmful variants, what explains these asymme-
tries? 
To accommodate this, we should suggest that the stringency of one’s rights depends not 
only on the comparison between the world of evaluation and the world of comparison, 
but on other modal considerations. There are several ways we could go here: we could 
think the stringency of one’s rights depends on whether we need to move from the closest 
worlds of evaluation and comparison to other worlds, on the number of worlds of evalu-
ation and comparison that satisfy the Safety Condition, on the distance of those worlds 
from the closest worlds, and so on. And in Hitmen, since Hitman1 could easily harm Vic-
tim, Victim has a right against Hitman1; but, other things being equal, that right is less 
stringent than it would have been were the harm not preempted.  
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At this stage, it is worth noting that some people think there might be different measures 
of stringency of a duty: one duty could be stronger than another ‘in the cost-requiring sense if 
we would be morally required to bear greater burdens, if that were necessary, to fulfil this 
duty’ but weaker ‘in the conflict-of-duty sense if this duty would outweigh the other when 
these duties conflict’ (Parfit 2017, 369; Kamm 1985). Consider the following example, 
based on a case from (Kamm, n.d.):  
Personal Lifeguard. Lifeguard is Client’s personal lifeguard. Suppose Life-
guard would be morally required to sacrifice their life for Client, were the 
need to arise. A wave threatens Client and 3 other people. Lifeguard can 
only save either Client or the 3.233 
It is plausible that Lifeguard is not required to save the 3. An explanation for this is that 
Lifeguard can lean on the costs of saving the 3 to justify her not saving them. Yet, Life-
guard cannot lean on those costs to justify failing to save Client. So, her duty to save Client 
is more stringent in the cost-requiring sense than her duty to save the 3. Yet, it is also 
plausible that Lifeguard may save the 3 rather than Client. So, her duty to save the 3 is 
equally stringent in the conflict-of-duty sense. And so, while the duty to save Client is 
more stringent in the cost-requiring sense, the duty to save the 3 is equally stringent in the 
conflict-requiring sense.  
Returning to harmless wronging, since rights correlate with directed duties, it is open for 
us to disambiguate the stringency of rights in these two ways: we have the conflict-of-
rights sense and the cost-requiring sense of the stringency of a right. To make sense of the 
two asymmetries mentioned above, we need only say the right not to be harmed is more 
stringent in the conflict-of-rights sense than the right not to be harmed when that harm is 
preempted and more stringent than the right not to be subjected to pure risk. And, we 
can explain this by appealing to the modal considerations mentioned above.  
 
233 Thanks to Kamm for allowing me to use this case. She has it that Lifeguard can save either Client or 
100 people, and in private communication has said she would deny that Lifeguard may fail to save Client 
if there were only 3 lives on the line.  
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But this leaves open whether the right not to be harmed is more stringent in the cost-
requiring sense. And we could go either way on this. For what it is worth, my intuition is 
that it is easier to defeat a duty not to harm when that harm is preempted or less certain 
than when it is not. If we do go this way, and think duties not to perform harmless wrongs 
are less stringent in both the conflict-of-rights sense and cost-requiring sense, this also 
leaves open that they might differ on how much less stringent. So, rights against harmless 
wrongs might be a little less stringent in the cost-requiring sense but much less stringent 
in the conflict-of-rights sense.234  
I began this subsection by arguing that Target’s right to life is not violated in Roulette. 
Rather, her right that her life not be robustly protected is violated. But this does not com-
mit us to saying Victim’s right to life has not been violated in Hitmen. I then suggested we 
can (and ought to) accommodate the fact that, intuitively, rights may be less stringent 
when the violation of those rights would be harmless. However, by distinguishing between 
different senses of stringency, I made space for the possibility that those rights are equally 
stringent in some senses but not in others.  
4.2 Non-Violations 
All of the examples considered so far have been rights that have actually been violated. 
But, how does the Safety Condition work when ascribing rights in more mundane cases 
where one’s rights are not actually violated?  
Here is how one might think it works. Suppose we have Ann and Beth. Beth is going 
about her day as a respectable member of the moral community. Does Ann have a right 
that Beth not hit her? Yes. But one might think the Safety Condition implies otherwise. 
After all, we can suppose that Beth is so well disposed towards Ann that there is no close 
world in which she harms Ann. Since there is no close world (to the actual world) in which 
 
234 It has surprised me how varied people’s intuitions have been on these questions. Let us begin with the 
conflict-of-rights sense. Some people have said they think we ought to toss a coin to decide between both (i) 
harming someone or harming someone else when that harm is preempted and (ii) shooting someone with 
certainty or playing roulette with them. Some have reported only one of these intuitions. Some have denied 
both intuitions. There have been similarly varying intuitions when it comes to the cost-requiring sense of 
the stringency of a right.  
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Beth harms Ann, this means there is no close world by reference to which Ann has a 
sufficiently weighty interest to place Beth under a duty not to harm her. So, Ann has no 
right that Beth not harm her. This is an alarming result.235  
The Safety Condition does not imply that we do not have rights against harm unless there 
is a close world in which we are harmed by the violation of our rights. The Safety Condi-
tion was wrongly applied above. Here is how things should work. First, we go to our world 
of evaluation. In Plane Crash and Hitmen, this is the actual world. In Roulette, this is a world 
close to the actual world in which Shooter puts a bullet into the cylinder, pulls the trigger, 
and shoots Target. Key to the identification of the world of evaluation is that it is the 
closest world(s) to the actual world (again, possibly inclusive of the actual world itself) in 
which the potential duty-bearer does not act as the potential duty dictates. In our three 
cases, where rights have actually been violated, this is either the actual world or some 
world close to the actual world. But, in cases in which one’s rights are not actually violated, 
the world of evaluation cannot be the actual world—if it was, the right would be violated! 
Rather, it is going to be the closest world, to the actual world, in which the duty is being 
violated. For example, in our case of law and morality abiding Ann and Beth, we go to 
the closest world, to the actual world, in which Beth hits Ann. We now have our world of 
evaluation. This world may itself be quite far away from the actual world.  
We need then to compare our world of evaluation, in which the potential duty is violated, 
with our world of comparison. The world of comparison is the closest world in which the 
potential duty is respected.236 We see if the potential right holder is worse off to enough 
 
235 See the relevant discussion from note 78, chapter 3.  
236 There are two ways we can go here that will have extensional differences in some cases. First, we can 
go to (1) the closest world, to the actual world, in which the potential duty is respected. In cases in which one’s 
rights are not being violated this will always be the actual world. (Why? Because the closest world to the 
actual world is the actual world, and the duty is being respected in the actual world. See (Lewis 1973, 29–
30) for discussion.) Second, we can go to (2) the closest world to the world in which the potential duty is being violated 
in which the duty is respected. Often, (1) and (2) will be the same. But they need not be. Suppose that Colin 
is in Canada and I am in St Andrews. We are wondering whether Colin has a right against me that I not 
hit him. The closest world in which I violate the potential duty not to hit him is one in which I am in 
Canada, and hit him (of course, it could be the world in which Colin is in St Andrews and I hit him). Now, 
the closest world, to the world in which I am in Canada and hit Colin, in which I do not hit Colin is one in 
which I am in Canada, but do not hit Colin. It is not the actual world, in which I am in St Andrews and do 
not hit him. But the closest world to the actual world in which I do not hit Colin is the actual world since, 
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of an extent in the world of evaluation than she is in the world of comparison to place the 
potential duty-bearer under the duty. So, we go to the closest world, to the world in which 
Beth hits Ann, in which Beth does not hit Ann—we see if Ann is worse off to enough of 
an extent to place Beth under a duty not to hit her.  
We then iterate this process, looking at comparisons between our world of evaluation and 
other close worlds of comparison. We also see how other worlds of evaluations fare.237 
This is why, even if there is no close world to the actual world in which Beth harms Ann, 
Ann still has a right that Beth not harm her. 
4.3 Overgenerations 
At the end of chapter 5, I introduced a problem that I did not address. Whereas the Prob-
lem of Very Preempted Harm questioned whether the Safety Condition will undergener-
ate rights, one might also worry it will overgenerate rights. In chapter 5, I delayed dealing 
with the problem because it was not yet at its worst. In that chapter, we focused on how 
the Safety Condition looks to worlds other than the closest counterfactual world in which 
the duty is respected. The worry was that there are many close worlds. We can now see 
why the problem has gotten worse following the discussion in this chapter: not only are 
there many close worlds of comparison, but there are also many close worlds of evalua-
tion—close worlds in which the potential duty-bearer does not act as the duty-dictates. 
All the Safety Condition requires is that there is some close world of evaluation in which 
the right-holder fares sufficiently worse than in some close world of comparison.  Is this 
not going to be too easy to satisfy?  
Before turning to specific examples in which it seems the Safety Condition overgenerates, 
in subsection 4.3.1 I argue the Problem of Overgeneration is not that, because the Safety 
Condition overgenerates rights, this leads to a proliferation of rights, and proliferations of 
 
by hypothesis, I do not hit Colin. So, (1) and (2) come apart. Since the world in which I am in St Andrews 
and do not hit Colin is not close to the world in which I am in Canada and hit Colin, this implies Colin 
does not have a right that I not hit him. So, we should go with way (2). (Offhand, some people have reported 
they do not find it odd that Colin does not have a right that I not hit him if I am in St Andrews, and he is 
in Canada; presumably, they think Colin would have a right were we together.) 
237 See note 217 on how this is a probably a matter of pragmatics.  
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rights are themselves problematic.238 I also argue the problem is not that this overgener-
ation leads to conflicts of rights, and conflicts are themselves problematic. Rather, the 
problem is that the Safety Condition may lead to counterintuitive rights. This we tackle 
in subsections 4.3.2-3. 
4.3.1 Why Proliferations and Conflicts Are Not Themselves Worrying 
One reason why we should not worry about proliferations of rights themselves is that most 
theories of rights already imply the existence of many, many rights. For example, Thom-
son worries if we have rights against risk of harm, this leads to a proliferation of rights 
(Thomson 1990, 244–46). But she endorses what she calls The Means Principle for Rights, on 
which ‘if (i) X has a claim against Y that Y not do beta, and (ii) if Y does alpha then he or 
she will thereby do beta, then X has a claim against Y that Y not do alpha’ (Thomson 
1990, 157). As Zimmerman remarks, ‘it follows [from this] that I have a right […] that 
you not stick a knife one inch into my back, a right that you not stick a knife two inches 
into my back, indeed an infinite number of such rights’ (Zimmerman 2008, 82). One 
might deny The Means Principle for Rights. But it is my hunch that there will be some 
transmission principle of this sort that leads to many, many rights.239   
Notwithstanding the above, suppose one’s theory of rights is objected to because it leads 
to a proliferation of rights. One replies by listing every right that obtains on one’s theory. 
For every right, one asks “Is this right alone implausible?” Suppose the answer is “Yes.” 
Well, the problem is not that the view leads to a proliferation of rights but that the theory 
of rights has overgenerated, leading to an implausible right. Now suppose the answer is 
“No.” And suppose that we are delivered the same answer for every right. What, then, is 
the objection meant to be? “Your theory generates many rights, none of which individu-
ally are implausible, but which together are implausible.” This objection seems odd.240  
 
238 See, e.g., (Sumner 1987; Wellman 1999). 
239 For example, see the discussion in chapter 1, section 4.3, where I argued we can speak about rights at 
differing levels of specificity.  
240 Perhaps the worry is that rights, as a normative phenomenon, are especially important and their prolif-
eration devalues that importance. So, even if no particular right is implausible, the combination of all those 
rights is implausible. This is an interesting argument. I am inclined to think, while rights themselves are an 
203 
 
Perhaps the worry is that if there is a proliferation of rights, this leads to conflicts of rights. 
And, it is conflicts of rights that are implausible. But it is not obvious that a conflict of 
rights is worrying, either. After all, we are assuming the  
Pro Tanto View. If X has a claim-right against Y that Y Φ, Y has a pro tanto 
duty to Φ.241 
Given this view, X can both have a right against Y that Y Φ and Z, for example, have a 
right against Y that Y not Φ. This can be the case even though X’s and Z’s rights conflict. 
The Pro Tanto View mandates only that Y has a pro tanto duty to Φ and a pro tanto duty 
not to Φ. This does not mean she is both required all-things-considered to Φ and not to 
Φ.  
But I did not spend too long defending the Pro Tanto View. So, suppose one endorses the 
All-Things-Considered View. If X has a claim-right against Y that Y Φ, Y is 
required to Φ. 
Then, if we have a conflict of rights, we might be in trouble. We are especially in trouble 
if we do not admit moral dilemmas (where Y is required all-things-considered both to Φ 
and not to Φ) or if we have an example of a conflict that does not look like a moral dilemma. 
(Our examples of Ben needing to cut across Ann’s land to save his life and Bystander 
needing to turn the trolley to save our sufficiently large number of people are two exam-
ples that do not look like moral dilemmas.)  
But defenders of the All-Things-Considered View already have mechanisms in place to 
deal with putative conflicts: they think the content of one of the conflicting rights specifies 
that the right does not obtain in those circumstances.242 Moral Specificationists think that 
X only has a claim-right that Y not unjustifiably or wrongfully Φ. Factual Specificationists 
 
important normative phenomenon, this does not stop some rights from being fairly trivial. Those rights 
have the important normative upshots that rights do (discussed in chapter 1, section 1), but they are not 
very weighty in that instance.  
241 Chapter 1, section 4.4. 
242 Chapter 1, section 4.4. 
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think that X only has a claim-right that Y Φ, unless: list of exemptive clauses. And if this 
machinery is already in place, we can use it to dissolve the potential conflicts the Safety 
Condition generates.  
So, if the Safety Condition overgenerates rights this is not problematic because it will lead 
to a proliferation of rights, nor that it will lead to conflicts of rights. It will be problematic 
because of the implausible nature of the overgenerated rights themselves. So what do 
these implausible rights look like? 
4.3.2 Ruling Out Worlds  
There is a close world, through comparison with which, Passenger is made worse off by 
being denied admittance onto the plane. The Safety Condition is satisfied, so Passenger 
has a right against being denied admittance onto the plane.243 However, there is also a 
close world, through comparison with which, Passenger is made better off by being denied 
admittance onto the plane. Namely, through comparison of  
(World 1) Attendant denies Passenger admittance onto the plane. The 
plane takes off and crashes killing everybody on board. 
And 
(World 2) Attendant does not deny Passenger admittance onto the plane. 
The plane takes off and crashes killing everybody on board. 
Does this imply that Passenger has a right against Attendant that Attendant deny Passenger 
admittance onto the plane? It appears that though—the Safety Condition has been satis-
fied. This is one example of what we can call the Problem of Overgeneration.  
Consider another example.  
A&E. An unconscious Patient comes into A&E with a burst aneurysm. 
There is no chance that the aneurysm will stop bleeding spontaneously 
 
243 Again, subject to our satisfying the other necessary but insufficient condition on right-ascriptions.  
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and so, without treatment, Patient will surely die. Surgeon can operate. 
The surgery is very serious, though all-things-considered beneficial. 
While the case stipulates that there is no nomologically possible world in which Patient 
recovers without treatment (by this I mean, a possible world with our laws of nature), 
there might nonetheless be a metaphysically close world in which the aneurysm stops 
bleeding. On the Lewisian view, all that would be required is a small miracle to stop the 
aneurysm from bleeding. Through comparison with this world, Patient would be worse 
off as a result of the operation: she will unnecessarily have gone through a very serious 
operation. Does this imply that Patient has a right against Surgeon performing the oper-
ation because there is a metaphysically close, though nomologically impossible, world in 
which the bleeding would stop?  
I think the Problem of Overgeneration can be resisted. In what follows, I do so on several 
fronts. The remainder of this subsection is taken up with a first general strategy of ruling 
out worlds that would otherwise allow the Safety Condition to overgenerate rights by 
appealing to other features of closeness. Then, in the following subsection, a second gen-
eral strategy makes appeal to other considerations on rights that rules out further over-
generations.  
First, we could move again to the 
Interest Theory (Safety, Relevance Variant). For X to have a right against Y that 
Y Φ, Y’s not Φ-ing must cause X to be worse off than she would have been 
in at least one relevant world, and the difference in X’s wellbeing must be 
of sufficient weight to place Y under a duty to Φ. 
Since there is no stipulation that close worlds are relevant, we need not worry that world 
2 is very close in Plane Crash since we can say world 2 is not relevant. Similarly, we need 
not worry about the metaphysically close world in which Patient’s burst aneurysm stops 
bleeding. The Problem of Overgeneration is solved. However, the problem from chapter 
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5 with the Relevance Variant has not miraculously solved itself: how do we determine 
which worlds are relevant?244  
Second, we may introduce what we can call the Realism Condition, according to which only 
those worlds that are nomologically possible count as close for rights.245 In A&E, the met-
aphysically possible world in which the aneurysm stops bleeding is not close, so the Safety 
Condition will not be satisfied. Building the Realism Condition into our view of closeness 
says that for a world to be close it must be nomologically possible. Alternatively, the Re-
alism Condition could be a separate necessary but insufficient condition on rights. This 
admits that merely metaphysically possible worlds are close, though are not relevant for 
rights. 
The Realism Condition takes us only so far. It is of little use in Plane Crash. Another feature 
of closeness that helps us deal with cases like Plane Crash is that the closeness relation is 
what we can call nonreciprocal—roughly, just because w1 is close to w2 when w1 is our 
focus does not entail that w2 is close to w1 when w2 is our focus.246 For example, though if 
the plane crashes there is a close world in which the plane does not crash, it is often not 
the case that, if the plane does not crash, there is a close world in which the plane does 
crash. Roughly, this is because a lot needs to go wrong for a plane to crash—meaning the 
world in which it does crash is far away. But, it does not take a lot for a plane not to crash—
meaning that the world in which the plane does not crash is close.247 While this does not 
 
244 Though, the considerations extended in the following subsection help on this front. 
245 This condition is based upon (McMahan 2002, 133–36). 
246 For discussion, see (Lewis 1973, 50–52). He says ‘it can happen that j is more similar than k to i in the 
respects of comparison that are important at i; k is more similar than i to j in the respects of comparison that 
are important at j; yet i is more similar to j to k in the respects of comparison that are important at k’ (Lewis 
1973, 51). There, Lewis is emphasising that different facts about a world could determine which worlds are 
close, and those facts could differ across worlds. For example, colour could be very important at i, meaning 
j is closer than k to i because j is more similar in colour to i than k is to i. But colour could be moderately 
important at j and not particularly important at k. The point I am emphasising is slightly different, though 
Lewis’s point could also help us out with some examples of the Problem of Overgeneration.  
247 To be incredibly crude, suppose that ten separate things need to go wrong for a plane to crash. Suppose 
the plane does crash (call this “Crash World”). There is a close world in which the plane does not crash for 
one of these things does not go wrong (call this “Almost Crash World”). Now, Crash World is close to 
Almost Crash World—it requires only one miracle to take us between those worlds. But, among the many 
possible worlds in which the plane does not crash are those in which none of the ten things go wrong (call 
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explain why Passenger does not have a right that she be denied admittance onto the plane 
(since in that case, there is a close world in which the plane crashes), it does explain why, 
generally, we do not have rights to be denied admittance onto planes—usually, there is no 
close world in which the plane crashes. The Problem of Overgeneration is not as worrying 
as it might have seemed. 
So far, the general strategy has been to rule out worlds that would otherwise allow the 
Safety Condition to overgenerate rights by appealing to other features of closeness. How-
ever, none of these considerations (save for the Relevance Variant) explain why Passenger 
does not have a right that she be denied admittance onto the plane. A final way to resist 
the Problem of Overgeneration that adheres to this general strategy is to rethink our view 
of closeness. In the remainder of this subsection, I introduce a normalcy view of closeness. 
However, this move is only illustrative—I do not mean to imply we should move to nor-
malcy (in fact, I introduce a problem with it).  
Instead of assuming a Lewisian view of similarity, let us build on a recent account of nor-
malcy (Smith 2016, 38–45). According to that view, we discover the closeness of some 
worlds at some time t through the call for explanation that is required if we to move from 
one world to the other. On this view of closeness, in Plane Crash world 2 is not a particularly 
close world to world 1. This is because the plane crashing would call for explanation. 
Whereas, world 3—the world in which Passenger is not denied admittance onto the plane 
and the plane lands at its destination—would be very close to our world of evaluation. 
The plane landing at its destination would not call for explanation. Given this, we can 
explain why Passenger does not have a right that she be denied admittance onto the plane. 
However, this view of closeness causes problems in other cases.248 For example, in Hitmen, 
HM world 3 is far away from HM world 1 on this understanding of closeness because it 
would call for explanation. “What happened there? Why didn’t Hitman2 shoot after Hit-
man1 didn’t? They’re always following each other around.” So, this normalcy view of 
 
these “Couldn’t Crash Worlds”). Crash World is not particularly close to any of Couldn’t Crash Worlds—
ten miracles would be needed to get us between those worlds.  
248 This problem was discussed in chapter 4, note 114. 
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closeness does not deal with all cases. However, this discussion has offered us an example 
of how we might hope to stem the Problem of Overgeneration by amending our view of 
closeness. We could be hopeful that there is an account of closeness out there that will 
solve all our problems. However, in lieu of having that account to hand, let us go back to 
assuming our Lewisian view of closeness.  
4.3.3 Other Considerations 
I have argued the Problem of Overgeneration is less severe than first thought. But, save 
moving to the Relevance Variant or Normalcy view of closeness, I have not been able to 
explain why Passenger does not have a right that she be denied admittance onto the plane 
in a satisfying way. To explain this, we need to turn to another feature of the Safety Con-
dition—that it is a necessary but insufficient condition on rights. This means that X might 
not have a right to Φ even if there is a close world in which Y’s Φ-ing leaves X much better 
off. In this subsection we turn to the other necessary conditions and considerations that 
explain why Passenger does not have a right that Attendant deny her admittance onto the 
plane.  
First, when introducing the Interest Theory (Canonical) in chapter 3, I said it is silent on 
the relation between the duty bearer’s not acting as the duty requires and the harm (or 
failure to benefit) to the right-holder. In formulating the Safety Condition, I did take a 
stand on this.  
For X to have a right against Y that Y Φ, Y’s not Φ-ing must cause X to be 
worse off in the world of evaluation… 
That Y needs to cause X to be worse off seems to get the cases right: Attendant causes 
Passenger to be worse off through being denied admittance onto the plane were the plane 
not to have crashed; Hitman1 causes Victim to be worse off were Hitman2 not present; 
and, Shooter causes Target to be worse off were the risk to materialise. But, were At-
tendant to allow Passenger onto the plane, we would not say that she causes Passenger to 
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be worse off.249 Given this, the Safety Condition is not satisfied, so Passenger will not have 
a right that Attendant deny her admittance onto the plane.   
Now, there may be problems with this causal restriction on the relationship between Y’s 
Φ-ing and how X fares as there might be cases in which Y’s not Φ-ing does not cause X to 
be worse off. Without a theory of causation on the table, we are not in a position to fully 
assess this issue. Due to space, let me introduce one last set of considerations that will also 
limit the Problem of Overgeneration. 
Recall also from chapter 3 that Interest Theorists might accept any combination of the 
following non-exhaustive list of moral asymmetries: 
Doctrine of Foreseeability. Other things being equal, it is harder to justify Y’s 
harming X when the harm is (or reasonably should have been) foreseen by 
Y than when the harm is not (or reasonably need not have been) foreseen 
by Y. 
Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). Other things being equal, it is harder to jus-
tify Y intending to harm X than it is to justify Y merely foreseeing that her 
action will harm X.  
Doctrine of Doing/Allowing (DDA). Other things being equal, it is harder to 
justify Y doing harm to X than it is to justify Y allowing harm to X.  
In making DDE internal to rights, for example, we would say that, other things being 
equal, if Y intends the harm that would befall X were she to violate the putative duty, it is 
more likely to warrant a right than if that harm were merely foreseen. This means that a 
harm to X caused by Y might be sufficient to warrant a right if that harm is intended by 
Y, though it might be insufficient if it was an unintended but foreseen consequence of her 
action. The same story could be told for Foreseeability and DDA.  
 
249 This is not because omissions are not causal. While there is some disagreement on this, it is generally 
taken as a desiderata of a theory of causation that it can make room for omissions (Lewis 1986a, 189–93; 
Paul and Hall 2013, 173–214). If our theory of causality does not permit causation through omission, one 
will need to rethink the causation strategy developed here as it would otherwise rule out positive rights.  
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While all three conditions are ceteris paribus and stated fairly generally, endorsing any com-
bination of them helps resist the Problem of Overgeneration. For example, suppose that 
Attendant were not to deny Passenger admittance onto the plane and the plane were to 
crash. Given the way that the case is stipulated, it is unlikely that Attendant foresees, in-
tends, or does (that is, her action counts as a doing in the senses relevant DDA) the harm 
that would befall Passenger when the plane crashes. This helps explain why Passenger 
fails to have a right that Attendant deny her admittance onto the plane. (That is, notwith-
standing my suggestion above that the Safety Condition is not satisfied in this variant in 
any case because Attendant would not cause Passenger to be worse off were she to allow 
her onto the plane).  
Across these two subsections, I have offered a range of reasons why rights will not over-
generate given the Safety Condition. We may move to the Relevance Variant. We can 
endorse the Realism Condition. I have noted that closeness is non-reciprocal and sug-
gested we may rethink our view of closeness altogether. And I have raised other consid-
erations that may fail to be satisfied on rights. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Across chapters 5 and 8, I have introduced the Safety Condition as a solution to the Prob-
lem of Harmless Wronging for the Interest Theory. A natural gloss on the Safety Condi-
tion is, for someone to hold a right against us that we not perform some action, we look 
to whether our performing that action could easily leave them sufficiently worse off to 
place us under a duty. I have argued that the Safety Condition fares extensionally very 
well. I further suggested that the reason why rights respond to modality in the way the 
Safety Condition prescribes is that this removes an objectionable form of luck from rights 
and makes duty-bearers sensitive to others’ wellbeing: we are formally required by rights 
on this picture not only not to harm people, but to ensure that we could not easily harm 
them. 
There are some points that deserve more thought moving forward. First, we need to de-
termine what to say about Jackson’s Case, while being mindful of accommodating Real Gun 
and Duped Soldiers. Perhaps what further analysis will show is that the relationship between 
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rights and all-things-considered requirements is more complicated than one might have 
thought. Second, I laid out a lot of the logical space when it comes to determining the 
stringency of rights on the Safety Condition; it would be helpful to examine further what 
to say here to decide between the options. Third, it would be interesting to determine 
whether there is a condition analogous to the Safety Condition for undirected duties; if 
not, this will neatly tie into rights’ relationality. Fourth, it would good to ask more about 
the relationship between modal facts and our knowledge of those facts—does what could 
easily have been the case matter when we know that this would not have been the case? 
But these are tasks for another day.  
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